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ABSTRACT 
   
 
This project examines the decision of American policymakers to deny the 
Amerasians of Vietnam—the offspring of American fathers and Vietnamese mothers 
born as a result of the Vietnam War—American citizenship in the 1982 Amerasian 
Immigration Act and the 1987 Amerasian Homecoming Act. It investigates why 
policymakers deemed a population unfit for the responsibilities of American society, 
despite the fact that they had American fathers.  
The examination draws upon numerous archival collections of the key 
policymakers, humanitarians and non-governmental organizations involved in each piece 
of legislation. Additionally, archival and published documents from the U.S. government 
and military, popular media, and veteran’s organizations, are important.  Since many of 
those involved in the legislation are still living, oral history interviews are also a critical 
piece of the methodology. 
The dissertation argues that the exclusion of citizenship was a component of 
bigger issues: international relationships in a Cold War era, America’s defeat in the 
Vietnam War, and a history in the United States of racialized exclusionary immigration 
and citizenship policies against people of Asian descent.  It exposes the contradictory 
approach of policymakers unable to reconcile the Amerasian mixture of race and nation 
with US law. Consequently, policymakers simultaneously employed an inclusionary 
discourse that deemed the Amerasians worthy of American attention, guidance and 
humanitarian aid, and implemented exclusionary policies that designated them unfit for 
the responsibilities of American citizenship.  
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PREFACE  
 “They’re called ‘bui doi,’ the dust of life. 
Conceived in hell, and born in strife…the living reminders of all the good we failed to do… 
We know deep in our hearts, they’re all our children too.” – Madame Butterfly 
 
During the winter of 2014-15, ISIS (The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) 
continued to wreak havoc on the people of Syria. US agencies and numerous 
humanitarian organizations braced for the impending flood of refugees into neighboring 
countries from the war-torn region. Simultaneously, debate raged in America over the 
growing numbers of illegal immigrants and refugees from Latin America. At that time, 
Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, Anne C. 
Richard, took a moment to address the issue of stateless children at the United Nations 
High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) event, “Out of the Shadows.” She sought to 
promote US support for the UNHCR’s mandate to prevent and reduce statelessness and 
protect those persons.  
 In her speech, Richard condemned the twenty-seven countries in the world that 
continue to confer nationality upon people born within their borders only through 
legitimation of the father. She framed it as a gender issue that empowered men to control 
the reproduction of citizens, thus often creating stateless children.
1
  
 War heightened the issue in Syria, Richard insisted, where it continued to destroy 
families and forced all children to face “unspeakable violence and instability.”2 In 
explaining the long-term consequences, Richard pointed to the Bidoon—a stateless and 
therefore marginalized population of over 100,000 in Kuwait. It is a population that is 
                                                 
1 Anne C. Richard, Remarks at the UNHCR Event: Out of the Shadows: Ending Statelessness in the Americas, The Newseum, 
Washington, D.C., November 18, 2014. 
2 Ibid. 
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problematic, Richard explained, because its statelessness makes it a “vulnerable group 
that faces huge barriers to becoming self-sufficient.”3 
 Richard underscored American values of democracy, equality, and 
humanitarianism in describing US support for the UNHCR program. Statelessness 
contradicted these fundamental American beliefs, specifically in the case of children 
punished by gendered citizenship laws. Americans, Richard explained, cannot accept 
“seeing individuals stripped of rights and protections, branded as outcasts, and not 
recognized as equal in dignity.”4  
Although a noble and inarguably humanitarian statement, Richard failed to 
acknowledge America’s own experience with “stateless” children of war and the nation’s 
own history of gendered citizenship laws. After the last American helicopter lifted off the 
top of the US Embassy building in Saigon on April 30, 1975, to escape the communists 
entering the city, America left behind its own marginalized population of “stateless” 
children.
5
  Vietnam’s “dirty little secret” labeled con lai, half breed, my lai, American 
child, or bui doi, “the dust of life,” were the progeny of American servicemen and 
Vietnamese women conceived during the Vietnam War.
6
 Evidence of the mothers’ 
betrayal of her country, the Amerasian children would continue to serve as a constant 
reminder to the Vietnamese of the American “enemy,” while most Americans ignored 
them, including their fathers. 
                                                 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. Throughout her remarks Richard used the term “nationality” and “citizenship” interchangeably although in many countries they 
are not equal. 
5 Although the Amerasians were not officially stateless, having automatically acquired Vietnamese citizenship, the author implies a 
similarity between statelessness and the second or third tier citizenship the Amerasians experienced as a result of their paternity.  
6 There is much disagreement about the label that best refers to Amerasians. While bui doi is a general term that refers to street 
children in Vietnam, a category that did include many Amerasians after the war, my lai and con lai refer specifically to the Amerasians 
themselves. 
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Even though the Amerasians inherited Vietnamese citizenship from their mothers, 
Vietnam like Japan and South Korea, was a patrilineal society dependent upon paternal 
legitimacy.
7
  While the faces and other features of the Amerasians displayed the presence 
of their American fathers—making denial of paternity difficult—their fatherlessness 
dictated their marginalized status within Vietnamese society and the shaming many 
encountered from their families and peers.
 8
  
In the immediate aftermath of the war, fears of a government-executed Amerasian 
bloodbath and mass sterilizations caused many mothers and family members to rid 
themselves of “evidence” that they had collaborated with the American enemy.9 Mothers 
destroyed birth certificates, pictures, and paperwork proving that their Amerasian child or 
its American father had ever existed. Many abandoned their Amerasian children to 
orphanages or to the streets.
10
 Some mothers who chose to raise their Amerasian children 
reconciled their situation through the physical and emotional abuse of their own 
children.
11
 
While the Vietnamese victors never sponsored mass government violence against 
Amerasians, the destruction of the evidence of their existence effectively erased any 
                                                 
7 Bongsoo Park, “Intimate Encounters: Racial Frontiers: Stateless GI Babies in South Korea and the United States, 1953-1965,” (PhD 
diss., University of Minnesota, 2010), 4, accessed July 1, 2014, ProQuest Dissertations & Theses. 
8 According to Charli R. Carpenter, children of war are most at risk when their origins are visibly marked on their features. Charli R. 
Carpenter, “Gender, Ethnicity, and Children’s Human Rights: Theorizing Babies Born of Wartime Rape and Sexual Exploitation,” in  
Born of War: Protecting Children of Sexual Violence Survivors in Conflict Zones, ed. Charli Carpenter (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian 
Press, Inc., 2007), 5. 
9 The Pearl S Buck Foundation reported that Amerasians in Korea and Vietnam had faced both murder and sterilization because of 
their American paternity. According to John Shade, sterilization and emasculation specifically served to ensure that they did not 
“intrude further” into Asian society. Although the communist victory did result in the destruction of orphanages and the abandonment 
of nuns and an estimated 300,000 children to the streets, there is no corroborating evidence for Shade’s claims of murder and 
sterilization. John A. Shade Jr.,“The Forgotten Child—The Amerasian in Indochina,” Conference for the National Organizations 
Advisory Council, Los Angeles, CA. May 8, 1980, Amerasians 1978-1984 folder, Box Vietnam; “PSBF Assistance to Vietnam,” 
General Info PSBF Vietnam #1 folder, Box Vietnam Operation Babylift, Archives of the Pearl S. Buck House, Pearl S. Buck 
International. 
10 Ibid., and Joyce Anis “Psychosocial Adjustment of Vietnamese Amerasians” (master’s thesis, University of Minnesota. 1996), 
accessed May 15, 2011, ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 48. 
11 Ibid. 
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documented proof of American paternity and claim to legitimacy.
12
  Illegitimate and 
ostracized because of their American paternity, the Amerasians of Vietnam, like the 
Bidoon of Kuwait, were outcasts within society. As a result, they experienced abuse and 
exploitation, were victims of economic and social discrimination and government 
persecution, and were effectively stateless. They became the lowest element of life in 
Vietnam, and no more valuable than dust. 
Many Amerasians looked to the land of their fathers for the acceptance and 
belonging missing from their lives in Vietnam. Unable to acquire recognition from their 
individual fathers, most Amerasians hoped for legal recognition—a gesture of national 
paternal responsibility—through citizenship, something not so easy to attain. One of the 
biggest misconceptions in America is the belief that all children born to an American 
citizen whether at home or abroad are automatically American citizens. American 
citizenship law in fact, is far more convoluted and inherently gendered.  
Children born abroad to American citizen mothers and foreign fathers are 
automatically US citizens. However children born to American fathers and foreign 
mothers are only US citizens if a father recognizes them. Thus, in 2008 when the birther 
movement attacked the US citizenship of Presidential candidate Barack Obama because 
of his alleged birth in Kenya and his Kenyan born father, missing was a simple 
understanding of US citizenship law. Obama’s Kansas born mother was an American 
citizen and thus, according to US law, Obama was legally a US citizen.  
                                                 
12 According to the Pearl S. Buck Foundation the city of Ban Me Thout reported that after the Viet Cong entered the city, they killed 
younger Amerasians and placed the older ones into slave labor. There is no evidence in the American record to corroborate this report 
however it did contribute to the fears of those associated with the Amerasians that the North Vietnamese would target them for 
retribution.  “Agencies licensed by the Republic of Vietnam to facilitate inter-country adoptions (prior to and during Babylift),” 
General Info PSBF Vietnam #1 folder, Box Vietnam Operation Babylift, Archives of the Pearl S. Buck House, Pearl S. Buck 
International. 
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Had Obama’s mother been Kenyan however and his father American, as in the 
case of the Amerasians, the birthers would have had a case. In that scenario, Obama 
would have automatically assumed the nationality of his mother and any claim to US 
citizenship would have been fully reliant upon the choice of his father to legitimate him. 
Thus, in the case of the Amerasians, because US citizenship law for persons born abroad 
is a system of “natural mothers and legal fathers,” Amerasians whose fathers did not 
claim them, could not secure US citizenship.
13
 
Between 1970 and 1979, there were numerous legislative proposals to grant US 
citizenship to the Amerasians. Humanitarian organizations saw citizenship as a way to 
create more flexible international adoption laws in efforts to bring large numbers of 
Amerasians to the United States. However, adoption affected only a small number of the 
tens of thousands of Amerasians in Vietnam and often failed to benefit the black 
Amerasians—the progeny of African American fathers—who social service workers 
found difficult to place within white middle-class American families.
14
 In each case, 
Congress failed to advance a single proposal. As the situation of the Amerasians became 
increasingly dire by the end of President Jimmy Carter’s administration, evident in the 
growing numbers of Amerasian street children, Congress faced increasing pressure to do 
something. 
During the Presidential administration of Ronald Reagan, Congress enacted two 
bills to deal with the Amerasians in Vietnam, the 1982 Amerasian Immigration Act 
                                                 
13 For further analysis see Kristin A. Collins, “Illegitimate Borders: Jus Sanguinis Citizenship and the Legal Construction of Family, 
Race, and Nation,” The Yale Law Journal 123 no. 2134 (2014). 
14 The additional discrimination faced by black Amerasians is discussed in more detail throughout the dissertation. For further 
information see, Robert McKelvey, The Dust of Life: America’s Children Abandoned in Vietnam, (Seattle: University of Washington, 
1999). 
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(AIA) and the 1987 Amerasian Homecoming Act (AHA). Policymakers employed a 
discourse of inclusion when discussing both bills, offering the Amerasians cultural and 
social acceptance by describing them as children of American citizens. Such a discourse 
reinforced the expectations of the Amerasians that they would find acceptance and 
belonging in the United States. 
However, both acts failed to provide birth-right citizenship, forcing those 
Amerasians who lacked paternal legitimacy to acquire citizenship through the same 
naturalization process as foreign immigrants. The exclusion of citizenship effectively 
categorized the Amerasians as foreigners whose legal status in the United States 
coincided not with their American paternity, but with their ability to transform from 
Vietnamese immigrants into American citizens.
15
 Thus, in practice, acceptance and 
belonging did not come naturally in America; the Amerasians had to earn it. 
The majority of the approximately 30-50,000 Amerasians in Vietnam after the 
war, were illegitimate.
16
 Most did not know their American fathers or lacked the 
necessary documentation to claim American citizenship. The failure of policymakers to 
turn their inclusionary rhetoric into acts of inclusion via citizenship negatively affected 
the Amerasians who often arrived in the United States without friends, family, or fathers.  
Rejected in Vietnam because they were biologically and physically “American” but 
                                                 
15 Diana H. Yoon, “Reproducing Citizens Through U.S.  Militarism: Amerasians and Descent Based Membership” (PhD diss.,New 
York University. 2010), 153. 
16 There is no accurate accounting of the number of Amerasians in Vietnam. US government officials and humanitarian organizations 
varied greatly in their reports depending on the location and resources utilized. The most accurate accounts have resulted from a 
combination of orphanages in South Vietnam, venereal disease clinics that treated the mothers of Amerasians, and chaplains. By the 
passage of the AHA in 1987, the range of 30,000-50,000 became the most consistent accounting.  For more information on accounting 
methods see, John A. Shade, Jr., “A Progress Report on Caring for the Amerasian: A Difficult Task.” The Pearl S. Buck Foundation, 
1978, Amerasians 1978-1984 folder, Box Vietnam, Archives of the Pearl S.  Buck House, Pearl S. Buck International. 
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marginalized within America because they were culturally and legally Vietnamese, many 
Amerasians faced an unresolved sense of self and significant obstacles to assimilation.
17
 
Questions of Citizenship 
On the surface, the answer to the question of why policymakers excluded 
citizenship from the AIA and the AHA appears obvious. Per U.S. law, the Amerasians— 
illegitimate children of American fathers born abroad—were not citizens. However, 
exclusion was more deeply rooted. Despite the law, in the debates and discussions 
surrounding both the AIA and the AHA, policymakers often utilized an inclusionary 
discourse that posited the Amerasians as the children of American fathers and considered 
citizenship a “benefit of their [American] birthright.”18 Furthermore, Congress did amend 
US law on behalf of the Amerasians. Both acts changed US immigration law which 
followed the tenets of US citizenship law regarding children born abroad to American 
fathers, in order to provide the Amerasians preferential immigration status as “children of 
United States Citizens.”19 The result was an approach that both engaged the Amerasians 
as potentially American children but excluded them legally from claiming full rights as 
citizens. 
 Thus the question of citizenship in this case is not just about the law because the 
answer to that is clear. Rather, the question is in the discourse of identification and 
                                                 
17 Fred Bemak and Rita Chi-Ying Chung, “Vietnamese Amerasians: Psychosocial Adjustment and Psychotherapy,” Journal of 
Multicultural Counseling & Development 25 (Jan 1997): 79-88. Bemak and Chi-Ying Chung use the term “internalized oppression” to 
describe the unresolved sense of self within Amerasians.  They suggest that because the Vietnamese culture has negative associations 
with fatherlessness, physical differences, U.S. culture, and soldiers who were the biological fathers of the Amerasians, internalized 
oppression may be more prevalent. The devaluation of differences may complicate and confirm the experience of not belonging. They 
reference studies by Kich (1992) who stated that the devaluation of self, results from a self-regulation fostered by the internalization of 
experiences of discrepancy, ambiguity and rejection--what has come to be called "internalization of racism" (Pinderhughes, 1989) and 
"internalized oppression" (Root, 1992).  
18 Statement of Senator Jeremiah Denton, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy, S, 1698, Amerasian 
Immigration Act of 1982, 97th Cong., 2nd sess., June 21, 1982, 13. 
19 Amerasian Immigration Act of 1982, Public Law 359, 97th Cong., 2nd sess. (Oct. 22, 1982). 
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immigration and the conflict and the confusion of policymakers struggling to reconcile 
the Amerasian mixture with their own notions of race and nation in the shadow of a 
military defeat. Such confusion framed the contradictory approach of policymakers who 
consistently saw American children, but legislated for Asian immigrants and refugees. 
The questions therefore become why did policymakers employ an inclusionary discourse 
about persons who, by law, were not US citizens? Why did Congress change US law to 
allow the Amerasians to immigrate to the United States as the children of American 
fathers, but never changed laws to allow them to legally claim American citizenship?  
The answers are inherently complicated. I argue that the uneven application of US 
immigration and citizenship law and the contradictory use of inclusionary discourse and 
exclusionary citizenship policies reveal deeper issues of race, nation, and the war in 
America. The exclusion of citizenship was deliberate, although the discrimination facing 
the Amerasian in Vietnam was real, as was the concern for them by congressional 
lawmakers who authored the legislation. However, the fate of the Amerasians fell victim 
to larger geopolitical issues:  international relationships in a Cold War era, America’s 
defeat in the Vietnam War, and a racialized history of exclusionary immigration and 
citizenship policies directed against people of Asian descent.  
 In the decade following the Vietnam War, President Ronald Reagan saw his 
foreign policy as rectifying America’s image as a military and humanitarian superpower 
and as securing the superiority of American democracy in the Cold War battle against 
Soviet communism. The Reagan doctrine shaped his neoconservative Cold War foreign 
policy formula—anti-Soviet and anti-communist. Framed within the Cold War conflict, 
  xiii 
the Amerasians became convenient and effective tools of Cold War propaganda that 
posed the “evils” of communism—evident in their stateless existence in Vietnam— 
against the “goodness” of American democracy and humanitarianism as depicted in the 
legislation.  
American sympathy for the Amerasian issue centered on their racial mixtures. 
Children of war were not a new phenomenon for the United States and by 1980 refugee 
migrations had become much more commonplace. But the Amerasians were unique. Like 
their predecessors from Korea and Japan, their physical difference stood out in the largely 
homogenous Vietnamese society. Americans who saw the photographs of the Amerasians 
of Vietnam scattered across newspapers during the decade experienced the conflict, the 
bewilderment, the confusion of the mixtures, and they saw the faces of the soldiers who 
fathered them.  
The Vietnam War evoked tremendous guilt and shame for many Americans as it 
cost America 58,000 lives and a deep-rooted pain for those whose loved ones never came 
home. For these Americans, the Amerasians represented the faces that American mothers 
and wives, sisters and brothers who lost someone in the war, recognized. These were the 
faces that challenged the pragmatism of policymakers who saw American children but 
legislated for Vietnamese immigrants and refugees. These were the faces that made the 
Amerasians valuable propaganda for Reagan’s Cold War battles, because while the 
Amerasians’ stories were sad, they were, more importantly, effective in garnering the 
sympathy of the American public and reinforcing the Reagan administration’s anti-
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communist agenda. In some ways the marginalization and the discrimination they faced 
in Vietnam served American national interests. 
Yet, the guilt from the Vietnam War and the physical characteristics that marked 
the Amerasians as children of American fathers, did not warrant citizenship. Regardless 
of the abuse they faced or their hair color, eye shape, or freckles, policymakers could not 
reconcile their American looks with citizenship. Ultimately, they perceived the 
Amerasians to be Asian rather than American. Following the tradition of America’s 
history of exclusionary policies against people of Asian descent, they effectively 
excluded them from American citizenship.
20
  
Historiographical Debate 
Considerable literature exists on the Amerasians across several disciplines.  The 
vast majority of this literature focuses on the individual stories of the Amerasians, 
providing a bottom-up, victim-centered approach to the narrative. Collections of oral 
histories reveal both stories of success and failure from Amerasians who came to 
America through adoption, evacuation, or immigration, as well as those left behind in 
Vietnam.
21
 Examinations of the refugee experience have given voice to those children 
lost in the refugee camps after the war and have exposed the failures in the refugee 
departure system.
22
 Studies on the Amerasians specifically tend to focus on the 
                                                 
20 Between 1875 and 1965 US policies including the 1875 Page Act, 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, 1907 Gentleman’s Agreement, 
1924 Walter-Reed Act, 1952 McCarran-Walter Act effectively excluded different groups of Asians from immigration to the United 
States and American citizenship. For further discussion see Chapter One. 
21 Thomas A. Bass, Vietnamerica: The War Comes Home (New York: Soho Press, 1996); Trin Yarborough, Surviving Twice: 
Amerasian Children of the Vietnam War (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc., 2005) and Steven DeBonis, Children of the Enemy: 
Oral Histories of Vietnamese Amerasians and Their Mothers (Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland and Company, Inc.,1995) can be 
considered pioneers in the area of Amerasian studies. Each author uses oral history to depict the injustices faced by the Amerasian 
children as a result of their mixed-blood.  
22 James M. Freeman and Nguyen Dinh Huu, Voices from the Camps: Vietnamese Children Seeking Asylum, (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 2003). 
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Amerasian Homecoming Act, addressing the effects of American humanitarian efforts 
and policy on the Amerasians themselves and the failures of American resettlement 
services.   
 Political scientists have also highlighted the injustice of American immigration 
policy as applied to the Amerasians, acknowledging the connection between 
humanitarian efforts and policy, while condemning America’s treatment of the 
Amerasians.
23
 Although much of this scholarship denounces the policies themselves, 
there is little analysis of the actual policy-making process or consideration of the factors 
that influenced that process.  In its discussion of American responsibility for the 
Amerasians, this literature has benefitted from the work of gender and feminist scholars 
on militarism not often associated with political science.  
The groundbreaking work of scholar Cynthia Enloe critically analyzes US 
military policies that endorse and therefore encourage the immoral (prostitution) and 
irresponsible actions (US policy) of American soldiers abroad.
24
 Newer works have 
expanded the gendered framework of militarized intimacies, viewing relationships 
between military men and foreign women abroad and the military policies that police 
these relationships as an extension of imperialism and colonialism.
25
 While such 
scholarship provides a theoretical analysis of how American imperialist and/or racial 
                                                 
23 Sue-Je Lee Gage, “The Amerasian Problem : Blood, Duty, and Race,” International Relations 21 (2007), and Marykim DeMonaco, 
“Disorderly Departure: An Analysis of the United States Policy Toward Amerasian Immigration,” Brooklyn Journal of International 
Law 15 (1989). Gage focuses on the challenges that Amerasians posed to politics of identity and citizenship focusing on the concept of 
“humanness,” who humanitarian groups deemed worthy of citizenship and protection. DeMonaco concentrates on the politics of the 
ODP in the AHA revealing the politicization of the Amerasians by Vietnam and America. 
24 Cynthia Enloe, Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics (Berkeley and Los Angeles: The 
University of California Press, 1990). and Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women’s Lives (Berkley, University 
of California Press, 2000); Katherine H.S. Moon, Sex Among Allies: Military Prostitution in US-Korea Relations (New York: 
Columbia, 1997). 
25 Setsu Shigematsu and Keith L. Camacho, eds., Militarized Currents: Toward a Decolonized Future in Asia and the Pacific 
(Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 2010). 
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ideology contributed to military policies regarding women and children in camptowns, 
missing is an analysis that extends to US immigration policy regarding children born 
from these relationships or specific to the Amerasians.
26
    
 Psychologists have contributed greatly to the literature on the Amerasians; 
however they have limited their studies to the psychological damage and issues of racial 
identity that resulted from resettlement. Consequently this scholarship deals strictly with 
race, identity, assimilation, and acceptance and often highlights the psychological harm 
resulting from the AIA and AHA. As bottom-up analyses, such studies tend to focus not 
on the intention of the legislation but rather its consequences and often specifically on the 
failures of the Philippine Refugee Processing Center and American Resettlement 
Services.
27
 Although valid and valuable, these scholars fail to analyze the fundamental 
forces that created the issues their work studies.  
 Also well documented are the humanitarian efforts towards the Amerasians 
during and after the Vietnam War. Much of the literature focuses on stories of 
abandonment and adoption, and specifically the debates surrounding the 1975 Operation 
                                                 
26 American scholar Cythia Enloe, (Maneuvers) has led the charge of both gender studies and the militarization of foreign women 
specifically through military endorsed prostitution. While Enloe has built upon the works of other scholars like Pearl S. Buck, and 
David Tarr, “The Military Abroad,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 31 (1966) the works of 
whom recognized fraternization and prostitution by U.S. military abroad, Enloe has inspired more recent works by Ann Scales “Soft 
on Defense: The Failure to Confront Militarism.” Berkeley Journal of Gender, Law & Justice, (2005): 369-393, and Katherine H.S. 
Moon “Resurrecting Prostitutes and Overturning Treaties: Gender Politics in the ‘Anti-American’ Movement in South Korea.” The 
Journal of Asian Studies 66, no. 1 (February 2007): 129-157. By concentrating on gender, such works have failed to address the 
connection between militarization, race, and nation with gender as tools of power and hierarchy.   
27 McKelvey (The Dust of Life), had led the field in psychological analysis of race and identity and the Amerasians from Vietnam. 
McKelvey studies the effects that the AHA and the immigration process had on Amerasians whose mixtures of race and nation 
resulted in their failure to attain an identity of acceptance either through lineage or belonging to a nation or place. McKelvey has 
contributed numerous psychological studies to scholarship on race and identity specifically in regards to Black-Amerasians, rejected 
in Vietnam for their racial inferiority and rejected by African Americans in America for their cultural differences. McKelvey’s more 
recent works have centered on the emotional dysfunctions and psychological disorders of Amerasians who have resettled in America 
as a result of the AHA.  While the Philippines Refugee Processing Center and America Resettlement Services existed before the AHA 
in addressing the needs of refugees, the AHA mandated both for Amerasians who left Vietnam through the program. 
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Babylift.
28
 Although adoption and evacuation efforts included Vietnamese and 
Amerasian children, this scholarship remains tightly tied to the narrative of American 
humanitarianism and the moral responsibility to “save” the Amerasian orphans. 
 Abandonment scholarship is also prevalent within the literature of the 
Amerasians. Numerous memoirs, reports and letters of humanitarian workers and military 
chaplains describe the vast numbers of abandoned Amerasians in Vietnam.
 29
 During the 
war Catholic nuns and aid workers were the first Western “saviors” of the Amerasians 
who often disproportionally filled Catholic orphanages. Dramatic efforts to save the 
Amerasian orphans consumed many aid workers and adoption organizations and helped 
cast all Amerasians in Vietnam as “orphans.”30 Some coerced Vietnamese mothers to 
give up their Amerasian children to the orphanages convincing them that their children 
would have better lives through adoption to the United States.
31
 Recent scholarship has 
finally begun to address such injustice and the destruction of families.
32
 There is little 
consideration however, of the particular condition of the Amerasians for whom 
abandonment and adoption reflected issues of rejection and paternal responsibility. 
                                                 
28 Dana Sachs, The Life We Were Given: Operation Babylift, International Adoption, and the Children of War in Vietnam (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 2010). 
29 Rosemary Taylor in collaboration with Wende Grant,, Orphans of War: Work with the Abandoned Children of Vietnam 1967-1975, 
(London and Sydney: Collins, 1988); John O’Conner, A Chaplain Looks at Vietnam (Cleveland: The World Publishing Company, 
1968). 
30 Numerous adoption agencies emerged to assist with international and transracial adoptions of Amerasian children during the period 
including the Pearl S. Buck Foundation and Holt International.  
31 There are many reports of humanitarian workers who convinced mothers of Vietnamese children and specifically Amerasians to 
give up their children for a “better” life in America. Such efforts coincided with the US withdrawal and the fall of South Vietnam to 
the Communist forces and to the 1974 allocation by USAID of $7.2 million to facilitate the adoption of war orphans by US citizens. In 
1975 such efforts faced the federal court system in the court case of Tuyen v. Schlesinger a lawsuit brought against the US government 
by Vietnamese mothers claiming the United States evacuated and adopted their children without their permission. For specific 
discussions and examples see, Taylor and Grant, Orphans of War; Debonis, Children of the Enemy; and Yarborough, Surviving Twice. 
For further information on the lawsuit see “Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order” In the United States District Court 
for the Northern District of California. Nguyen Da Yen, Nguyen Da Vuong and Nguyen Da Tuyen v. James Schlesinger, Secretary of 
Defense, et al. June 30 1975, Legal Information 1975 folder, Box Vietnam Operation Babylift, Archives of the Pearl S. Buck House, 
Pearl S. Buck International.  
32 Catherin Choy, Global Families: A History of Asian International Adoption in America (New York: New York University Press, 
2013); Laura Briggs, Somebody’s Children: The Politics of Transracial and Transnational Adoption (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2012); Jane Jeong Trenka et al (eds)., Outsiders Within: Writing on Transracial Adoption (Cambridge: South End Press, 2006). 
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Race fundamentally shaped most of the adoption literature on Amerasian 
adoptees, noting it often posed as a barrier to overcome or an identity to erase to achieve 
successful assimilation into America. Presumably, national identity was not a legal 
concern for the adopted Amerasian; rather this scholarship contends that racial 
assimilation into America was the key to national belonging.
33
 Documentaries like the 
Daughter of Danang and Andrea Warren’s popular and compelling narrative Escape 
from Saigon highlight issues of race and identity as experienced by Amerasians adopted 
by white families in both urban and rural communities.
34
  
Here exists a critical gap in the Amerasian historiography.  The conflation of 
racial assimilation and national belonging assumes that Amerasians who could racially 
and culturally assimilate into white America or black America became American. Absent 
is any consideration of citizenship as evidence of American identity. Even Heidi, the 
Amerasian profiled in  Daughter of Danang  who became a U.S. citizen through the 
adoption process, admitted that her white adoptive mother “permed her hair curly” and 
directed Heidi to tell people she was born in South Carolina—“doing everything she 
could to make me as American as possible.”35   
For black Amerasians, racial assimilation as proof of belonging proved even more 
challenging. The documentary Amerasians reveals the futile attempts of young black 
Amerasian men who immigrated under the AHA to find acceptance in America by 
                                                 
33 The film Amerasian is the exception as it deals specifically with the issues of racial and cultural assimilation facing those 
Amerasians who entered the United States as young adults. Amerasian, directed by Gandini Multifilm (The Cinema Guild, Inc, 1998), 
Videocassette. 
34 Overall, little scholarship exists on Amerasians adopted by non-white American families and this remains an area for future 
research. Daughter From Danang directed by Vincent Franco and Gail Dolgin (Interfaze Educational Productions, Inc., 2003), DVD; 
Andrea Warren, Escape from Saigon: How a Vietnam War Orphan Became an American Boy (New York: Square Fish, 2008). 
35 Daughter From Danang, DVD. 
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racially assimilating as African Americans, many joining black street gangs to relate.
36
 
While the focus in the film is on race, there is no discussion of how acquiring citizenship 
could legalize their belonging in America.
37
 
Finally, there are the memoirs of the Amerasians themselves and the increasing 
number of fictional tales and novels that take a victim-centered approach. These too, are 
powerful stories of persecution and isolation.
38
 Specifically in the novels, the Amerasian 
is often a tragic figure, the product of the streets who struggles with abuse, discrimination 
and identity or, in the case of Donald Zlotnik’s recent work, The Amerasian, who 
imposes violence against the United States in retribution for his abandonment by his 
American father.
39
 In each case the victimization of the Amerasian occurs at the hands of 
the Vietnamese government and people. Even Zlotnik’s character commits his atrocities 
after being brainwashed by a manipulative Vietnamese military officer. This literature 
reinforces the Cold War narrative of the period which posed the “good” America against 
                                                 
36 Amerasian, Videocassette. 
37 Although very little scholarship exists to address these issues of race, citizenship and identity for the Amerasians, there is a large 
historiography regarding the same concerns for the thousands of Germany’s brown babies—the progeny of African American soldiers 
and German women—after World War II. Historians continue to examine the relationship between race, citizenship and identity 
regarding the brown babies and specifically work to deconstruct assumptions of transnational kinship with African Americans. While 
analyzing how Germany and the United States constructed the racial and national identities of the brown babies largely through the 
promotion of racial kinship with African Americans, this literature also points to the importance of German citizenship which secured 
the brown babies a national identity and confirmed Germany’s commitment of national responsibility. A similar analysis is absent 
regarding the black Amerasians. Heide Fehrenbach, Race After Hitler: Black Occupation Children in Postwar Germany and America 
(Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2005); Tina Campt, Other Germans: Black Germans and the Politics of Race, 
Gender, and Memory in the Third Reich (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004); Maria L. Diedrich, Maria I. and Jurgen 
Heinrichs eds., From Black to Schwarz: Cultural Crossovers Between African America and Germany (East Lansing: Michigan State 
University Press, 2011). While each author agrees that the expectation for racial kinship between African Americans and the brown 
babies existed, promoted initially by both the U.S. and German governments, military authorities and the general public, there is much 
argument against this kinship in the literature. While the African American community stressed the racial kinship with the brown 
babies viewing Germany’s social integration of the brown babies into German society beneficial to the African American push for 
civil rights during the 1950s and 1960s, Campt, Diedrich and Fehrenbach all assert that such kinship did not exist. Rather, they stress 
the different historical, cultural, and linguistic roots to situate the brown babies outside of what is commonly referred to as the racial 
and diasporic kinship of the “Black Atlantic.” For a more detailed and comparative analysis of transnational racial kinship regarding 
the brown babies and the black Amerasians see: Sabrina Thomas, “The Soul of Blood and Water” submitted for review Summer 2015. 
38 Kien, Nguyen, The Unwanted: A Memoir (Boston and London; Little, Brown and Company, 2001). 
39 Donald E. Zlotnik, The AmerAsians (Seraphim & Angel LLC, 2013). Additional novels and works of fiction include: Carol Zanetti, 
Legacy of Guilt (Lulu.com, 2007); Heinz Insu Fenkl, Memories of My Ghost Brother: A Novel (Dutton Adult, 1996) and David L. 
Meth, A Hint of Light (Writer’s Production, 2010). 
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the “bad” Vietnam. In each story, the Amerasian looks to America as the symbol of hope, 
vindication, and identity.  
Hence, for all its strengths, existing scholarship on the Amerasians in Vietnam has 
a limited bottom-up victim centered approach with analyses of the systematic and human 
consequences of the Amerasian legislation, the humanitarianism of rescue and adoption, 
and the sympathetic stories of discrimination and abuse by an unjust communist 
government. Not a single work considers the point at which all of these factors 
intersect—the policymaking process. This process combines the decisions of leaders with 
the lives of the Amerasians, the opinions of the American public with the stories of 
American media, the foreign policies of two Cold War foes with the geopolitical 
environment of the Cold War, and the deliberate framing of the Amerasians as 
sympathetic victims but unworthy citizens with the colonial undertones of Asian 
exclusion in America. These points of intersection reveal the intent behind the policy that 
shaped the lives and the plight of the Amerasians. It is this gap that I seek to fill.  
Organization of the Dissertation 
To get to the heart of the policymaking process, my research focuses on the US 
leaders who created, contributed to and opposed Amerasian legislation, the debates and 
discussions surrounding the bills, and the policies themselves. The dissertation flows 
chronologically in an effort to trace the evolution of the Amerasian legislation from the 
Orderly Departure Program (ODP) to the AHA.  
Chapter One begins the project by examining US citizenship and immigration 
laws for children born abroad. Specifically, it explores the sex-based distinction 
  xxi 
embedded in the interpretation and the application of the jus-sanguinis law and the 
problematic implications that the distinction has for children born abroad specifically to 
American servicemen. This chapter considers the history of laws and practices regarding 
mixed-race populations in America that racialized white-non-white mixtures into the 
racial category of their non-white parent. American imperialists at the end of the 
nineteenth-century extended the non-white classification to the darker skinned 
populations from Pacific and Caribbean nations. Such colonial perceptions stretched into 
the twentieth-century to shape the way American policymakers approached and perceived 
the people of Vietnam. It is the intersection of these factors and US foreign policy in 
which the plight of the Amerasian exists.  
Chapter Two examines the 1979 ODP and the social, economic, political and 
international context in which it emerged in the post-Vietnam War era.  It begins with an 
analysis of the French colonial experience in Indochina and how France chose to address 
its own mixed-race population of French-Vietnamese metis. This chapter also introduces 
the plight of the Amerasian children as recognized by policymakers under the presidential 
administrations of Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter and the political 
pressures extended by international adoption agencies, journalists, humanitarians, non-
governmental organizations and activists to address the Amerasian issue. The 
classification of the Amerasians as refugees framed the perception that like all of the 
Vietnamese “boat people,” the Amerasians were distant, different, and distinct and 
contributed to the inability of policymakers to fully embrace them as American children 
or to recognize them as American citizens. 
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Chapter Three focuses on the debates and discussions surrounding the passage of 
the AIA and examines the intentions of the various political and non-political actors 
involved in the efforts. Specifically it highlights the collaboration of US political leaders, 
humanitarians and religious leaders in pushing Congress to pass the AIA and in framing 
the Amerasians as “American” children through an inclusionary discourse. It is the 
intentions of those advocating for the AIA and the eventual realities of the bill that are 
vital to understanding the critical contradictions between inclusionary rhetoric and 
exclusionary policy. 
Chapter Four fills the gap between the passage of the AIA in 1982 and the AHA 
in 1987. It highlights the domestic, political and international contexts which reveal the 
limitations of the AIA, the manipulation of the Amerasian issue for Cold War 
propaganda, and the extent to which domestic debates over illegal immigration 
intertwined with policy decisions regarding legal immigrants and refugees. 
Chapter Five tells the story of Le Van Minh, the Amerasian teenager whose 
photograph inspired the AHA. It considers the unlikely events at Huntington High School 
which led to the creation of the AHA, the decision of policymakers to exclude citizenship 
and a policy that designated the Amerasians as the children of American fathers but failed 
to grant them American citizenship. The story exposes the intentions behind the decision 
to bring Minh to America and to pass the AHA into law as well as his life and its 
outcome. 
Chapter Six examines the implementation of the AHA and its real effects on the 
Amerasians of Vietnam. The process of determining which Amerasians qualified for the 
AHA based on their physical appearance, forced American authorities in Vietnam to 
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racially categorize the Amerasians into their own subjective concept of an American 
appearance. Still, while selected Amerasians entered the United States having met the 
standards of American physical identity, the exclusion of citizenship remained a barrier 
to legal acceptance.   
The heart of my research is the policy and the intention of policymakers in these 
two pieces of legislation. This research significantly broadens the notion and changes the 
idea of US foreign policy of issues of race, class and gender. While criticism of 
diplomatic history or policy studies often center on the top-down approach to history, my 
work shows that while policy is top-down, its effects come from the bottom up – the 
points at which policy intersects with lives. The intentions behind the creation or 
changing of policies are important and reflect the social, economic, political and global 
environment of the period. Policies have direct implications, benefits and consequences 
and this project makes that relationship clear. In the case of the Amerasians, it helps to 
determine “the value of dust.” 
 
  1 
CHAPTER 1 
MIXING A NATION  
“‘All waters and women look the same under the light of the moon,’ but all nations do not appear the same 
in the light of civilization. The West speaks of the ‘heathen’ East, and the East with equal contempt calls 
the Westerner a barbarian. Each complains that the other is uncivilized.”40 
 
 
The presence of mixed-race persons in the United States has always been 
problematic, especially products of one white and one non-white parent.
41
 The progeny of 
these interactions have always existed as evidence of the ever-illicit, interracial sex, 
which simultaneously challenged the gendered and racialized constructs of white male 
superiority, the sanctity of white womanhood, and racial purity.
42
  In order to protect the 
racial hierarchy that placed whiteness above all others, the American legal system even 
criminalized interracial sex through anti-miscegenation laws and marriage restrictions 
that effectively coded such acts as unnatural.
43
  However, initial laws failed to prepare for 
the challenges wrought by the existence of mixed-race children who blurred the clear cut 
                                                 
40 “Every-Day Life in Japan” Harper’s Weekly, October 20, 1904 as referenced in Onoto Watanna, “A Half Caste” and Other 
Writings, ed. Linda Trinh Moser and Elizabeth Rooney (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2003), 165. 
41 Susan Koshy posits that in the history of anti-miscegenation laws and mixed race children in the United States, white-Native 
American and white-Mexican miscegenation differed from black-white and later, white-Asian miscegenation. There was, she argues, 
an assumption of some degree of social assimilation for the mixed-race offspring produced by those specific mixtures providing 
restricted access to the privileges of whiteness. Susan Koshy, Sexual Naturalization: Asian Americans and Miscegenation (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2004), 6. 
42 Peggy Pascoe, What Comes Naturally: Miscegenation Law and the Making of Race in America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2010); Martha Hodes, White Women Black Men: Illicit Sex in the 19th-Century South (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999).   
43 Susan Koshy argues that anti-miscegenation laws for Asian Americans reaffirmed their status as perpetual foreigners and racial and 
sexual aliens and differs from other forms of anti-miscegenation in the United States because it was produced in both a territorial and 
extraterritorial frame that incorporated US domestic, immigration and naturalization laws. While sexual relations between white men 
and Asian women overseas emerged “in the context of the sexual license and power” that accompanied men in ports, military bases or 
as occupying forces in Asia, US immigration law required a legitimate marital union in order for such relationship to continue in the 
United States. Koshy, Asian American Miscegenation, 1-17. For more information on Eurasian children see Emma Teng, Eurasian: 
Mixed Identities in the United States, China, and Hong Kong, 1842-1943 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013). For a 
discussion on intermarriages between Chinese immigrant men and black and Native American women in the American South and 
East, during the period see Robert G. Lee, Orientals: Asian Americans in Popular Culture (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 
1999). For additional scholarship on mixed-race populations in America see:  Pascoe, What Comes Naturally, 1-5. For more on 
miscegenation in the United States see Martha Hodes, ed., Sex, Love, Race: Crossing Boundaries in North American History (New 
York: New York University Press, 1999); Paul R. Spickard, Mixed Blood: Intermarriage and Ethnic Identity in Twentieth-Century 
America (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1989). 
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racial lines upon which the social order and white superiority depended, inciting a racial 
“identity crisis” in America by the end of the nineteenth-century.44  
To resolve the “crisis,” U.S. laws defined racial identity by measuring blood or 
blood quantum, the “enduring fiction of miscegenation law.”45 Efforts to protect 
whiteness required restricting access of mixed-race individuals to marry, inherit property, 
vote, and sometimes become citizens.
46
 Consequently, mixed-race persons faced the 
same restrictions to power and the privileges of whiteness as their racially non-white 
parent. Thus, legally identified as non-white through assumptions of blood quantum and 
systematically excluded from white privilege, mixed race persons in America became 
racially “othered.”47  
The racialization of mixed-race persons in America into “other,” non-white racial 
categories, was vital to a racial moment—“the critical juncture in relationships between 
people when they come to see each other, and are seen by outsiders, as fundamentally, 
essentially immutably different from one another.”48 For racially distinct populations like 
African Americans and Asians in America, race obviously marked differences. Skin tone, 
                                                 
44 Maria P.P. Root, “Within, Between and Beyond Race,” in Racially Mixed People in America, ed. Maria P.P. Root (Newbury Park, 
California: Sage, 1992), 3. 
45 Pascoe, What Comes Naturally, 8. Lisa Funderburg posits that America’s one-drop rule has successfully defined race for blacks and 
whites and black-white mixtures in America, while ensuring that the black community absorbs the offspring of miscegenation, thereby 
identifying them as black.  Maria Root suggests that race mixing is considered most dangerous when it threatens the border between 
“White and non-White” and involves groups most distant socially and culturally—black/white, Japanese/black, Japanese/white—and 
involves groups most wedded to preserving the “purity” of the race, which she identifies as whites and Asians. Lise Funderburg, 
Black, White, Other: Biracial Americans Talk about Race and Identity (New York: William Morrow, 1994-1994), 13. Root,“Within, 
Between and Beyond Race” in Root, 6. 
46 Such concerns emerged most notably after the emancipation of African American slaves in 1865 and the passage of the Fourteenth 
Amendment which granted African Americans American citizenship. Both acts raised national anxieties concerning race relations and 
the threat posed to the racial hierarchy in America and coincided with the racialization of Asian migrants as coolies and challenging 
systems of race, labor and citizenship for American racial minorities and Asian immigrants. For further discussion see Helen Heran 
Jun, Race for Citizenship: Black Orientalism and Asian Uplift from Pre-Emancipation to Neoliberal America (New York: New York 
University Press, 2011), and Martha Hodes, White Women Black Men: Illicit Sex in the 19th-Century South (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1999). For laws regarding marriage, inheritance, citizenship and voting see: California Supreme Court 
Perez v. Sharp (Oct. 1, 1948) 32 Cal.2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 and US Supreme Court, Loving v. Virginia (1967) 388 U.S. 1 (1967) 
47 Edward Said describes this practice through the concept of Orientalism, “a collective notion identifying ‘us’ Europeans as against 
all ‘those’ non –Europeans,” reinforcing ideas of superiority and inferiority based on progress and modernity, Selections from 
Orientalism in Williams and Chrisman, Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory: A Reader (Columbia University Press, 1994). 
48 Paul Spickard, “Race and Nation, Identity and Power: Thinking Comparatively about Ethnic Systems,” in Race and Nation: Ethnic 
Systems in the Modern World ed. Paul Spickard (New York and London: Routledge, 2005), 8. 
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hair texture, eye shape and features, became clear indicators of natural biological 
difference and to some, racial inferiority. Mixed-race individuals “othered” into these 
racial categories faced the same restrictions, similarly identified by physical 
characteristics, markers of their non-white parent.
49
 Such categorization became 
increasingly complicated when placed within the emerging push in the second-half of the 
nineteenth century, for citizenship rights for non-whites. 
The Benefits of Blood  
In America, birth-right citizenship, defined by jus soli (land) and jus sanguini 
(blood), not only provides legal membership and national identity, but typically dictates 
access to the constitutional rights and privileges of the nation. It is a tool of inclusion and 
exclusion structured in terms of ethnic, racial, and gender hierarchies, which reflect 
America’s imperialistic and racialized history.50  Since its founding, America has used 
citizenship to undermine the inclusive nature of blood and land in order to control the 
membership of the American national community, a racialized process that justified 
excluding African Americans and Native Americans from citizenship until 1868 and 
1924 respectively.
51
  
During the nineteenth-century however, Asians in America faced a different 
citizenship challenge than other non-whites. Shaping the social and legal exclusions that 
mark the “‘American’ experience” of Asians in America, regardless of citizenship or 
                                                 
49 Pascoe, What Comes Naturally; Paul R. Spickard, Mixed Blood; Cynthia L. Nakashima, “Servants of Culture: The Symbolic Role of 
Mixed-Race Asians in American Discourse” in The Sum of Our Parts: Mixed-Heritage Asian Americans, Teresa Williams-Leon and 
Cynthia L. Nakashima eds (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2001). 
50 Diana H. Yoon, “Reproducing Citizens Through U.S. Militarism: Amerasians and Descent Based Membership” (Ph.D. diss., New 
York University, 2010),8. 
51 Spickard, “Race and Nation, Identity and Power,” in Spickard,17. According to Spickard, citizenship for Native Americans was 
predicated on contingencies of land ownership and cultural assimilation 
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generation, remain questions of whether Asians could become Americans or if Asian 
Americans were Americans.
52
 The first Asians in America entered as immigrants, who 
found their efforts to attain naturalized citizenship by mid-century limited by the phrase 
“free white persons” in the 1790 Naturalization Law and the nativist backlash and racist 
vitriol from white American workers concerned about the economic threat posed by 
Asian labor.
53
 In fact the failure of Republican Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner in 
1869 to convince Congress to abandon the principle of a racial qualification for 
citizenship and remove the word “white” from the 1790 law occurred because of Western 
delegates in Congress who adamantly opposed immigration from Asia because of the 
economic threat to white labor.
54
   
Between 1875 and 1952, economic concerns and racism framed American 
immigration policies that effectively excluded Asian immigrants from American 
citizenship. Additionally, the need to police the sexuality of the primarily male Asian 
immigrant work force and to impede their incorporation into America through marriage 
or reproduction of American-born citizens, shaped anti-miscegenation laws aimed at 
                                                 
52 Theresa Williams-Leon and Cynthia L. Nakashima, “Reconfiguring Race, Rearticulating Ethnicity,” The Sum of Our Parts: Mixed-
Heritage Asian Americans, eds. Teresa Williams-Leon and Cynthia L. Nakashima (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2001), 7. 
53 The first mass immigration from Asia came from China as Chinese laborers entered to work on the railroads and the mines of the 
American western frontier. The first official record of Japanese coming to America was in 1861. The economic competition wrought 
by the “coolie” labor of Chinese workers in the West united the European immigrant working class in opposition. Matthew Jacobson 
argues that the process of “becoming Caucasian” was a crucial part of the politico-cultural saga of European migration and settlement. 
The perceived differences among white “others” declined during the 1920s as immigration restrictions and black migration redrew 
racial lines along white, black and other casting all white Europeans into the general category of “white.” Spickard, Mixed Blood, 25. 
54 Western delegates from California and Oregon understood the value of cheap Chinese labor for their states however they did not 
believe the Chinese deserved political rights, although some Western delegates like Oregon Republican Cornelius Cole and Nevada 
Senator William Stewart argued that because they were better educated and more industrious, the Chinese would make better citizens 
than African Americans. Cornelius Cole, Memoirs of Cornelius Cole, Ex-Senator of the United States from California (New York: 
McLoughlin Brothers, 1908), 285-87. In 1870, 78 % of the nation’s Chinese population lived in California, the majority laboring in 
the mining industry, as merchants and cheap labor for the transcontinental railroad and in agriculture. In 1855 California initiated 
efforts to ban Chinese immigration levying an immigration tax on “persons who cannot become citizens,” and in 1862 a police tax on 
every Chinese to “protect free white labor” from “competition with Chinese coolie labor.” The opposition to Sumner’s proposal led by 
Western delegates, sought to prevent the granting of US citizenship and citizenship rights to the Chinese and to deny them the vote 
thus allowing them to continue economic sanctions like the 1852 Foreign Miners Tax which reduced the earnings of immigrant 
workers and anti-alien laws that prevented property ownership, equal pay and protection from the law. The US Congress ratified the 
Fifteenth Amendment in 1870 extending suffrage to African Americans but denying it to Chinese immigrants. Out of concern that the 
law could open suffrage to Chinese immigrants, California and Oregon did not ratify the law until 1962 and 1959 respectively. 
Sucheng Chan, Asian Americans: An Interpretive History (Boston, Twayne, 1991), 28-42, 54; Lee, Orientals, 85. 
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Asian Americans.
55
 Such policies failed to distinguish between nationalities, grouping all 
Asians into one big “Oriental” category.56 The 1875 Page Act, 1882 Chinese Exclusion 
Act, 1892 Geary Act and the 1907 Gentleman’s Agreement barred specific Asians—
women and workers— from immigration and citizenship.57 But in 1917 and 1924, 
Congress legally excluded all Asians from immigration and citizenship. The 1917 Asiatic 
Barred Zone Act denied “criminals, persons who failed to meet certain moral standards; 
persons with various diseases; paupers; assorted radicals; and illiterates” and Asians, 
admission to the United States; while the 1924 Johnson-Reed Act, instituted the national-
origins quota system that excluded Asians from American citizenship until 1952.
58
  
Race undergirded these laws.  In 1922, the Supreme Court Case of Ozawa v. 
United States declared that the 1790 Naturalization law was an inclusionary policy meant 
to open American borders to white persons “‘from the Caucasian race.’”59 The exclusion 
of non-white Asian immigrants, the Court insisted, was simply an unintended yet legal 
                                                 
55 Koshy, Asian American Miscegenation, 7. 
56 According to Matthaei and Amott, American federal and state government instituted approximately fifty laws aimed at restricting 
and subordinating Asian immigrants. While Asians were classified in the U.S. Census by nationality—Chinese and Japanese, Black 
and Latin Americans were classified by race. Latin Americans were categorized as white, mulatto, or racially distinct, and whites by 
country of birth. Native Americans were largely omitted from this process. Julie Matthaei and Teresa Amott, “Race, Gender, Work: 
the History of Asian and Asian-American Women,” Race and Class, 31 (1990), 61. For further discussion of American exclusionary 
immigration policies against Asians see: Cahe Chan Ping v. United States (May 13, 1989) in Michael LeMay and Elliott Robert 
Barkan, eds. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Laws and Issues (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1999), 64; Roger Daniels, Coming to 
America: A History of Immigration and Ethnicity in American Life 2d ed. (New York: Harper Perennial, 2002), 278-279. 
57 The 1875 Page Act targeted the transportation into the United States of Chinese women for the purpose of prostitution. The Chinese 
Exclusion Act stopped the immigration of Chinese laborers for ten years before being extended in 1892 by the Geary Act and made 
permanent in 1902. The 1907 Gentleman’s Agreement provided that the Japanese Government would restrict the immigration of 
Japanese laborers to the U.S., an exclusionary policy reinforced with the Alien Land Act of 1913 that barred Japanese in America 
from owning or leasing land for more than three years. For an analysis of the history of exclusion against Asian women and sexuality, 
see Koshy, Asian American Miscegenation. 
58 The 1924 Act limited the number of immigrants into the United States to two-percent of the total number of people of each 
nationality present in the country per the 1890 census. However Asians were excluded from the quotas and from immigration to 
America. In 1952, while preserving the national-origins quota system established by the Johnson-Reed Act, the McCarran-Walter Act, 
awarded a miniscule immigration quota of 100 visas per year to each country from the Asian-Pacific Triangle with a maximum annual 
quota for the region of 2000. The quotas were based on a rate of one-sixth of one percent of each nationality’s population in the 
United States in 1920 and were consequentially highly restrictive for people from Asia since Asian immigration by 1920 had largely 
been halted. The Asian-Pacific Triangle consisted of 19 countries including: India, Japan, Pacific islands north of Australia and New 
Zealand. The Triangle did not include China, as US immigration policy changed in 1943 to account for Chinese immigration, 
establishing a separate annual quota for China of 105 that would be in place until 1965.  LeMay and Barkan, 109. Bill Ong Hing 
Making and Remaking Asian American through Immigration Policy: 1850-1990 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 38. 
59 The Supreme Court upheld the Ozawa v. US, 260 US 178 (1922) decision in the United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U.S. 204 
(1923) which was also reinforced by the exclusionary policies of the 1924 Johnson Reed Immigration Act. 
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consequence of the law.
60
 One year later, in the United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind, the 
Supreme Court ruled that the term “free white persons” specifically referred only to those 
persons “who appeared and would be commonly viewed as ‘white.’”61 The argument, the 
Court asserted, was not a question of racial superiority or inferiority, but rather racial 
differences. Because Asians did not “look white,” they were therefore ineligible for 
citizenship.
62
  
Even the 1952 McCarran-Walter Act, which opened the door for Asian 
immigration and citizenship, lauded by some as a progressive U.S. immigration policy 
that “removed all racial, gender, and nationality barriers to citizenship,” racialized the 
process.  For Asian applicants, race not nationality defined the quotas awarded to Asian 
countries.
63
 Regardless of the place of their birth or their citizenship, any child born to 
one or more Asian parent counted against the quota for the specific Asian nation of their 
“race”—Japanese, Korean, Vietnamese, etc, or the general quota for the Asian-Pacific 
Triangle.
64
  For the Amerasians born as a result of US military presence in Japan (World 
War II) and Korea (Korean War), this had major implications for immigration and 
citizenship. In his statement vetoing the legislation, President Harry Truman was critical 
of its hypocritically discriminatory policies against people from Asia and its inherently 
racist implications.
65
  
The countries of Asia are told in one breath that they shall have quotas for 
their nationals, and in the next, that the nationals of other countries, if their 
                                                 
60 Ozawa v. US, 260 US 178 (1922). 
61 Lemay and Barkan, U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Laws and Issues,138;  United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U.S. 204 
(1923). 
62 Lemay and Barkan, U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Laws and Issues, 140. 
63 Ibid., xxxv. 
64 The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Office of the Historian. Accessed, January 7th, 2014, 
http://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/immigration-act; For debates regarding this law see, Hearings before the President’s 
Commission on Immigration and Naturalization,82nd Cong., 2nd sess., House, October 29, 1952, Thirteenth Session, H1719-1800; 
H1216-1217. 
65 LeMay and Barkan, eds. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Laws and Issues, xxxv. 
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ancestry is as much as 50 percent Asian, shall be charged to these quotas. 
It is only with respect to persons of oriental ancestry that this invidious 
discrimination applies….These provisions are without justification.66 
 
Yet, Truman’s words fell on deaf ears. It was not until 1965 that the Hart-Cellar 
Immigration Act expanded quotas and preferences— based on family relationships and 
reunification and labor needs—finally replaced the national-origins quota system.67 The 
resulting massive and unexpected influx of Asian immigrants to America however 
rekindled the nineteenth-century racialized fears of many Americans that the invading 
yellow horde, the yellow peril would take American jobs.
68
 Underlying such anxieties 
and contributing to the exclusionary policies to which America had subjected Asians for 
almost a century, was the racial classification of Asians as non-white “others” and the 
perceptions that they were innately foreign and thus, inferior.
69
  
Even though the 1965 Act removed the quota system and the classification of 
persons with one Asian parent as Asian, the practice persisted. Although both the AIA 
and the AHA labeled the Amerasians as immigrants, they continued to count against the 
annual allowance of refugees from Vietnam. Their categorization as Asians continued. 
The Persistence of Colonialism 
Orientalism is the colonial practice described by Edward Said of dividing the 
world into two opposing parts—the developed, civilized, racially superior occident 
                                                 
66 Ibid., 228. 
67 After the passage of the 1965 Immigration Act, 75% of immigrants to the U.S. were from Asia, Africa and Central or South 
America. Gabriel Chin, “The Civil Rights Revolution Comes to Immigration Law: A New Look at the Immigration and Nationality 
Act of 1965,” North Carolina Law Review 75 (1996): 273. 1996. Hing, Making and Remaking Asian America Through Immigration 
Policy, 40. 
68 During the last half of the twentieth-century Asians in American became models of both success and poverty— model minority and 
refugee. In each case some Americans perceived them an economic threat, either by taking high-level American jobs and buying 
American land and companies or by a dependency on social services and welfare. For further discussion see Nadia Y. Kim, Imperial 
Citizens: Koreans and Race from Seoul to LA (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008); Lee, Orientals; Jun, Race for Citizenship; 
Chan, Asian Americans. 
69 Susan Koshy argues that the exclusionary domestic policies (anti-miscegenation) combined with immigration and naturalization 
polices throughout US history to continuously reaffirm the status of Asians in America and of Asian Americans as “perpetual 
foreigners” and “racial and sexual aliens.” Koshy, Asian American Miscegenation, 1. 
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(West) and the lesser developed, uncivilized, racially inferior orient (East); “a collective 
notion identifying ‘us’ Europeans as against all ‘those’ non –Europeans.” 70   While 
critics of Said often point to the overzealousness of his framework, the East-West binary 
gives credence to assumptions of Asian foreignness that have continued to shape the 
Asian experience in America.
71
 Specifically, it reinforces the power relationship between 
the West and Asia, juxtaposing the Occident and the Orient as cultural polarities defined 
by a real or imagined geographic distance and racial difference.
72
 
Historians and others have studied how imperialism had colonial policies that 
reinforced domestic American laws regarding racial mixing, interracial marriage and 
blood quantum and fears of miscegenation, blood contamination and racial degeneracy.
73
  
In the eyes of American imperialists, mixed-race populations contested race and 
nationality and represented the paramount danger to racial purity and national identity.
74
  
As an example, in 1898, the American experience in the Philippines depicted the 
human consequences of combining fears of racial mixing—blood contamination and 
racial degeneracy— with concern of geographic degeneration—a product of the 
                                                 
70 Said, Selections from Orientalism in Williams and Chrisman, 134. Also see, Henry Yu, Thinking Orientals: Migration, Contact, 
and Exoticism in Modern America  (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 106. 
71 Others, like Historian Ann Laura Stoler have extended Said’s framework. They have posited that by contesting racial categories, 
sexual morality, cultural competence and national identity, the metis challenged the construction of colonial categories and national 
identities. Attempting to expose the relationship between what she terms, “inclusionary impulses” –discourses of inclusion, 
humanitarianism, and equality that informed colonial policy—and “exclusionary practices”  that were reactive to, coexistent with, and 
inherent within those policies—Stoler considers how the metis of French Indochina were legally handled, culturally inscribed, and 
politically treated. Ann Laura Stoler, Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule (Berkeley: 
University of California, 2002), 79.  
72 Robert Lee makes this explicit argument in his discussion of Chinese immigration to the United States in the 19th century which he 
posits “undermined the definition of Oriental difference” from distance to race. Immigration replaced the distant and exotic with a 
construction of racial difference as both present and threatening. Lee, Orientals, 28. For further discussion of the development in 
western popular culture of the “feminine” East, see Yoko Kawaguchi,  Butterfly’s Sisters: The Geisha in Western Culture (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2010). 
73 Ann McClintock extends Stoler’s examination of the metis from European to American imperialism Anne McClintock, Imperial 
Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest (New York and London: Routledge, 1995), 47. 
74 Ibid., 48. 
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distancing, foreignness, and exoticism embedded in Orientalism and war.
 75
  The 
savagery of the war and the ferocity of the fighting became a template for American wars 
in Asia throughout the twentieth-century, the result, according to historian John Dower, 
of a “four-hundred year intellectual development of European concepts of the colored 
other as ‘savages, children, madmen, and beasts.’” 76   
The Philippines also set the precedent for the response of American policymakers 
to the 18,000 mixed-race offspring, primarily the result of relationships between US 
soldiers and Filipina women.
77
 As occurred in Vietnam half a century later, the US 
government officially recognized this new population of half-American, half-Asian 
children as the “Mestizo problem.”78 In 1920, US officials provided a formal accounting 
of the mestizos while reporting the horrendous conditions in which they lived and the 
rejection and abandonment they faced because of their racial mixture.
79
 In line with 
American laws and practices regarding miscegenation and racially mixed populations 
during the period, Americans viewed the Filipino mestizos as products of blood 
contamination and racial degeneracy. As such, they existed in direct contrast to the racial 
purity and desired racial reproduction of whiteness.
80
 
                                                 
75 Simply by being in the Philippines, many Americans believed, white American men and women would degenerate into a decivilized 
and savage state. Kramer. The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States, and the Philippines (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2006), 23. 
76 John Dower, War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), 149. 
77 John A. Shade, Jr., “A Progress Report on Caring for the Amerasian: A Difficult Task,” 1978, Amerasians, 1978-1984 folder, Box 
Vietnam, Archives of the Pearl S. Buck House, Pearl S. Buck International. According to Paul Kramer, gender and race defined U.S. 
imperialism in the Philippines. Cubans and Filipinos were declared racially inferior and as a result determined to be “unfit for self-
rule,” a designation which justified a continued American policy of patriarchal dominance and paternal “guidance” that would remain 
in both countries through the first half of the twentieth-century. Kramer, The Blood of Government.   
78 The use of the term “mestizo” to refer to half-American, half-Filipino children was an extension of the term from Spanish colonial 
mixtures—Indian mothers and Spanish fathers. The term Amerasian applied to the children of America and Filipino parents after 
Philippine independence in 1946.  
79 John A. Shade, Jr., “A Progress Report on Caring for the Amerasian: A Difficult Task.” The Pearl S. Buck Foundation, Inc. 
Philadelphia, 1978, Box: Vietnam, Folder: Amerasian, 1978-1984, Archives of the Pearl S. Buck Foundation, Pearl S. Buck 
International. 
80 Two conflicting notions of racial mixing emerged in American society during the early twentieth-century: eugenics and the melting 
pot theory. The justification of racial hierarchies through science facilitated the emergence of Eugenic during the mid-nineteenth 
century with Joseph Gobineau’s The Inequality of Human Races which arranged the races of the world along a strict hierarchy of 
intellect, ability and morality. In the United States policymakers utilized eugenics to justify immigration restrictions to prevent the 
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Categorized into the white-non-white binary, the mestizos too, assumed the race 
and status of their Filipina mothers. Often illegitimate and Filipino, the mestizos faced the 
same immigration and citizenship laws as their Filipino peers, considered US Nationals 
until 1934.
 81
 However, the installation of US military bases in the Philippines after the 
signing of the 1947 Military Bases Agreement ensured the permanent presence of 
prostitution and American fathered children.
82
  
The actions of American leaders regarding the mestizos set the precedent for how 
the United States would treat all of its succeeding Amerasian offspring leading up to 
Vietnam—that is, to recognize them as children of American fathers, report on the 
challenges they faced because of their paternity, relegate them to the racialized and 
colonial status of their Asian mothers, and ultimately do little to alleviate their suffering, 
and take no national responsibility for them.  
Colonial Wars and the French Precedent 
Other countries provided different examples to the US experience in the 
Philippines.  During French colonialism in Southeast Asia in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, the metis –French Asian offspring— became racialized subjects in Indochina 
                                                                                                                                                 
“breeding” by people deemed inferior. Henry Yu argues that the melting pot ideal was the lens through which most Americans 
understood society. The emphasis on assimilation and the disappearance of difference also shared an emphasis on the importance of 
boundaries or difference. However, Yu claims there was an increasing fascination with people who were racially different and sexual 
relations and reproduction represented the most intimate of social relations that equated with the most profound lack of physical and 
social distance between two races. Such curiosities remained framed within assumptions of Asian inferiority now backed by racial 
“science” reinforced fears that while Asians were more fertile than whites, they remained intellectually and physically inferior. Henry 
Yu, “Mixing Bodies and Cultures: The Meaning of America’s Fascination with Sex Between ‘Orientals’ and ‘Whites,’” in Sex, Love, 
Race: Crossing Boundaries in North American History, ed. Martha Hodes (New York and London: New York University Press, 
1999), 444-447; Paul Spickard, Almost All Aliens: Immigration, Race, and Colonialism in American History and Identity (New York 
and London: Routledge, 2007), 269-270. 
81 In 1934 and in preparation for the impending independence of the Philippines in 1946, the Tydings-McDuffie Act stripped Filipinos 
of their status as U.S. Nationals, and secured their racialized position as the Asian “other” by reclassifying them as “aliens.” The 
Philippine Independence Act (Tydings-McDuffie Act), PL 73-127(1934). 
82 There is a vast and growing scholarship regarding the specific plight of the Amerasians in the Philippines due to the sheer numbers 
produced and the continued refusal of American policymakers to admit responsibility. Because neither the AIA nor the AHA 
incorporates the Philippines into their legislation, I too exclude them. For more information on the Military Bases Agreement see:  
Stephen R. Shalom, “Securing the US-Philippine Military Bases Agreement of 1947,” Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 22, no. 4 
(October-December 1990). 
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created by French colonial policies and practices to sustain the distinction between 
French colonizers and colonial subjects.
83
  Because the metis blurred lines of distinction 
in racial and colonial categories, they confused national identities leaving French colonial 
administrators to view them as subversive threats to whiteness and French national 
identity.
84
  
To allay these threats, colonial authorities incorporated those metis deemed 
worthy of inclusion, into the French empire, awarding them French citizenship.
85
 Such 
inclusionary policies and practices of empire reveal the underlying colonial motivation 
for France to take national responsibility for its Eurasian children. Following its defeat in 
the First Indochina War, French authorities transported 25,000 Eurasian children to 
France, awarded them French citizenship and provided financial support.
86
 While critics 
of America’s response to the Amerasians in Vietnam often pointed to the French efforts 
as a model, a broader understanding of the French plan would have silenced these voices 
as this was an imperial decision. 
The US response later in Vietnam was also an imperial one and shaped by racial 
factors. In the early Cold War era, US foreign policy faced international pressure to 
justify the racial discrimination of African Americans in the country while promoting 
democratic ideals abroad. US policymakers viewed the world in “race-conscious terms” 
and made foreign policy decisions on the “basis of racial assumptions.”87 The apparent 
                                                 
83 Stoler, Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power, 15, 79-11. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid., 82-83; Emannuelle Saada, Empire’s Children: Race, Filiation, and Citizenship in the French Colonies, trans. Arthur 
Goldhammer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012). 
86 Eric T. Jennings, Imperial Heights: Dalat and the Making and Undoing of French Indochina (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2011); Yarborough, Surviving Twice, 9. 
87 There exists a rich scholarship on American race relations and US foreign policy during the period which I do not wish to replicate 
but rather extend. Thomas Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line (Cambridge: Harvard, 2001), 8 (quotation); Mary Dudziak, 
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solidarity between black, brown, and yellow people across the world against colonialism, 
oppression and racial discrimination concerned US leaders ideologically committed to 
self-determination but practically anxious of losing the new nations to communism.
 88
     
Vietnam’s victory over its French colonizer in 1954 appeared to conclude a 
history of struggle against foreign invaders by the Vietnamese while further inspiring 
other decolonization movements. US support of the French in the war undermined 
America’s rhetoric of a commitment to global democracy and provided the framework 
within which US leaders would approach the second Indochina war. Diplomatic 
historians position America’s anticolonial hypocrisy and eventual military intervention in 
Vietnam within an overzealous commitment to containment that caused two decades of 
paranoia over the possibility of “losing” the tiny Southeast Asian country to 
communism.
89
 
The Vietnamese tended to view the American War as a continuation of centuries 
of anti-colonial struggle, this time a war against US imperialism.
90
 Despite their anti-
colonial rhetoric, US leaders approached the war with clearly misguided colonial 
assumptions about the intellectual, physical, and racial characteristics of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Cold War Civil Rights:Race and the Image of American Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Brenda Gayle 
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88 Sudarshan Kapur, Raising Up a Prophet: The African-American Encounter with Gandhi (Boston: Beacon Press, 1992); Nikhil Pal 
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Vietnamese.
91
 The Truman administration’s decision to support French re-colonization of 
Vietnam related to the unfavorable perceptions of the Vietnamese capacity for self-
government. Racialized within the colonial terms that America had previously imposed 
on Hawaiians, Filipinos, Cubans and Puerto Ricans in its own conquests, U.S. leaders 
saw the Vietnamese in particular as intellectually incapable of government—“‘attractive 
and even loveable…but ‘essentially childish.’”92  
America had had very little prior interest in Vietnam and therefore few reference 
points or personal knowledge in assessing the capabilities of the Vietnamese people 
before World War II. In fact by the end of the French Indochina War, the majority of 
American intelligence about the country came from French colonial authorities.
93
 Thus, a 
colonial discourse shaped and guided the perceptions of American leaders regarding the 
ability of the Vietnamese for self-government and their capabilities for war. Such notions 
framed how US leaders viewed the Vietnamese people as the United States prepared for 
its own war in Vietnam. 
Prior to Vietnam, American soldiers had faced Asian opponents in the 
Philippines, China, Japan, and in Korea.
94
 In each case, the battles proved incredibly 
savage; revealing the underlying racialized colonial notions that Asians were inherently 
                                                 
91 Luu Doan Huynh reveals the distinction among Vietnamese between the war as a victory of US Imperialism and the war as a 
military defeat of America.  Luu Doan Huynh, “The American War in Vietnamese Memory,” in The Vietnam War: Vietnamese and 
American Perspectives, eds. Jane S. Werner and Luu Doan Huynh (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), 243-257.  
92 William C. Bullitt, the American ambassador to the Soviet Union and France during the 1930s used this description in conversation 
with the US State Department Division of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs in 1947 to explain his suspicions about Vietnamese 
communism. Bullitt’s view reiterated previous reports by the American consult to Saigon, Charles S. Reed who noted that the 
Vietnamese were not “particularly industrious” nor were they known for their “‘honesty, loyalty or veracity.’” Mark Bradley, “An 
Improbable Opportunity: America and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam’s 1947 Initiative,” in The Vietnam War: Vietnamese and 
American Perspectives, eds. Jane S. Werner and Luu Doan Huynh (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), 12-14. For further discussion of 
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94 See, the Spanish-American War, the Boxer Rebellion, World War II, and the Korean War. 
  14 
inferior.
95
 Central to the ferocity of war in Asia was rage. America’s war in the 
Philippines (1899-1902) was a race war in which Americans understood the Filipinos and 
the fighting in racial terms.
96
 The staunch opposition of the non-white Filipinos to 
American efforts to control the Philippines stunned American imperialists. They 
interpreted such resistance as a clear violation of the natural order and justified a US war 
strategy of extreme savagery and “exterminism” against Filipino fighters.97  
The racial discourse contributed to the savagery of America’s war against Japan 
in World War II.
98
  American misperceptions about the Japanese race and culture framed 
in the European colonial context of the colored “other” justified the brutality of American 
soldiers and shaped the perception that the Japanese were “savages, children, madmen, 
and beasts.”99 In the post-war occupation, US leaders retained their racist views now 
shrouded in an “enlightened paternalism” that saw the Japanese as capable of developing 
a freer society with the help of the United States.
100
 Yet, even then, Secretary of State 
John Foster Dulles expressed concerns that because of their race, the Japanese, like all 
other Asians, were untrustworthy. “‘The Oriental mind,’” Dulles explained, “‘was always 
more devious than the Occidental mind.’”101 
The racial discourse and the east-west binary accompanied the onset of the Cold 
War, as US leaders committed to preventing the spread of communism sent American 
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troops back to Asia. The “loss” of China to communism in 1949 bolstered the anti-
communist fears of American leaders, including Dulles, that the Chinese “Yellow Peril” 
and the Russian “Red Peril” were inseparable and presumptions that the Russians were 
really Asiatic and the true evil in the East.
102
  
 In Korea, US fighting and occupation forces placed 40,000 troops below the 38
th
 
parallel. As in the Philippines, Japan and China, colonial notions of racial inferiority 
persisted in the discourse of war and the relationships between US soldiers and South 
Korean women. As in previous wars in Asia, American soldiers revived the term “gook” 
to describe the North Koreans.
103
 American media reports also consistently dehumanized 
them. One report by the Los Angeles Times, described the North Koreans as “droves of 
cattle,” and in another relaying the victory of US forces in battle, “it was like scraping 
ants off with a stick.”104   
Racial assumptions and notions of racial hierarchy also shaped how the US 
military regulated relationships with its South Korean allies; and specifically military-
civilian relations.
105
 In accord with the expectations of colonized women of color during 
American expansion in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, US soldiers sensing 
their own racial  and cultural superiority anticipated Korean women were also readily and 
sexually available.
106
 Thus, the emergence of a massive military-oriented prostitution 
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industry defined in gendered, racialized and colonial terms, by the sexual domination of 
Korean women by American men.
107
 
Framed within a colonial context and discourse, US leaders extended many 
beliefs of Asian inferiority into the Vietnam War.
108
 As in the Philippines, the reliance 
upon body counts in Vietnam as the standard for military victories pushed an idea of the 
Vietnamese as subhuman.
109
 First used to degrade Filipinos, the term “gook,” one fraught 
with historical, racial and colonial connotations, became the most common racial epithet 
used to describe the Vietnamese, and a term that intentionally failed to distinguish 
between enemies and allies.
110
 Upon entering boot camp, American soldiers trained to 
“kill, kill, kill the gook” and “If it’s dead and Vietnamese, it’s VC,” learned to view all 
Vietnamese as inferior.
111
  
The dehumanization of all Vietnamese as “gooks” accompanied American 
perceptions of Vietnamese women. The history of U.S. militarism in Asia has a history of 
U.S. military prostitution. Americans have always objectified or “Orientalized” Asian 
women into the stereotypical image of being compliant, demure, and exotic.
112
 Perceived 
in tandem to the Orient—a geographically distant woman in a foreign land of devious 
cultural practices waiting to be discovered and experienced. Americans saw Asian 
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women too, like their male counterparts as deviant, inferior and awaiting proper 
subjugation, supervision, and moral uplift.
113
  
These stereotypes often derived from nineteenth-century American encounters 
with Asian women in the ports of Japan where prostitution was legal, and the influx of 
Chinese immigrant women often associated with prostitution, especially in the West.
114
  
During World War II, the siren-voices of the mythical “Tokyo Rose” further exoticized 
the image of the seductive and sexual Japanese woman, the Orientalized Asian, who 
allowed American soldiers to simultaneously “‘transfer their racial fantasies and 
hostilities.’”115 In the post-war occupation of Japan, military-endorsed prostitution gave 
American servicemen the opportunity to act out the visceral fantasies and images on the 
bodies of real Asian women— the Japanese geisha, the Korean comfort woman, and the 
Vietnamese bar girl— contributing to lucrative sex and service industries in each 
country.
116
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Japan’s Interior Ministry ordered the enlistment of four Tokyo brothels—staffed largely by Korean, Filipina and other non-Japanese 
Asian women-- to specifically service American soldiers. Although, in 1945 American military authorities prohibited the selling of 
Japanese women into overseas prostitution, according to Cynthia Enloe, American authorities took steps to hide evidence of the 
Japanese imperial military’s prostitution program and accepted the new prostitution program that the Japanese government redesigned 
to better serve “’sex-starved’” U.S. male soldiers. Enloe, Maneuvers, 85. Sarah Kovner argues that the U.S. occupation in Japan 
transformed the landscape of Japan’s sex industry by abolishing licensed and legal prostitution to comply with U.S. regulations against 
commercialized sex which forced sex workers underground making them less visible and more vulnerable to abuses. Sarah Kovner, 
Occupying Power: Sex Workers and Servicemen in Postwar Japan (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012). 
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But the majority of Asian women were not prostitutes.
117
 The post-World War II 
era brought forth the “Americanization of the Asian war bride.”118 Increasingly 
Orientalized and objectified as the paragon of domestic virtue—submissive, docile, 
sexually subservient to the needs of her man—the Asian war bride became a 
progressively common occurrence on U.S. military bases.
119
  However, this was not often 
the case in Vietnam where Americans increasingly racialized, dehumanized and 
militarized Vietnamese women. They were the Vietnamese “gook,” and the seductive and 
sinister Vietnamese prostitute whose exotic Asian beauty and feminine docility would 
seduce an American serviceman into her bedroom before viciously cutting his throat.
120
  
U.S. military policy encouraged such perceptions of Vietnamese women in their 
efforts to discourage the same Asian war bride infatuation that had occurred in Japan and 
Korea. Not only did many US military authorities consider Vietnamese women racially 
inferior, they were also potential Communist subversives. In addition to the extensive 
security and background checks required for potential Vietnamese spouses, military 
officials used paperwork, red tape, and the high cost of immigration as obstacles to 
prevent soldier marriages.
 121
   
For example, U.S. serviceman Michael Schado endured two years of red tape to 
secure a marriage certificate from the U.S. Embassy to marry his Vietnamese wife in 
1970.  Schado, however, failed to acquire an exit visa for his legitimated Amerasian child 
                                                 
117 Robert Lee asserts that the perception of Asian women of prostitutes contradicts the reality for many. Lee, Orientals. 
118 Ibid., 162. 
119 The “Americanization of the Asian war bride” domesticated Orientalism by promoting the Cold War narrative of ethnic 
assimilation and domesticity that could restore credibility to the inclusive narrative of America through the reconstruction of the 
American family as “modern, universal, multi-ethnic,” and multi-racial. Lee, Orientals, 162. In 1964 the New York Times reported that 
1,265 American servicemen married Korean wives and 771 had married by October 1965. “Marriage by G.I.’s Problem in Korea: One 
Soldier in 40, the Army Finds, Weds a Korean,” The New York Times, Oct 24, 1965. 
120 Lee, Orientals, 180.  
121 Susan Zeiger, Entangling Alliances: Foreign War Brides and American Soldiers in the Twentieth Century (New York: New York, 
2010), 244. 1966 MACV Directive 608-1, Spickard, Mixed Blood, 133.  
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until 1985.
122
 Emmanuel J. Holloman, a U.S. Army interpreter stationed in Vietnam from 
1966-1971, believed commanders made the process so challenging because “A few 
blacks, but mostly whites, felt that the Vietnamese weren’t equal to us. So they made it 
real difficult to marry one.”123  
Others echoed Holloman’s claim, even some Asian American soldiers in 
Vietnam. After requesting permission to marry his Vietnamese girlfriend, the military 
superior of one Asian American soldier stated, “‘Man you don’t want to marry one of 
these ‘gooks’ over there. They’re not civilized, and if you take her back home with you, 
people won’t be able to handle her cause she’s not civilized and you wouldn’t be able to 
trust her once you got back to the States.’”124 The commander added, “‘once you get 
back, you’ll see all those blonds and stuff, and you’ll look at your wife and she’ll be this 
old farmer chick—this gook—and you’ll want to get rid of her. You’ll be embarrassed 
when you get back because she’s Vietnamese.’”125 
Even as the US withdrew, the U.S Ambassador to Vietnam, Graham Martin, 
excluded common-law Vietnamese wives and their children as legitimate dependents of 
U.S. servicemen.
126
 Author A.J. Langguth described Martin as a “strange man who made 
many poor decisions in the final weeks of the war,” and who was “‘very rigid in defining 
which Vietnamese qualified as legitimate dependents’” of Americans.127 Each of these 
policies had dire consequences for the children produced from the sexual liaisons, 
                                                 
122 Bass, Vietnamerica, 36. 
123 Wallace Terry, Bloods: An Oral history of the Vietnam War by Black Veterans (New York: Ballantine, 1984), 88. 
124 Spickard, Mixed Race, 134. 
125 Ibid. 
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government to recognize common-law wives as legitimate dependents extended to couples married in Buddhist ceremonies as well. In 
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romantic relationships and failed marital unions between American servicemen and 
Vietnamese women. 
A Note on Citizenship 
 
 Products of American and Vietnamese liaisons, the Amerasians posed a 
fundamental challenge to American conceptions of race and nation, and therefore to 
citizenship, as had many racially mixed populations before them. Their American 
paternity and physical appearance destabilized the boundaries of both. While viewed as a 
source of social disorder in Vietnam, the Amerasians constituted a symbol of categorical 
confusion for many Americans.
128
 Their physical appearance blurred clean cut 
delineations of race, nation and family and combined with the added complication of the 
guilt of war.  
Historians have noted that mixed-race populations in America have always 
disrupted the official appearance of both nation and state by contesting the image of 
Americans as a homogenous racially pure white citizenry.
129
 Such notions appeared to 
underscore discussions among policymakers whose affinity for the Amerasians 
frequently revolved around their “whiteness,” but ignored the many complexities and 
nuances of the race. Congressman Ronald Mazzoli (D-KY), an influential political figure 
on immigration during the Reagan era, often described the Amerasians as, “the mixed 
Asian and Caucasian children,” carelessly disregarding those Amerasians fathered by 
non-white Americans.
130
   
                                                 
128 Cynthia Nakashima argues that mixed race individuals, people who do not fit into clearly defined racial categories, threaten the 
psychological, sociological foundations of the “we” and “they” mentality. Such a challenge to the racial hierarchy necessitates racial 
distancing in order to maintain the distinction. Cynthia L. Nakashima, “An Invisible Monster: The Creation and Denial of Mixed Race 
People in America,” Racially Mixed People in America, ed. Maria P.P. Root (Newbury Park, California: Sage, 1992), 164-177. 
129 Basson, White Enough to Be American?, 5. 
130 While reports indicate that black Amerasians composed thirty-percent of the Amerasian population in Vietnam, there are no 
reliable accounts of Amerasians fathered by other American racial minorities whose physical appearances were less racially distinct. 
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Yet even their “whiteness” was not enough for citizenship. While US laws forced 
previous mixed-race populations into “clear” pre-existing racial categories—black, 
Native American, Asian—preventing threats to membership and the social order, the 
Amerasian mixture proved much more problematic.
131
 Many policymakers seemed 
incapable of reconciling the Amerasians’ biological familiarity and claims of paternity 
with their geographic and cultural foreignness shaped by assumptions of Asian 
inferiority.
132
 America’s history of racialized exclusion and subordination of people of 
Asian descent, rooted in assumptions of Asians as an “alien presence” in the United 
States and reinforced by US immigration and nationality laws, clashed with the physical 
evidence of American paternity.
133
  It simply was not clear where the Amerasians 
belonged.
134
  
Thus, policymakers employed a contradictory approach of inclusionary rhetoric 
and exclusionary policies that offered the Amerasians a place to belong but marginalized 
them. The rhetoric shaped an informal offer of membership because of a biological 
filiation between Amerasians and American fathers. Yet, policymakers simultaneously 
excluded them from formal membership in the nation via citizenship, denying legal claim 
                                                                                                                                                 
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, International Law, HR 3405 and HR 808, Miscellaneous Immigration 
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Interdisciplinary History, XLI:I (Summer 2010), 63. 
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to that filiation.
135
 Regardless of their familiar faces and the welcoming words of 
advocates and supporters, the Amerasians faced many obstacles to citizenship.   
Central to the question of citizenship was the racially exclusive and gendered 
nature of US citizenship and immigration law. Blood ties— jus sanguine— determined 
citizenship for children born abroad. Yet, consideration of blood for membership outside 
the institution of marriage, as was the case for the majority of Amerasians in Vietnam, 
was and is an intentionally gendered process. Although marriage has been a powerful tool 
of racial exclusion and racial reproduction, by dictating who could marry and which 
citizens’ children received citizenship, for children of unwed parents, the tool became the 
citizenship law.
 136
  
Some have argued that gender and racial exclusion have always worked in tandem 
as a core component of American nationality law.
137
 For illegitimate children of one 
American and a foreign parent born abroad, US law has consistently declared that 
American mothers automatically transmit citizenship to their illegitimate children but 
American fathers do not. The 1854 Guyer v. Smith case established the precedent by 
declaring that foreign born illegitimate children were not citizens, even with fathers who 
held citizenship.
138
  In 1952, Section 309 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) 
reinforced the Guyer precedent by declaring that a child born abroad out of wedlock, 
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136 In 1967 the case of Loving v. Virginia the Supreme Court ruled state bans on interracial marriage unconstitutional. According to 
Pascoe, the approval of a marriage license was the most common way to prevent interracial marriage domestically and would combine 
with US immigration law to regulate international unions. Pascoe, What Comes Naturally, 9-12. Domestic relations law through the 
19th century prevented illegitimate children from patrilineal inheritance specifically as states tended to allow nonmarital children to 
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“shall have acquired at birth the nationality status of his mother.”139 The child received 
citizenship only if the father claimed his child.  
In practice, the unequal and gendered application of the law assumes a role of 
parental responsibility and legal filiation between child and mother and an absence of 
both between child and father. American men faced no legal obligation for the children of 
their foreign girlfriends or lovers and their children had no legal grounds for citizenship. 
Placed into the context of the large US military presence abroad in the nineteenth and 
twentieth-centuries especially in developing countries with racially distinct populations, 
the precedent set by Guyer and reinforced in the 1952 INA exposed racially exclusionary 
implications.   
As Americans expanded into the Pacific and the Caribbean at the end of the 
nineteenth-century efforts to protect the physical and racial borders of the nation 
intensified.
140
 From 1885 to 1905 a “transformative period” evolved that changed 
boundaries of the nation and the state, and the people and places included in them.
141
 
Such changes confirmed and strengthened the importance of certain ascribed 
characteristics like race in defining an American.
142
  
In imperial terms, the meaning of being American was “white” and “civilized.” 
Therefore, policymakers debated the status of the people in their newly acquired 
territories and citizenship was a “highly contested political institution.”143 After the 
                                                 
139 The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (Pub.L. 82–414, 66 Stat. 163, enacted June 27, 1952). 
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annexation of Hawaii in 1898, concerns of unrestricted immigration from the island of 
Hawaiians, Japanese and Chinese led to challenges that the citizenship of the United 
States “shall not be contaminated and debased by the unrestricted importation of this 
class of people.”144 In Puerto Rico, annexation exposed racially charged fears that 
absorbing the island into the nation would result in racial mixing and the accompanying 
degeneracy of the American citizenry.  
Thus, Supreme Court Justice Edward White worried that “if the Constitution 
automatically granted citizenship to Puerto Ricans, then American citizenship might be 
dismantled and the people of the United States enslaved….the language of physical 
degradation suggests a moral and racial tainting thereby rendering the body of the 
American citizen incapable of citizenship.”145 American imperialists imposed a similar 
discourse on the Philippines, where perceptions of the racial inferiority of the Filipinos 
marked them as permanently unassimilable, unfit for self-government and therefore, 
unqualified for citizenship.
146
  
However, neither the discourse nor the justification for exclusion considered the 
possibility of mixed-race children born abroad. American men in Hawaii, Puerto Rico 
and the Philippines fathered children with native women as they would do in Western 
Europe, Japan, Korea, and Vietnam throughout the 20
th
 century. Rather than passing laws 
                                                 
144 The United States annexed Hawaii in 1898, it became a US territory in 1900 and the 50th US state in 1959. Basson, White Enough 
to Be American, 24. 
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that prohibited mixed-race children born abroad from citizenship, policymakers once 
again pointed to the Guyer precedent. Simply by extending the racialized domestic 
marriage policies against miscegenation and interracial marriage overseas, policymakers 
could ensure the illegitimacy of such children who, without the father’s claim, could not 
attain citizenship.  
Additionally, in the twentieth-century, policymakers who worried specifically 
about large numbers of Amerasian children and Asian mothers immigrating to the 
country and claiming citizenship, could rely on US immigration law that prevented 
Asians from entering the United States or becoming citizens.
147
 In either case, the Guyer 
precedent and the 1952 INA had major implications for the offspring born as a result of 
the foreign US military presence and the relationships between large numbers of 
American men and foreign women. 
The Filiation of Fiallo v. Bell 
Even after the end of the Vietnam War, debates continued and shaped the 
Amerasian question in the 1980s. In 1977, the US Supreme Court issued its ruling in the 
case of Fiallo v. Bell, upholding the 1952 INA and the sex-based distinction embedded in 
US immigration law based on jus-sanguini citizenship.
148
 Per the 1952 law, unwed 
American mothers automatically transmitted US birth-right citizenship and therefore 
immigration preferences to children born abroad with foreign fathers while unwed 
American fathers did not.
149
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149 Section 309 (c ) nationality and Sections 101 (b)(1)(D) and 101 (b)(2) of the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act, exclude the 
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In this case, three unwed American fathers and their illegitimate children 
challenged the sex-based distinction of the law arguing that it violated equal protection 
and due process by excluding unwed fathers from the definition of “parent” and their 
children born outside of marriage from the definition of “child.”150  In its ruling 
upholding the sex-based distinctions, the Court pointed to the intention of US 
immigration law which appeared clear to the Court as the law reflected the specific 
concern of Congress to protect the relationship between the illegitimate child and its 
natural mother.
151
  
A similar consideration of a relationship between child and father was more 
difficult, the majority argued, because of the perceived absence of family ties and the 
“lurking problems” of proving paternity.152  Thus the law reflected “an intentional choice 
not to provide preferential immigration status by virtue of the relationship between an 
illegitimate child and his or her natural father.”153 Citing Congress’s plenary power to 
regulate immigration the Court argued that the sex-based distinction was rational and no 
different than any other requirements such as age or residency for citizenship.
154
  
The cases all failed on the basis of proving paternity.  Cleophus Werner, a 
naturalized US citizen had petitioned for his illegitimate son Serge born to a foreign 
mother in the French West Indies. The other two families included Trevor and Earl 
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Wilson, permanent resident aliens of the United States who had petitioned for their father 
Arthur, a citizen of Jamaica to immigrate. Finally, Ramon Martin Fiallo Jr., a U.S citizen 
by birth and the illegitimate son of Ramon Fiallo-Sone, a citizen of the Dominican 
Republic, had petitioned for immigration preference as the “parent” of a US citizen. 
Problems arose for Warner as the Court denied his appeal on the grounds that no 
supporting evidence existed for his claim of paternity. The Court denied the Wilson 
brothers’ petition on the grounds that there was no evidence that either Trevor or Earl 
were the legitimate children of Arthur. Finally, the Court rejected the petition of Ramon 
Fiallo Jr., to bring his father to the United States also on the grounds that he was not a 
legitimate child.
155
 
While the effects of Fiallo v. Bell tragically affected the plaintiffs, the ruling itself 
created problems for the Amerasians of Vietnam. The decision upheld the sex-based 
distinction in US immigration law that corresponded with US citizenship rulings. It 
ensured that the majority of the 50,000 illegitimate sons and daughters of American men 
living in Vietnam after the war had no claim to American paternity, citizenship, or 
preferential immigration status. More importantly, when placed into the context of the 
large US military presence abroad, the ruling continued to protect American servicemen 
from parental accountability from liaisons with foreign women.  
As before in Asia, the military highly discouraged soldier marriages between 
servicemen and Vietnamese women, but encouraged sexual relationships as a way to 
boost soldier morale, provide comfort, and reinforce the masculinity necessary to “keep 
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soldiers fighting like men.”156  Many of these relationships were consensual, long-
standing and loving; while others were relationships of convenience for the soldier.  
Still others took the violent and racialized form of the war itself. “When men are 
men, slugging it out among themselves, conquering new land, subjugating new people, 
driving toward victory, unquestionably there shall be some raping,” one person 
observed.
157
 Racialized perceptions of the Vietnamese as inferior and inhuman, justified 
sexual assault for some servicemen. When asked about the rape of Vietnamese women 
during the war, Sergeant Scott Camil, a Marine responded, “‘It wasn’t like they were 
humans….They were a gook or a Commie and it was okay.’”158 
The emergence of South Vietnam’s “entertainment” industry fully equipped with 
massage parlors and brothels, coincided with the increasing numbers of US servicemen in 
the country between 1965 and 1973.
159
 Thousands of Vietnamese women flocked to US 
bases for employment as laundresses, maids, and cooks. Others, came as “mama-sans and 
hooch-girls” and prostitutes.160 Military endorsed brothels sprouted up on Army bases 
with names inviting play and frivolity—Sin City, Disneyland, Boom Boom Parlors. 
Many were built under the directive of military leaders—division commanders, two-star 
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generals, and colonels— to whom Washington had given “considerable discretion” in 
regulating prostitution.
161
  
Some military leaders believed prostitution an unnecessary evil that “interfered” 
with soldier effectiveness, while others saw it as a necessary component of normalizing 
the lives of soldiers in very abnormal conditions.
162
 Regardless of the specific scenario 
however— marriage, rape, prostitution—  the conscious and deliberate calculations  
made by US leaders about the sexual needs of male soldiers and about “how Vietnamese 
women could best meet those needs,” exposes the fallacy, when applied to military 
presence abroad, behind the sex-based distinction in US law.
163
  
The military’s suggested support of sex with foreign women and protection 
against responsibility for the children produced changed little from the Philippines to 
Vietnam.
164
 Rather, some military leaders viewed the responsibility of paternity as 
counterproductive to the maintenance of a well-oiled fighting machine by “depriving 
combat of some of its appeal.”165 They feared forcing American men to take 
responsibility for illegitimate children and worried it would encourage foreign women to 
seduce American men and have their babies to get a free ride to the United States.
166
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Subjecting soldiers to paternity suits, child support payments, and the responsibilities of 
fathering could undermine the appeal of combat. According to one observer, it would 
“miss the existential and deeply gendered point of mayhem.”167 
Thus, US citizenship and immigration law and military policy worked in tandem 
to ensure that many of the relationships between servicemen and foreign women occurred 
outside of marriage.  Consequently such policies and the preservation of the sex-based 
distinction facilitated the production of tens of thousands of illegitimate GI babies. 
However unlike many of the GI children born from European mothers who often shared a 
racial kinship that masked questions of paternity, shielded mothers from accusations of 
prostitution and infidelity, and enabled the children to blend into European society, the 
markers of racial difference that signified illegitimacy and American paternity for the 
Amerasians resulted in discrimination and abuse.
168
 For mothers of the Amerasians, the 
racial mixture of their children highlighted their own sexual immorality and promiscuity. 
They also faced rejection and persecution for their role in creating half-American and 
illegitimate children.
169
 
In Europe, there was one powerful corresponding example however. Like the 
Amerasians, the racial differences of the “brown babies,”— the offspring of African 
American servicemen and European women—often exposed them to abuse, persecution, 
and violence.
170
 While comparisons exist between the Amerasians and the brown babies 
                                                 
167 Scales, “Soft on Defense,” 379. 
168 Carpenter, Born of War. 
169 For further information on the experiences of militarized women and mothers in Asia see: Enloe, Maneuvers, Moon, Sex Among 
Allies, Hohn and Moon, Over There, and Lee, Service Economies. Letter to Romano L. Mazzoi, from R. Dean Tice, Lieutenant 
General, Jan. 11, 1982, HR 3405 and HR 808, Hearing;  871.  
170 Fears that the brown babies were targets for persecution and discrimination were largely unfounded and rooted in concerns that 
post-Nazi Germany specifically would abuse the children because of engrained assumptions of racial inferiority. However, in post-war 
era, the children became public examples of Germany’s racial progress and evidence of its redemption from the horrors of the war. 
Letter from Thomasina Norford to Walter White, July 7, 1950. Papers of the NAACP, General Office File, 1940-1950 “Brown Babies 
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in terms of military conception, racial distinction, suffering, and illegitimacy, critical 
differences also existed. African American servicemen who married their white European 
girlfriends, thus legitimating their racially mixed children, were legally permitted to bring 
their wives and children to the United States as citizens.
171
 Until 1952, US law prevented 
the Asian wives and children of US servicemen from immigration or naturalization.
172
  
Furthermore, a national campaign by the African American community promoting 
adoption by African American families in America through assertions of a transnational 
racial kinship emerged to address the issue of illegitimate “brown babies.”173 Such efforts 
never surfaced on behalf of the Amerasians from any racially or ethnically distinct 
community in America. African American soldiers composed only ten-percent of US 
military forces in Europe during World War II and produced a small number of children. 
Although reports of brown babies in England reached 10,000, officials ultimately 
documented only 1,700 and the brown babies composed only 3,000 of the 90,000 GI 
                                                                                                                                                 
in Europe” File 2, 1950-55, Part II Box A642; Tina Campt, Other Germans: Black Germans and the Politics of Race, Gender, and 
Memory in the Third Reich (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004.), 224. 
171 Yukiko Koshiro and Susan Zeiger agree that the different perceptions of German and Japanese women during the post-WWII 
occupation is evident in the unequal application of military fraternization and marriage policy and the reliance on prostitution in Asia. 
The nonfraternization policy in Germany lasted only five months while in Japan it remained in effect for four years. The majority of 
wives (85000/114000) admitted to the United States under the War Brides Act of 1945 were white, European and English-speaking. 
Petra Goedde argues that contributing to the acceptance of German women as wives was the rapid improvement in US-German 
relations after the war which she contends emerged from a cultural affinity with the German people and the cultural feminization of 
Germany that shifted perceptions of Germans as masculine wartime enemies responsible for Nazi crimes to victims of war that needed 
protection.  Yukiko Koshiro, “Race as International Identity: 'Miscegenation' in the U.S. Occupation of Japan and Beyond,” 
Amerikastudien/American Studies 8, no.1  (2003): 61-77; Zeiger, Entangling Alliances, Petra Goedde, GIs and Germans: Culture, 
Gender and Foreign Relations, 1945-1949 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003) Shukert and Scibetta, War Brides of World War 
Two.  
172 In 1947 Congress passed the Alien Brides Act which allowed entrance to the U.S. of ‘alien spouses’ otherwise considered 
‘inadmissible because of race’ and gave permission to couples who applied for and were wed within 30 days of the laws enactment – a 
provision that proved unreasonable and impossible for most. This exception was reintroduced in P.L. 717 from 1950-1952 to coincide 
with the marriage requests resulting from the Korean War. Zeiger, Entangling Alliances, 6. According to the article in 1964, 1,265 
American servicemen married Korean wives with an additional 771 married by October 1965. “Marriage by G.I.’s Problem in Korea: 
One Soldier in 40, the Army Finds, Weds a Korean,” The New York Times, Oct 24, 1965. 
173 in 1952 Mabel Grammer, a writer for the African American Newspaper the Baltimore Afro-American, assisted Mr. and Mrs. 
Edward F. Cardwell to adopt three-year old Annaliese Gehring and five-year old Eduard Schmitt, officially kicking off the “Brown 
Baby Plan,” a two-year campaign to save Germany’s brown babies through adoption into African-American families. The campaign 
was largely a response to fears by African Americans that the race of the brown babies in post-Nazi Germany placed them at risk for 
physical harm. The plan ended in 1954 when Grammer official retired. “First Brown Babies Here for Adoption,” Baltimore Afro-
American, January 13, 1953. Mabel Grammer, “Is This the End of the Brown Baby Plan?” The Afro-American, August 7, 
1954.Chicago Defender, October 10, 1951. Baltimore Afro-American, January 13, 1953; As stated in Sabrina Thomas, “The Soul of 
Blood and Water: Transnationalism and Race Across the Oceans,” submitted for review, summer 2015. 
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babies born in Germany.
174
  In contrast, the Amerasian children were the offspring of 
black and white fathers and numbered in the tens of thousands creating a much larger 
population whose claims of paternity were less easily ignored in a war most Americans 
sought to forget.
175
  
Finally the shared political, cultural and racial ideologies of democracy, 
capitalism, technological advancement, and racial superiority that defined America’s 
Occidental relationship with Western Europe did not exist with Asia. There, colonial 
notions of racial inferiority and a well-established history of exclusionary policies against 
people of Asian descent shaped US-Asian relations. Unlike in World War II, Cold War 
politics and fears of communism framed American intervention in Vietnam. Despite the 
misguided presumptions of US leaders about the colonial character of the Vietnamese 
and the paranoid efforts of four US Presidents, America did “lose” Vietnam. The defeat 
shattered America’s confidence in its military superiority and exposed the reprehensible 
actions of American soldiers in the war, damaging American humanitarian and 
ideological credibility. In the process of losing the war, some posit that America had lost 
its identity which led to a collective amnesia regarding its effects and a search over many 
years for a new one. 
                                                 
174 Heide Fehrenbach, “Of German Mothers and ‘Negermischlingskinder’: Race, Sex and the Postwar Nation” in The Miracle years: A 
Cultural History of West Germany, ed. Hanna Schissler, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 164. According to Fehrenbach, 
by 1950 only 3000/90,000 estimated population of GI babies in Germany were brown babies. “Illegitimate Children Born in Britain of 
English Mothers and Coloured Americans; Report of a Survey.” Made by Miss Sylvia McNeill. London: The League of Coloured 
Peoples. 1945. Papers of the Official report and survey sent to the British officials. Papers of the NAACP, General Office File, 1940-
1950 “Brown Babies in Europe” File 1945-1949, Part II Box A642.  “Ship Tan-Yank Babies to U.S.” Chicago Defender, April 12, 
1947; “British Families Adopt Brown Babies: Illegitimate Tots Left Behind by Negro GIs Finally Find Homes,” Ebony, March 1949. 
Official studies later found the numbers of brown babies in England to be greatly inflated 
175 Although Amerasians were also fathered by non-white and non-black Americans, policymakers, US media reports and photographs 
and social service and humanitarian organizations consistently categorized them as the children only of either white or black fathers. It 
was simply more difficult to determine paternity for Amerasians fathered by Latin Americans, Hawaiian Americans or Asian 
Americans. This issue is addressed further in Chapter Three and Chapter Six.   
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Thus, the exclusion of citizenship for the Amerasians of Vietnam was not a new 
phenomenon, and it had the legal rationale of US immigration and citizenship law now 
reinforced by the Supreme Court ruling in Fiallo v. Bell. However it is the legal 
justification that calls into question the intentions behind the attention given to the 
Amerasian issue by policymakers in the post-Vietnam War era. The Amerasian mixture 
of race, nation and war challenged the legacy of exclusion that permeated America’s 
military tradition of ignoring the illegitimate children born to unwed American fathers 
abroad. While the militarized conditions that created Amerasian children in Vietnam 
mirrored those in other countries, America’s military defeat in the Vietnam War 
compounded the issues of citizenship and illegitimacy. The dynamics of this war shifted 
the discourse regarding citizenship and responsibility.
176
  
 
                                                 
176 Yoon, “Reproducing Citizens,” 28. 
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CHAPTER 2 
NATIONAL PATERNAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE ORDERLY DEPARTURE 
PROGRAM 
 
 “We, who are homeless” - Nietzsche 
  
In 1954, the French defeat in the First Indochina War brought France not only the 
problem of global humiliation but also tens of thousands of legitimate and illegitimate 
French-Vietnamese Eurasian children. Rather than viewing the children as the problem of 
individual French fathers, French leaders enacted a policy of national paternal 
responsibility. 
After the war, France evacuated 25,000 Eurasian children from Vietnam to 
France, granting them French citizenship and uniting or reuniting them with their French 
relatives. Those Eurasians who remained in Vietnam with their Vietnamese mothers, 
received financial support from the French government and French citizenship until the 
age of eighteen, when they could choose to adopt Vietnamese citizenship.
177
   
The enactment of such paternal policies proved vital for the Eurasians in Vietnam 
where the role of the father is critical. In Vietnamese culture the father validates the very 
existence of the child by linking him to past, present, and future family members. The 
emphasis on the family as a whole unit rather than on its individual members means that 
the illegitimate child stigmatizes the immediate family, the extended family and all the 
ancestors and future family members, including the unborn.
178
  By legitimizing the 
                                                 
177 Jennings, Imperial Heights; Yarborough, Surviving Twice, 9. For more on French Nationality Law and the Code of 1945 which 
extended French citizenship see Richard Plender, “The New French Nationality Law,” The International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 23, no. 4 (October 1974): 709-747. 
178 A 1987 Country Study by the US Government reported that the basic social institution in Vietnam is the patriarchal family. 
Vietnam societal norms are rooted in Confucian values, framed in terms of the duties and obligation of a family to its father. 
Individual family members are less independent beings than members of a family group that includes the living members of the 
family, dead ancestors, and those yet born. Ronald J. Cima, ed.,Vietnam: A Country Study (Washington: GPO for the Library of 
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Eurasians through policies of national paternity, France protected them from the stigma 
of illegitimacy and ensured their acceptance into Vietnamese society.
179
 
French colonialism and citizenship law contributed to the implementation of 
national paternal responsibility.
180
 Since 1883 when all of Vietnam became subject to 
French colonial rule, the fathering and abandonment of Eurasian children by French men 
agitated the colonial administrators, who viewed the Eurasians as a source of anguish and 
a threat to the colonial order. The métis—mixed race individual—proved problematic for 
European colonizers because it called into question the criteria by which “Europeanness 
could be identified, citizenship accorded and nationality assigned.”181 The existence of 
                                                                                                                                                 
Congress, 1987). Numerous humanitarian organizations and Amerasian advocates who worked with the Amerasians in Asia described 
the familial and societal issues that arose from fatherlessness. According to the Pearl S. Buck Foundation and Father Alfred Keane of 
the St. Vincent’s Home for Amerasian Children in South Korea, in Asia, it is both custom and tradition for the identity of a child to 
come from the father. In 1982, John Shade (PSBF) testified to the US Senate that in Asia, the father is the key to “birth registration, 
legitimacy, citizenship, education, employment and marriage.” His absence results in societal problems that Amerasians cannot 
overcome. In addition to fatherlessness. Testimony of John Shade, Jr., SB 1698, Hearing,70. Kieu Linh Caroline Valverde posits that 
the stigma of the Vietnam War contributes to the shame associated with the Amerasian child in Vietnam. The term “Amerasian” is a 
loaded and militarized term that assumes the mothers are prostitutes and the children, the offspring of the American enemy. Kieu Linh 
Caroline Valverde, “Doing the Mixed-Race Dance: Negotiating Social Spaces Within the Multiracial Vietnamese American Class 
Typology,” in The Sum of Our Parts: Mixed-Heritage Asian Americans, eds. Teresa Williams-Leon and Cynthia L. Nakashima 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2001); Yarborough, Surviving Twice, 12.  
179 The benefits of French national paternity did not extend equally to those children fathered by French African colonial soldiers. 
Assumptions of racial inferiority dictated their existence in Vietnam where dark skin is considered a negative and inferior attribute. 
The history of racism against darker skinned people in Asia is extensive and evident in the discrimination faced by the children of 
African colonial soldiers and the black Amerasians born to African American soldiers. Within Vietnam’s ethnically diverse 
population, skin color has always been evidence of class— darker skin associated with peasantry and laboring in the sun, while lighter 
skin represented the elite. Kieu Linh Caroline Valverde, “Doing the Mixed-Race Dance” in Williams-Leon Nakashima; Rotem 
Kowener and Walter Demel, eds., Race and Racism in Modern East Asia: Western and Eastern Constructions (Leiden, Netherlands: 
BRILL, 2012). For studies of Black Amerasians from Vietnam, treatment and racial identity see, Maria P.P. Root, “Factors 
Influencing the Variation in Racial and Ethnic Identity of Mixed-Heritage Persons of Asian Ancestry” in Williams-Leon and 
Nakashima. For further discussion of the history and historiography concerning the influence of racism in western civilization on 
Japan see, John Russell, “Race and Reflexivity: The Black Other in Contemporary Japanese Mass Culture” Cultural Anthropology 6, 
no. 1 (Feb, 1991). For a deeper discussion of race and Japanese Amerasians and how white Amerasians were deemed attractive while 
black Amerasians were considered primitive, animalistic and inferior, see Hiroshi Wagatsuma, “Identity Problems of Black Japanese 
Youth,” in The Mixing of Peoples: Problems of Identity and Ethnicity, ed., Robert I. Rotberg (Stamford: Greylock Publishers, 1978).  
180 For more on the French colonization of Vietnam, its civilizing mission and the Vietnamese response to French imperialism, 
including the role of collaborators see: David G. Marr, Vietnamese Anticolonialism 1885-1925 (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: 
University of California Press, 1971). 
181 A distinction existed between the “Eurasian” and the “métis.” The term Eurasian applied to a legitimate child of French and 
Vietnamese parents and who was, therefore, a French citizen. The tem métis applied to the illegitimate child of French and 
Vietnamese parents. Due to its illegitimacy and the abandonment by the father the métis was not a French citizen but a French colonial 
subject. In her examination of the making of colonial categories and the colonial order in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Ann 
Laura Stoler asserts that racial thinking to the class-based logic that differentiated between native and European. Stoler, Carnal 
Knowledge and Imperial Power, 13, 80. For a discussion of French policies and practices towards the metis in French colonial West 
Africa see Rachel Jean-Baptiste, “‘Miss Eurafrica’: Men, Women’s Sexuality and Métis Identity in late Colonial French Africa, 1945-
1960,” Journal of the History of Sexuality 20, No. 3 (September 2011): 568-593. According to Jean-Baptiste in French colonial West 
Africa, the racial mixtures of the métis posed a danger to French colonial society and French discourses discouraged interracial sex 
between French men and West African women due to the fear that reproducing children with women of color threatened the 
“maintenance of whiteness.” The métis identity, as in Vietnam, blurred the colonial categories of white citizen and black colonial 
subject. 
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the métis complicated colonial categories of “us” and “them” by forcing colonizers to 
consider how to deal with a racially mixed, culturally different population that lacked a 
national identity.
182
  
However, some French authorities believed that the transnational roots of the 
Eurasians made them valuable collaborators in the French colonial cause, worthy of 
inclusion in the national community without full membership.
183
 The métis were 
especially valuable, as their inherent transnational qualities allowed them to exist 
simultaneously among the Vietnamese masses and French colonizers.
184
 Numerous plans 
emerged to utilize the métis as agents of agricultural or industrial colonization resulting in 
the establishment in 1907 of an agricultural school for métis in Tonkin.
185
 In 1938 the 
Governor-General of French West Africa, Jules Brevie proposed using the métis in 
Indochina to colonize the Darlac Plateau.
186
  
                                                 
182 Questions of national identity were central to the anguish of French colonial administrators regarding the métis in French Indochina 
and all of the French colonial Empire. Emmanuelle Saada explains that the majority of the métis were unrecognized and abandoned by 
their fathers leaving them a “hybrid and a bastard” population that threatened the order of colonial society and causing French colonial 
administrators to reconsider issues of “race” (French or native) and nation (citizen or subject). Until 1946, natives were considered 
French nationals but without the rights of French citizenship. Nationality was an unstable status in the colonies interpreted on varying 
degrees of difference and distance from “Frenchness,” but always absent of citizenship for natives. The determination by a 1928 
decree that metis considered of the French “race” were eligible for French citizenship—determined by social status, and familiarity 
with French culture rather than biology—became the template for how other French colonies handled the “métis problem.” Saada, 
Empire’s Children, 2-4, 97-104. According to Rachel Jean-Baptiste in her study of colonial West Africa, throughout the French 
Empire, colonial rule depended upon ridged racial categories of difference that regulated both social and legal status. While some non-
white persons able to demonstrate significant assimilation had access to nationality, it remained primarily reserved for whites only. 
The majority of non-whites were colonial subjects controlled by “native law” and subject to repressive colonial regulations. Much of 
the conversation by French colonial administrators in West Africa regarded whether or not métis was a racial and legal category—
were they native colonial subjects, or French citizens? Rachel Jean-Baptiste Rachel Jean-Baptiste, “‘Miss Eurafrica,’” 574-575. 
183 David Marr, Vietnamese Anti-colonialism, 1885-1925 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California, 1971). Marr posits that 
French colonial success in Vietnam was dependent upon Vietnamese collaborators. According to Jennings, French colonial 
administrators began recruiting Eurasians to the town of Dalat where they would lose their Vietnamese roots and learn French ones at 
the Écoles dé Enfants de Troupe Eurasians de Dalat, a boarding school to prepare Eurasians for the French army. Jennings, Imperial 
Heights, 187-189. See also: Milton E. Osborne, The French Presence in Cochinchina and Cambodia: Rule and Response (1859-1905) 
(Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1969); Mark W. McLeod, The Vietnamese Response to French Intervention, 1862-1874 
(New York and London: Praeger Press, 1991).  
184 Perhaps a product of start racial differences, Emmanuelle Saada and Rachel Jean-Baptiste agree that the notion of the métis as 
potential collaborators did not extend to French colonial Africa. Additionally even those métis who graduated from the French 
education, language and cultural training programs successfully stripped of their “exotic and foreign elements” remained classified in 
France through 1928 remained officially classified as métis. Saada, Empire’s Children, 70-74 and 87, Jean-Baptiste, “‘Miss 
Eurafrica.’” 
185 Saada, Empire’s Children, 70-71. According to Saada, the project ended after some of the students caused a disturbance. 
186 Ibid., 71. Brevie’s proposal was never enacted. 
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Motivating such efforts was a belief that the métis could transform into 
“Frenchmen in soul and character” with the proper environmental influences and 
education while remaining native subjects.
187
 Orphanages like the Orphenlinat des 
enfants franco-indochinois abandonnés, philanthropic societies like Société d’assistance 
des enfants métis abandonnés, and boarding schools such as the Écoles dé Enfants de 
Troupe Eurasians de Dalat, emerged to provide métis children French education, 
language and culture training in efforts to teach some “how” to be French. 188   
It was precisely because of their transnational makeup and ability to act as a 
population in transition that French authorities commonly viewed the métis as the “fruit 
of colonial sin.”189 Even amidst such controversial reasoning, the notion by the French 
that Eurasians were an extension of the French empire and therefore a national 
responsibility shaped colonial and post-colonial policies.
190
 Still, the actions of the 
French government to transport its metis population to France and award citizenship and 
financial support, depicted a national obligation to the métis that in many cases replaced 
the expectation of responsibility by individual French fathers.
191
 Furthermore, by granting 
the métis French citizenship, French leaders legitimated a political and social identity for 
                                                 
187 Ibid., 85.The status of the métis—illegitimate and unrecognized by their French fathers— kept them classified as native subjects 
rather than French citizens The inability of French administrators to reconcile the French paternity of the métis with their illegitimacy 
and native attributes was at the heart of discussions regarding the colonial classification of the métis in terms of race and nation.  
188 Ibid., 34-65. According to Emmanuelle Saada, the “métis problem” applied primarily to those illegitimate and abandoned offspring 
whose race and nationality remained in question as a result of racial mixture and fatherlessness. French colonial authorities concerned 
with the potential for crime, poverty and subversion within the population sought to “make them” French as a solution.  
189 Jennings, Imperial Heights, 187. 
190 Ibid., 239. In 1945 French law guaranteed French citizenship to the Eurasians although the law was largely based on military 
service to the French government and excluded the majority of Afro-Asians—the children of French Moroccan colonial soldiers—on 
the basis of both their Moroccan nationality and race. 
191 Saada, Empire’s Children, 24-25. The roots of the French decision to evacuate large numbers of métis, award French nationality 
and reclassify them as French citizens are complicated. According to Saada the first attempt to legally resolve the métis problem 
occurred in 1926 by the Governor-General Alexandre Varenne. The issue reemerged after the First Indochina War when discussions 
of the métis preceded the Geneva accords and in 1955 the French-Vietnamese nationality agreement addressed the issue extensively. 
Such legal actions combined, according to Saada, with the nature of French colonial settlement that encouraged the production of 
mixed race children who were then abandoned when colonial officials were transferred to other colonies or returned home; and the 
negative attitudes of the Vietnamese toward the children whose abandonment by foreign fathers made life difficult in a patrilineal 
society.  
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them that ensured they had a homeland. Perhaps due to France’s favorable response to 
the children and its willingness to accept a national paternal responsibility, the Eurasians, 
did not face the same abuse and discrimination as would the Amerasian children twenty 
years later.
192
  
 The irony in the very different approach by the United States to its Amerasian 
children lies within the similarities of French and American citizenship. French and 
American citizenship have an expansive and assimilationist ideology in which 
membership, or nationality, originate through both jus sanguinis (blood) and jus soli 
(land).
193
  
Both nations term membership and national identity from an Enlightenment 
ideology that defines the national narratives of openness and accessibility.
194
 However, 
this narrative changed when considering the different approaches taken to address the 
Eurasian and the Amerasian. The French policy of national paternal responsibility 
reinforced the French narrative of assimilation and expansive citizenship, through empire. 
In contrast, America’s approach of an inclusionary discourse and exclusionary policy, 
                                                 
192 Although the métis did face similar forms of discrimination within Indochina as a result of their paternity and bastardy, many métis 
also elevated their status in society through French schooling and efforts at French cultural assimilation. Orphanages, boarding schools 
and philanthropic organizations assisted with such efforts. Additionally those mixed-race Eurasian children whose French fathers 
legitimated them via marriage or claim were considered French citizens and benefitted accordingly within society. Unlike the 
Amerasians whose social and legal identity was more rigidly defined by abandonment, illegitimacy and foreign paternity, the social 
and legal identity of the métis was more porous. Saada, Empire’s Children; Yoon, “Reproducing Citizens Through U.S.  Militarism,” 
9-11. The children of French African colonial soldiers did face discrimination and abuse in the post-colonial era, however American 
sources on this subject are lacking. This is an area in need of more historical research that also encourages comparative research 
between the black Eurasians and the black Amerasians. 
193 French citizenship is ascribed at birth to those born in France, its territories and colonies, with at least one French citizen parent; it 
is acquired automatically at age eighteen by all children born in France to foreign parents. Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and 
Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992); Plender, “The New French Nationality Law,” 709-
747. 
194 Rob Kroes, Them and Us: Questions of Citizenship in a Globalizing World (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 
2000), 76. 
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reflected the contradictions in the American narrative of open borders and inclusion with 
a history of conquest and exclusion against the racial “other.”195   
France accepted its role as a colonizing nation with the purpose of expanding the 
French empire through territorial acquisition and the conquest and inclusion of its racially 
“inferior” colonial subjects. In contrast, the United States has always been uncomfortable 
“owning” its colonialism as it directly undermines American democracy. American 
leaders have consistently denied the assertion that military efforts against Native 
Americans, Filipinos, Puerto Ricans, or Haitians were imperialist. The result is a 
contradiction that has framed American conquest abroad not as colonial, but as paternally 
benevolent and necessary. 
196
 
In each case, American imperialism did not result in the formal incorporation of 
colonial populations into an American empire. Native Americans and Puerto Ricans did 
not receive American citizenship until 1924 and 1917 respectively while Filipinos never 
did.
197
 By not awarding citizenship to its “non-colonial subjects” American leaders could 
                                                 
195 Please note that the argument made here is specific to the policies regarding the Eurasian and Amerasian populations in Vietnam 
only. The author recognizes that the discussion of the legal status of the métis incorporated ever-shifting lines of inclusionary 
discourses and exclusionary policies based primarily on ascriptive characteristics that determined whether a mixed-race person was 
“French.”  
196 In asserting that the native populations affected by American expansion into the Pacific and Caribbean were “unfit for self-
government” and “hopeless heathens” in need of the United States’ benevolent guidance in government and spirituality and 
civilization, American imperialists justified military occupation and annexation of Hawaii, the Philippines and Puerto Rico. For 
further information on US imperialism and race regarding the annexation of Hawaii and the Philippines see Spickard, Almost All 
Aliens; Lee, Orientals and Basson, White Enough to be American. Paul Kramer argues that framing American intervention in the 
Philippines in 1898 was a discourse of paternalism via the “White Man’s Burden,” the creation of Empire necessitated race-making to 
secure Anglo-Saxon superiority by imposing colonial hierarchies on the indigenous population perceived to be the “’children’ of 
benevolent or disciplinarian ‘fathers.” Kramer, The Blood of Government, 23. In Puerto Rico Laura Briggs asserts that America 
“worked out its attitudes towards expansionism” through the racialization and sexualization of Puerto Rican women. Briggs, 
Reproducing Empire, 2.  Finally, In Haiti, occupied by U.S. forces from 1915-1940, American leaders again imposed a policy of 
paternalism. Viewing the Haitians as racially and sexually inferior and therefore unfit for self-government, American leaders felt 
obliged to evoke the paternal image of America as father figure and the intention of U.S. policy to protect, educate and discipline its 
Haitian child. Mary Renda, Taking Haiti: Military Occupation and the Culture of U.S. Imperialism (Chapel Hill: The University of 
North Carolina Press, 2001), 25. 
197 Jones-Shafroth Act, Public Law 175, 64th Cong., 2d sess. (June 2, 1924), authorized the Secretary of the Interior to issue certificates 
of citizenship to Indians.” June 2, 1924; Enrolled Acts and Resolutions of Congress, 1789-1996; General Records of the US 
Government, RG 11; National Archives; Puerto Ricans and Filipinos became U.S. nationals rather than U.S. citizens until 1917 and 
1946 respectively. As nationals they could come to America but could not benefit from the rights and protections of citizenship. The 
Insular Cases [(Downes v. Bidwell (182 U.S. 244, 1901), Dorr v. United States (195 U.S. 138, 1904), Balzac v. Porto Rico (258 U.S. 
298, 1922), and Rasmussen v. United States (197 U.S. 516, 1925) ] were a series of Supreme Court rulings from 1901-1922 and 
established that the U.S. Constitution did not extend to unincorporated territories of the United States and thus the territories as a result 
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deny accusations of empire and maintain the narrative that the intentions of American 
conquest were not exploitative but rather humanitarian. It was the same narrative that 
President Dwight Eisenhower evoked in 1954 to criticize the misguided and futile French 
effort to perpetuate colonialism in Vietnam and to justify America’s own neocolonial 
intervention: “‘we must work with these people [Vietnamese], and then they themselves 
will soon find out that we are their friends and that they can’t live without us.’”198 
The “People Problems” 
The United States had been “officially” involved in military action against North 
Vietnam for almost a decade when humanitarian organizations like the Pearl S. Buck 
Foundation began to pressure policymakers to address the issue of the growing 
Amerasian population.
 199
 Additionally, media sources began to point to America’s own 
failure to take responsibility for the “people problems” created as a result of U.S. 
presence during the war.
200
 American soldiers also contributed to growing awareness. 
According to Sister Rosemary Taylor of Catholic Relief Services, the emerging 
                                                                                                                                                 
of the 1898 Spanish-American War belonged to the United States but were not part of the United States. The result of the rulings 
created two kinds of territorial categories. Incorporated territories included everything acquired prior to the Spanish-American war and 
reflected an intent to turn such territories into states (Hawaii). Unincorporated territories included everything acquired during and after 
including Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands and the Philippines. There was no intention of statehood however the Tydings-
McDuffie Act of 1934 granted the Philippines independence in 1946. Between the passing of the Act in 1934 and independence, 
Filipinos lost their status as US nationals and became “aliens,” ineligible for US citizenship like all other Asians, per the 1924 
Immigration and Nationality Act. Puerto Ricans gained U.S. citizenship in 1917 but in 1922 Balzac v. Porto ruled that citizenship only 
applied to those Puerto Ricans residing on the mainland.  
198 Record of telephone conversation, Eisenhower and Dulles, July 20, 1954, Eisenhower Papers, Diary Series, Box 4. 
199 The Buck Foundation became officially active in Vietnam providing humanitarian assistance and international adoption services in 
1971. Holt International signed an agreement with the government of South Vietnam in 1973 for the same services. On June 12, 1973, 
the Vietnamese Amerasian Children’s Fund, the Ministry of Social welfare, and the Pearl S. Buck Foundation’s Welcome House 
established an official agreement of support. “W.H.A.P.G to Work Alongside VACF,” The Welcomer, November 1973, Welcomer 
1973 folder, Box Welcome House, Archives of the Pearl S. Buck House, Pearl S. Buck International.  
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Japan including the Pearl S. Buck Foundation’s Welcome House (1949), the Holt Adoption Agency (1956) and International Social 
Services (1957). Gage argues that little attention was given to these NGOs until the Vietnam War when the intersection of the War 
and the Civil Rights Movement’s focus on civil liberties created a cultural shift that linked civil societies, international organizations, 
government and media to help create policy change. Sue-Je Lee Gage, “Pure Mixed Blood: The Multiple Identities of Amerasians in 
South Korea,” (Ph.D diss., Indiana University, 2007), 99.    
  41 
consciousness of the Amerasians in Vietnam resulted from the stories of servicemen who 
returned to America and related their experiences of the orphanages.
201
 
However, the administration of President Richard Nixon had little interest in the 
Amerasians. Rather than accepting responsibility for the actions of its soldiers abroad, the 
Department of Defense (DoD) released a statement in 1970 that, “The care and welfare of 
these unfortunate children…has never been and is not now considered an area of 
Government responsibility nor an appropriate mission for the Department of Defense to 
assume.”202 In 1971 journalist Tom Tiede reported that the United States did not 
officially recognize the existence of the Amerasians. According to Tiede, White House 
aides said “‘It’s a Defense Department matter.’ The Defense Departments says: ‘It’s a 
State Department matter.’ And the State Department, through an official of the Agency of 
International Development says: ‘We have no program for the children, and none is 
contemplated.’”203  
Still, advocates for the Amerasians remained adamant that the US take 
responsibility by granting citizenship. The Pearl S. Buck Foundation insisted that the 
Amerasians were American children who deserved both the fruits of American 
responsibility and American citizenship. Adoption organizations like Holt International 
also advocated citizenship for these soon-to-be American children as a way to make the 
international adoption process easier.  
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However more politicized humanitarian organizations like International Social 
Service and Church World Service insisted that despite their apparent American 
paternity, the Amerasians were Vietnamese children.
204
 Both organizations stressed that 
the Amerasians were no different than other Vietnamese child war victims. Thus, 
according to Reverend John Shower of the Church World Service, US citizenship was not 
the answer for the Amerasians because they “are not Americans.”205 In 1971, the New 
York Times reported that US officials agreed with Shower’s assessment and did not 
consider the Amerasians an American issue because they were not American citizens.
206
  
 Part of the resistance to responsibility by the Nixon administration was the 
unwillingness to admit to the sexual indiscretions or consensual interracial relationships 
of American soldiers with Vietnamese women. American mothers, according to Don 
Luce, the Head of International Voluntary Service in Vietnam, “would be upset to know 
their sons were sleeping with Vietnamese girls.”207 Pearl S. Buck asserted that for many 
Americans, “the very idea of American servicemen fathering babies overseas is 
unthinkable, therefore the children, do not exist.”208  
Rather, the DoD defended its soldiers and US military policy explaining that it did 
not condone the “irresponsible and immoral behavior” of American servicemen. To 
address the issues of loneliness that arose from family separation and placement in a 
foreign environment, the DoD pointed to the variety of wholesome activities, 
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entertainment options and strict rules that prevent such immoral behaviors.
209
 As in 
previous wars, one Korean War Veteran explained, the general belief is that “‘Our men 
don’t do that (make babies), they play volleyball for relaxation.’”210 
Instead of recognizing the Amerasians as an American concern, the DoD pointed 
to the emotion and compassion associated with the issue, asserting a distortion of the 
magnitude of the problem. Rather than addressing the behavior of its misbehaving 
soldiers or the ineffective policies that failed to deter it, the DoD reminded Americans of 
the generosity of the American soldier abroad who provided orphanages with food, 
medicine and toys, that led to the adoption of “many of these alien children.”211  
Ironically however, while the US government resisted accepting national 
responsibility for the Amerasians, increasing concerns by the American public for all of 
the child victims of the Vietnam War—the orphaned, fatherless, maimed, and hungry—
helped bring them to the attention of American policymakers. Between 1971 and 1975 
policymakers unsuccessfully introduced numerous bills regarding the Amerasians.  
In May of 1971, Representatives Patsy Takemoto Mink (D-HA) and Donald M. 
Fraser (D-MN) co-sponsored H.R 8462 a bill to issue special immigrant visas for the 
Amerasians in Vietnam.
212
 Fraser criticized the US government for its record of ignoring 
the Amerasian problem, referencing the thousands of Amerasians in Japan and Korea 
who preceded the Amerasians of Vietnam and who Fraser asserted also grew up 
ostracized in a society that swept them under the rug. “The US Government,” he 
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exclaimed, “had a hand on the broom.”213 Posed as an opportunity for the United States 
to fix its track record on Amerasians, the bill received very little support and died in the 
Judiciary Committee.  
Less than a year later, in April 1972, Congressmen Mark Hatfield (D-OR), 
Harrison Williams (D-NJ) and Harold Hughes (D-IA) presented S.B. 2497 to the Foreign 
Relations Committee. The bill would establish the Vietnam Children’s Care Agency and 
authorized the President to collaborate with the government of South Vietnam to provide 
welfare assistance and adoption for all child victims of the war, but specifically for the 
growing Amerasian population.
214
  It too, never made it out of committee.
215
 
In 1973, the Agency for International Development (AID) and the Department of 
State reviewed the request to modify U.S. Immigration and Nationality law to allow 
Amerasians in Vietnam to obtain American citizenship, primarily for the purpose of 
making their adoption by American families, easier and as a show of responsibility.
216
 
That same year Congressman William Steiger (R-WI ) and Howard Robison (R-NY) 
proposed H.R. 8381 to confer U.S. citizenship on the Amerasians for the purposes of 
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easing the adoption process and expediting their adoption to America.
217
  In presenting 
the bill to the House, Steiger explained that “by bestowing US citizenship on these 
children, we will clearly indicate to the South Vietnamese that we are willing to accept 
our responsibilities and that we want to provide them [Amerasians] all the care, rights, 
and privileges that we grant all American citizens.”218 Proposed nine times in 1973 to the 
House, this bill never passed the Judiciary Committee.
219
  
Finally, on March 19, 1975, Representative Paul Tsongas (D-MA) introduced yet 
another bill that failed to pass the Committee. Tsongas’ bill, H.R. 5187, would confer 
U.S. citizenship upon the Amerasian orphans adopted by Americans. Citizenship was 
necessary, according to Tsongas, not simply for the purpose of expediting the adoption 
process, but because, “the United States bears a special responsibility to these 
children.”220 
The number of bills proposed in both the House and Senate on the issue reflected 
the growing bi-partisan awareness of the Amerasian problem by the end of the war. As 
U.S. forces withdrew from Vietnam in 1973, a flood of concern arose from American 
politicians worried about the post-war consequences for the people of Vietnam. Senator 
Edward Kennedy (D-MA) led this charge and placed the issue of the Amerasians into the 
context of an ending war when he proposed three amendments to the Foreign Assistance 
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Authorization Act. Although Kennedy expressed relief with ending the war, he urged the 
Nixon Administration and Congress to remember that America’s primary responsibility 
in Indochina, “is to the people who live there.”221 
The focus of Kennedy’s amendments was the “people problems” created by the 
war. Fundamentally humanitarian, the amendments authorized five-million dollars to 
provide assistance to South Vietnamese children disadvantaged by the war and to aid in 
their adoption to the United States. In his effort to gain political support Kennedy 
described the refugees and orphans, the crippled and maimed, and the twenty to thirty-
thousand Amerasian children he deemed “a special concern,” long “neglected by Saigon 
and Washington.”222 According to Kennedy, the United States had to share in the 
humanitarian burden it helped create in Southeast Asia. It was time for Americans, he 
said, “to pause and open our eyes to the plight of the children in Indochina.” Addressing 
their plight and that of the Amerasian children was vital to “healing the wounds of 
war.”223 Although the Senate Foreign Relations Committee issued a report 
recommending further action on the bill, it too died before any action could occur.
224
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Adopting US National Security 
While Kennedy and other policymakers framed the Amerasians as a humanitarian 
responsibility, some viewed them as a population critical to U.S. national security. In the 
era of Cold War politics, increasing anxiety among some American policymakers that 
half-American and “stateless” children born abroad might become purveyors of anti-
Americanism dictated the push for international adoptions.
225
 Certainly, they implied, 
Amerasians could receive the proper guidance necessary to alleviate such threats through 
humanitarian efforts and adoption into primarily white middle-class American 
families.
226
  
Others outside the government also emphasized this need. Pearl Buck argued that 
international and interracial adoptions could facilitate positive relations between the 
United States and Asia. Buck utilized the framework of containment to advocate for the 
adoption of the Amerasian children as the key to preventing further losses of Asian 
nations to communism.
227
 In a 1971 interview with the Washington Post, Buck explained, 
“‘These children who have no country are going to be a menace. They’re angry. They’re 
very angry. And our men have been abroad so long that some children are now 20 years 
old. I’m afraid there’s a danger the Amerasians will go over to the Communists.’”228  
Although Buck seemed resigned to the reality that, for the Amerasians, 
international adoption “could never be more than a ‘selective medication’ and certainly 
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not a ‘universal remedy,’” politicizing the issue as vital to U.S. national security found 
success in gaining sympathetic humanitarian support for the Amerasians.
229
 American 
popular media presented the white, middle-class suburban family as a foundation of 
postwar national identity, “an emblem of a prosperous and secure America that 
reinforced identification through contrast with communist nations—bent on destroying 
the family and replacing it with the state.”230  
The Politics of Race 
U.S. social service organizations, adoption experts, and politicians continued to 
gain public sympathy and support for the Amerasians by emphasizing the injustice they 
faced in Vietnam where their American heritage marked them physically different. Many 
believed their American blood caused a moral degeneracy that turned Amerasians into 
cultural misfits, incapable of adhering to the norms of Vietnamese society. In her 
psychological study of the psychosocial and adaptational issues facing the Amerasians of 
Vietnam, Joyce Anis discovered that many Amerasians internalized the stigma of being 
seen as wild, criminal, homeless, and bad by their Vietnamese family members and peers. 
According to one Amerasian, “‘a lot of older people think that Amerasian kids are hard to 
raise because we have a mixture of blood, Vietnamese blood and American blood, and 
we are hard headed, hard to raise, don’t listen and they pretty much categorize us as bad 
kids.’”231 
The notion of race factored in even more for the estimated 15,000 black 
Amerasians whom American social service and adoption experts agreed faced a dire 
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situation in Vietnam.
 232
 In 1972, the Holt International Adoption Agency reported that 
black Amerasians faced abandonment to orphanages or the streets in Vietnam at a ratio 
seven-to-three over white Amerasians.
233
 While many Amerasian babies and children 
grew into their American features—nose shape, hair color, height— throughout their 
childhood, black Amerasians—unable to escape their skin— felt the sting from birth. 
Like America, Vietnam had a history of racial hierarchy that characterized “whiteness” as 
good and “blackness” as bad.234  
As a result, many black Amerasians experienced childhoods hidden away, 
shunned and ridiculed by parents, neighbors, and classmates. On average, black 
Amerasians were more likely to have been in fights than white Amerasians and 33% of 
black Amerasians had no schooling in Vietnam compared to 13% of white.
235
 Twenty-six 
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year old black Amerasian Luong Hung and two others describe their own feelings of race 
in Vietnam: 
I feel ashamed that my mother was with a black man, and now I have to 
carry that.
236
 
When I go to store and they saw me come, some the people [sic] they 
throwing things at me…They say I am black, or something.237 
I don’t know how they would treat someone who has lighter skin, but for 
me having dark skin, they did not like. Those who have dark skin they 
think are ugly—we don’t look good with dark skin.238 
 
Due to the racist and classist ideology in Vietnam that associated dark skin with 
poverty and white skin with wealth, European features were more desirable than African 
features.
 239
 In his interviews with Amerasians from Vietnam, child psychiatrist and 
Vietnam Veteran Robert McKelvey discovered that whiteness equated to physical 
attractiveness in Vietnamese society while blackness did not.
240
 As a result of their dark 
skin, black Amerasians faced intense discrimination and “more than their share of 
difficulties.”241   
Since dark skin brought shame to the Vietnamese family, many mothers 
abandoned their black Amerasian children at hospitals and orphanages.
 242
 In 1971 
although they composed an estimated ten-percent of the Amerasians in Vietnam, black 
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Amerasians made up fifty-two percent of those in orphanages.
243
 According to Sister 
Francoise, head of the Caritas Orphanage in Saigon, the Vietnamese viewed such 
abandonment as “good for the family but sad for the child.”244   
Additionally, Amerasians in Vietnam lacked other references to racial or ethnic 
identity. Because there was no black community in Vietnam, the International Social 
Services (ISS) explained, the black Amerasian will “grow up and live in social 
isolation.”245  In 1971, Vo Thi Nen, the grandmother and caretaker of her black 
Amerasian grandson explained that her grandchild was “‘too different from the other 
children in our community. I think he would be better off in the United States.’”246 
Those expressing initial concerns for the black Amerasian framed the issue as the 
responsibility of the African American community. In June 1971 the US Embassy 
expressed its specific concerns for the black Amerasian, noting the “black child may have 
a more difficult time growing up in Vietnam than other children.”247 The ISS reported 
that because of its colonial history, Vietnam accepted the Caucasian-Vietnamese 
children, allowing them to blend into Vietnamese society.
248
 In Vietnam Wells Klein, the 
General Directory of ISS, claimed, “‘white is beautiful’ and light-skinned infants are 
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considered the most attractive.
249
 While Klein advocated keeping the “white” Amerasians 
in Vietnam and treating them the same as all Vietnamese children, the black Amerasians 
he insisted, must come to America where they could find racial kinship amongst the 
African American community.
250
 
In February, 1972 Gloria Emerson’s article “Part Vietnamese, Part Black and 
Orphan” in the New York Times, brought to the attention of the American public the 
problematic existence of the black Amerasian in Vietnam: illegitimate, black and foreign. 
According to Emerson, “Any child who grows up without a family which is the focus of 
Vietnamese life, and is also black, confronts obstacles that a Westerner cannot easily 
imagine.”251 
Within the black community, Juanita Williams, wife of civil rights leader Hosea 
Williams, of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), led on the black 
Amerasian issue. During a 1971 trip to South Vietnam, the number of mixed-race black 
babies in the Vietnamese orphanages had proved shocking.
252
 Upon returning, Williams 
set in motion plans to build an orphanage for the black Amerasians in Vietnam.
253
 She 
also hoped to get Catholic, African American couples in America to adopt the black 
Amerasian children.
254
  
                                                 
249 According to Klein the difficulties that Caucasian Amerasians faced in Vietnam were less about racial difference and more about 
illegitimacy and assumptions that their mothers were prostitutes. Subsequent reports and research showed that as they matured, all 
Amerasians faced societal discrimination and challenges due to racial mixture. Wells Klein, “The Special Needs of Vietnamese 
Children.” 
250 Similar efforts to characterize the problem of GI babies after World War II as the responsibility of the African American 
community incited a national campaign during the period by the African American press to take racial responsibility for the 3000 
brown babies in Germany. Wells Klein, “The Special Needs of Vietnamese Children.” 
251 Gloria Emerson, “Part Vietnamese, Part Black—And Orphans,” New York Times, 7 February 1972. 
252 There were an estimated 500 orphanages existing in Vietnam by 1972 with 126 legally registered with the Vietnamese government 
which provided financial support through the Ministry of Social Welfare to 120 of the approved orphanages. Gloria Emerson, “Part 
Vietnamese, Part Black—and Orphans,” New York Times, February 7, 1972; Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, S 
2497, Vietnam Children’s Care Agency, 92nd Cong., 2nd sess., April 5, 1972:19. 
253 Juanita Williams, audio interview, 1972,  Martin Luther King Speaks Subseries, Series 19, Emory University Archives, 
Manuscript, Archives and Rare Book Library, Emory University 
254 The focus on black Catholic families was critical to the Williams’ efforts to work with orphanages and with the Government of 
South Vietnam to bring black Amerasians to the United States. The Government of South Vietnam would not allow a mass-exodus but 
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But the lack of coverage from the black press, aside from one article in Ebony 
Magazine by Era Bell Thompson, “The Plight of Black Babies in Vietnam,” in December 
1972, reflected a lack of interest by the African American community in the issue.
255
  
More concerned with the disproportionate number of black men dying in Vietnam and 
protecting the gains made during the civil rights movement, there was no mass response 
by the African American community on behalf of the Amerasians.
256
 By December of 
1972, the Williams had officially terminated the program, having failed to adopt out even 
a single black Amerasian child.
257
  
Operation Babylift 
While serving as Richard Nixon’s Vice President, Gerald Ford proved 
sympathetic to the plight of the Amerasians. In 1973 he praised the way France had 
handled its Eurasians as the “most humane and generous” approach.258 In April 1975, 
President Ford made available two-million dollars to Operation Babylift, an emergency 
                                                                                                                                                 
was willing to allow groups of five to ten black Amerasians adoption to the United States if the Williamses found appropriate families. 
While Juanita Williams hoped to find black Catholic families, any effort to do so in the United States is an area for further research. 
Memorandum from Juanita Williams to Stoney Cooks, January 1, 1972, Collection 1083, Box 209, Folder 22, item 1, Manuscript, 
Archives, and Rare Book Library, Emory University.  Additionally Catholic orphanages insisted that adoptive parents be Catholic and 
Buddhist orphanages did not traditionally place children for adoption. Adoption of the Amerasians was a tenuous venture and the 
Catholic Government of South Vietnam worked in conjunction with Catholic Relief Services which advised the Ministry of Social 
Welfare of the Government of Vietnam in developing professional programs in child welfare and in upgrading its children’s 
institutions. While Catholic Relief Services reported that less than 30% of the orphan population was Catholic, the Catholic Church 
operated 90% of the orphanages. Vietnam Children’s Care Agency, S 2497, Hearing, 65-68.  
255 Thompson, “The Plight of Black Babies in Vietnam,” Ebony, December 1972.  
256 According to Kyle Longley racial inequities in draft boards, selective enrollment in the National Guard and the reserves that 
catered to sons of politicians, the wealthy and professional athletes ensured that the grunts were composed primarily of poor, less 
educated, less privileged and black men. The death rates for black soldiers consistently exceeded the proportion of the black 
population throughout the conflict. By 1975 African Americans composed 11 percent of the American population but 13.1 percent of 
the deaths. Kyle Longley, Grunts, 9-11, 30. For more information see Sabrina Thomas, The Soul of Blood and Water; Lawrence 
Eldridge, Chronicles of a Two-Front War: Civil Rights and Vietnam in the African American Press (Columba, MO: University of 
Missouri Press, 2012). 
257 In January 1972, SCLC hired Victor Srinivasan to head the SCLC “Viet-American Children’s Program” in Saigon, with an annual 
salary of $5000. However increasingly agitated and unanswered letters from Srinivasan to Juanita Williams and Stoney Cooks reveal 
that by June 1972 SCLC failed to file the proper paperwork with the South Vietnam Government or pay Srinivasan. In August 1972 
Srinivasan, now responsible for the full care of ten black Amerasians under the auspices of SCLC, wrote, “I am very disappointed (but 
not angry) at the present situation I am in…you haven’t paid my salaries for over two months….the offensive is getting closer to 
Saigon…I tried to call Juanita and she refused to accept the call.” On December 31, 1972, SCLC notified Srinivasan that SCLC had 
discontinued the program. Letter to Stoney Cooks from Juanita Williams, June 21, 1972; Letter to Mrs. Juanita Williams from Victor 
Srinivasan, July 23, 1972, Letter to Stoney Cooks from Victor Srinivasan, August 19, 1972; Letter to Victor Srinivasan from Bernard 
S. Lee, December 31, 1972. Stoney Cook Files, 1965-1972, Manuscript, Archives, and Rare Book Library, Emory University. 
258 Pamphlet, “The Amerasians: A Human Rights Issue and U.S. Foreign Policy Question,” Pearl S. Buck Foundation, c1980, Pearl Q-
Z folder, WHCF, Name File, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library. 
  54 
evacuation of two-thousand Vietnamese and Amerasian orphans from Vietnam for 
adoption before the fall of Saigon.
259
 There was mayhem in Saigon in the days leading up 
to the communist victory. Fears that the communists would take vengeance on anyone 
associated with the United States ran rampant. There were specific concerns that a special 
kind of vengeance awaited the Amerasians. Consequentially, many mothers abandoned 
their children on the streets and in orphanages and hospitals.
260
 They destroyed any 
evidence including birth certificates, pictures, and paperwork that proved that their 
Amerasian child or its American father had ever existed, erasing any claim to legitimacy 
rights.  
The Buck Foundation reported that in the last days, Vietnamese mothers began 
“throwing their kids over the wall of orphanages” in the hopes that they would be taken 
to the United States.
261
 According to Trin Yarborough, the day that Saigon fell, “dozens 
of abandoned children, some as young as two years old, with half-Vietnamese, half 
American faces…had been pushed frantically into the streets or left at orphanages by 
terrified Vietnamese mothers or other family members convinced the Communists would 
murder anyone ever connected to the American enemy.”262  
President Ford announced Operation Babylift on April 3, 1975. On April 4
th
 
hopeful Americans watched in horror as emergency personnel removed the tiny and 
lifeless bodies of seventy-eight Vietnamese and Amerasian orphans from the Vietnam 
                                                 
259 Statement by the President, April 3, 1975, Office of the White House Press Secretary. Box 9, White House Press Releases at the 
Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library. 
260 In his 1980 report, John Shade referenced Amerasians who were murdered because of their American paternity in both Korea in 
1954 and Vietnam in 1975. According to Shade, “‘these children have been sterilized and emasculated so as not to intrude further 
[into Asian society], culturally.’” John A. Shade, Jr., “The Forgotten Child—The Amerasian in Indochina,” Conference for the 
National Organizations Advisory Council, Los Angeles, CA. May 8, 1980, Amerasian folder, 1978-84, Box Vietnam, Archives of the 
Pearl S. Buck House, Pearl S. Buck International.  
261 “Agencies licensed by the Republic of Vietnam to facilitate inter-country adoptions (prior to and during Babylift), General info 
PSBF Vietnam #1 folder, Box Vietnam Operation Babylift, Archives of the Pearl S. Buck House, Pearl S. Buck International. 
262 Yarborough, Surviving Twice, x. 
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field in which their military rescue plane had crashed just minutes after take-off.
263
 Sheila 
Weidenfeld, the press secretary for First Lady Betty Ford, described the crash as “the 
ultimate disaster in a country of endless disasters—a cruel attack on the most innocent 
victims of war, and when they were so close to safety and comfort and familial love.”264 
The images of the crash, the dramatic rescue and accounts of numerous journalists and 
social welfare workers ignited the guilt of many Americans now more determined to help 
the children of Vietnam through adoption. 
However, America’s minority communities were not as taken by the call for 
patriotic adoption. In 1975, Ebony Magazine reported that African-Americans were upset 
about the federal government’s role in Operation Babylift. Declining numbers of white 
American babies available for adoption countered a crisis regarding the number of 
African American and mixed-race American children available for adoption. The needs 
of these 40,000 “hard to place” American children had been forgotten with the plight of 
foreign children.
 265
   Ursula Gallagher of the U.S. Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare questioned why American families that traditionally wanted to adopt healthy 
white infants were now willing to take “older, handicapped Vietnamese children” 
instead.
266
  
                                                 
263 “Agencies licensed by the Republic of Vietnam to facilitate inter-country adoptions (prior to and during Babylift), General info 
PSBF Vietnam #1 folder, Box Vietnam Operation Babylift, Archives of the Pearl S. Buck House, Pearl S. Buck International; The 
Sun, 27 April 2000. 
264 Sheila Weidenfeld, First Lady’s Lady: With the Fords at the White House (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1979), 112-113. 
265 In 1975, 40,000 of the 100,000 American children awaiting adoption in the United States, were, African American. The push by 
domestic adoption agencies for African American couples and single black women to adopt black babies failed to meet the demand of 
the growing numbers of available black children resulting in greater acceptance of interracial adoptions. Social services classified 
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266 Kathy Begley. “Orphans: Too Little, Too Late,” The Philadelphia Inquirer, 13 April 1975.  
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Such concerns seemed justified when the predicted “blood bath” of Amerasians 
after the fall of Saigon never occurred and when two months after the Babylift, reports 
emerged that some of the “rescued” orphans were, in fact, not orphans at all.267 However 
the efforts to rescue Vietnam’s children and the humanitarian discourse surrounding them 
became part of a bigger movement to redefine the American experience in Vietnam. 
Unable to glorify American military heroism or triumph after the war, the focus on 
rescuing Vietnamese children from the dangerous clutches of an “uncaring” Vietnamese 
communist government enabled some Americans to begin to reconstitute their defeat in 
Vietnam as a humanitarian victory.
268
 
Victims of War 
The perception that American policymakers and social service organizations 
placed the needs of foreign children over those of American children persisted after the 
war, as did the insistence that although Amerasians were the children of American 
fathers, they were no different than other Vietnamese child war victims.
269
 The 
Amerasians were not unique, all the children in Vietnam were in need of rescue. Still, by 
conflating the conditions facing the Amerasians in Vietnam with those facing all 
Vietnamese child war victims— poverty, persecution, abandonment—policymakers 
effectively framed the Amerasians as Vietnamese children, therefore removing any 
                                                 
267 “Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order” in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. 
Nguyen Da Yen, Nguyen Da Vuong and Nguyen Da Tuyen v. James Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense, et al. June 30 1975, Legal 
Information folder, Box Vietnam Operation Babylift, Archives of the Pearl S. Buck House, Pearl S. Buck International. 
268 According to Christina Klein advocates of Asian adoption in the United States used a similar rescue narrative after World War II, 
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government cared more about foreign children than orphaned American children. This was particularly prevalent in black newspapers 
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assumptions that their plight was significant to America or that the Amerasians were 
American children.
270
   
 Social service organizations did attempt to establish a connection of racial 
kinship between the black Amerasians and African Americans, as had Juanita Williams, 
hoping to alleviate their specific racialized suffering. However besides the assumption of 
a transnational racial kinship that these organizations assumed would provide a 
communal connection in America for the black Amerasians, there was no further 
consideration of the Amerasians as American.  
Symptomatic of the view that the Amerasians were not American but Asian, was 
the purposeful avoidance of any acknowledgement of paternal responsibility. An 
acknowledgement of paternity would surely have brought forth additional calls for U.S. 
citizenship, forcing policymakers to consider making an exception to US nationality law. 
Citizenship could resolve many of the issues the Amerasians faced. As U.S. citizens the 
Amerasians would be immediately eligible for immigration to the United States under 
preference category two and four – wed and unwed sons and daughters of U.S. citizens. 
Additionally, citizenship would require the United States government to address the 
discrimination, poor living conditions, and alleged persecution of the Amerasians in 
Vietnam and provide the constitutional justification necessary to act abroad. However, in 
the tradition of the precedent set in previous cases of GI babies and US nationality law, 
neither acknowledgement nor citizenship occurred. 
                                                 
270 As a result of Vietnam’s victory in the war, no US politician was willing to do anything, including bringing the Amerasians to the 
United States for fear of the political repercussions and that it might appear “to be aiding and abetting the enemy.” The US 
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In 1978, Senator Edward Kennedy revived the Amerasian issue when he 
presented his case to Congress to establish a $2 million dollar fund to assist the 
disadvantaged children and orphans of Asia. Especially important were those children, 
Kennedy asserted, “fathered by U.S. citizens.”271 While the bill provided needed 
humanitarian and financial assistance to establish—orphanages, day care centers, 
nutrition, health and education– Kennedy missed an opportunity to address the specific 
condition of the Amerasians and instead focused his bill on improving their lives in 
Asia.
272
  
The United States-Asian Immigration Act 
Historian Thomas Bass describes 1978 as the year that Vietnam “began 
hemorrhaging boat people.” International humanitarian attention focused on the dire 
situation in Vietnam as its inhabitants risked the dangers and violence of the seas.
273
 The 
massive influx of refugees arriving in first asylum countries began outpacing those 
leaving for permanent resettlement. This trend posed difficulties for Southeast Asian 
nations now faced with the prospect of permanently absorbing large refugee populations. 
The United States responded by increasing its number of Indochina refugee admissions 
from 25,000 to 53,000 per year and extending the Indochinese Refugee Assistance Act 
through 1978.
274
  
                                                 
271 The $2 million fund was approved by October 1978. To Provide Assistance to Disadvantaged Children and Orphans in Asia, S. 
Amend 2452, 95th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record, (June 26 1978): S18946-18947.  
272 Ibid., S189479.While Kennedy’s bill did address the basic needs of the Amerasians he failed to deal with the issues surrounding 
their American paternity—immigration and nationality.  
273 Bass, Vietnamerica, 37. 
274 According to SOS Cyrus Vance between April 1978 and June 1978 the refugee crisis exploded with 160,000 arriving at UN 
sponsored camps in Southeast Asia and only 27,500 resettled. Additional problems arose with the increasing numbers of refugees 
fleeing into Thailand as a result of the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Kampuchea, Cambodia. Hearing before the Committee 
on the Judiciary, Senate, The Refugee Crisis in Southeast Asia, 96th Cong., 1st sess., July 26, 1979, 8. 
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That same year, “Rosie,” a Vietnamese woman and mother of an Amerasian 
child, garnered the interest of the American public for the Amerasian cause as she began 
proposing to foreign journalists that the U.S. government follow in the tradition of the 
French government and begin airlifting its children home.
275
 American media outlets too, 
publicized the plight of the Amerasians to a mass American audience. On December 31, 
1979, the popular television show M.A.S.H. aired the episode “Yessir, That’s our Baby,” 
in which the staff of the fictional 4077
th
 find an abandoned Amerasian baby.  The show 
immediately evoked notions of transnational kinship. Unlike the abandoning mother 
whom the doctors describe in the racialized terms of the “sneaky Asian,” as “too cagey, 
slipping in and out without nobody seeing her,” the child is immediately pronounced a 
“good baby,” “strong, beautiful,” able to bring out the maternal instincts of “Auntie” 
Margaret.
276
  
The episode had two clear messages: the Amerasians faced lives of misery and 
discrimination in their homelands where Amerasian boys are “emasculated” and girls 
“killed,” and neither the mother of the Amerasian, the local community nor the U.S. 
military wanted to take responsibility for the baby. In a heated interaction in which a U.S. 
military official declared that the child was “not an army matter” and that the army was 
not responsible for “what happens when a solider gets lonely,” an angry Hawkeye 
responded, “Not an army matter? You jackass! Where do you think that child came from? 
                                                 
275 According to Thomas Bass, the Amerasian issue disappeared after Operation Babylift, resurfacing with the media attention given to 
“Rosie.” Following the passage of the ODP, Rosie sent letters of support to the U.S. government and collected the names of numerous 
Amerasian children and their Vietnamese mothers in an effort to get them accepted by the new program. Bass, Vietnamerica. 
276 M.A.S.H. season 8, episode 15, “Yessir That’s Our Baby,” directed by Alan Alda, aired December 31, 1979, on CBS (20th Century 
Fox TV). The portrayal of the Amerasian in the episode as good, strong and beautiful promoted notions of hybrid vigor discussed by 
Nakashima, “An Invisible Monster: The Creation and Denial of Mixed Race People in America,” in Root. The insinuation that the 
abandoning mother was a “sneaky Asian” reinforces Robert Lee’s argument that in the post-war era Americans continued to view the 
Vietnamese as “gooks,” a silent and secretive alien threat to the United States. Lee, Orientals, 190-191. 
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You’ve got people in American soldier suits running around out there making babies and 
then making tracks. Don’t you think it’s about time it became an army matter?”277 
 The show also exposed the hypocrisy of American inaction on the issue. As a 
South Korean government official explained to Hawkeye and Colonel Sherman Potter, 
that while France, Great Britain and the Netherlands had taken responsibility of their 
military babies by offering them support and citizenship, “the United States, where all 
men are created equal refuses to do this.”278 In the end the 4077th re-abandon the baby to 
a local monastery, concerned about its future but unable or unwilling to be responsible. 
The Buck Foundation acted as a consultant on the episode and some of the 
criticism of U.S. military inaction seemed to come directly from Buck Foundation 
material. Although the episode was uncharacteristically grim for the television show, it 
brought awareness and public attention to the issue by broadcasting the problem into the 
living rooms of American viewers.
279
  
Still, neither Rosie’s pleas nor did the M.A.S.H. episode spur the massive airlifts 
that many had hoped for. Instead, the DoD released its most current policy regarding GI 
babies, Directive 1344.3, which restated the official US policy that had been in place 
since World War II: in cases of paternity claims against American and allied personnel, 
“no individual in the military service will be required or requested to admit paternity.”280 
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Z folder, WHCF, Name File, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library. Despite ranking in the Top Twenty television programs in ten of its 
eleven seasons (1972-1983), including the Top Fifteen in season eight,“Yessir, That’s Our Baby” was one of only two episodes that 
season to drop out of the Top Twenty. “Ratings and Rankings,” MASH4077TV.com, accessed, February 1, 2015, 
http://www.mash4077tv.com/episodes/ratings/. 
280 Paternity Claims by Non-Nationals, Circular No. 157, Headquarters European Command, February 15, 1949; Records of the Civil 
Administration Division: General Records of Public Welfare and Displaced Persons, Bavaria, 1946-50; Records of United States 
Occupation Headquarters, WWII, OMGUS Germany, Record Group 250 Box 25; NACB.  “Policy Governing Certain Marital Status 
of Officers, Warrant Officers or Enlisted Men,” War department Memo, June 29, 1944; Adjutant Generals Section Operations 
Division Mail & Records Branch Decimal File, 1945-46, File 291-1 #1 SCAP Allied Operational and Occupational Headquarters, 
WWII, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers; Record Group 33, Box 433; NACB. 
  61 
Furthermore, the DoD considered complaints by foreign mothers against a member of the 
military for child support to be unfounded unless legitimated by the judgment of a court 
of record in the United States.
281
 Such policy had proved an effective barrier against 
paternity claims by foreign women, protecting American servicemen from any 
responsibility for fathering “foreign” children and excluding those children from any 
claim to U.S. citizenship.
282
  
Elected to Congress in 1971, Representative Stewart McKinney (R-CT) quickly 
established himself as a moderate Republican and a committed champion of urban aid 
and social welfare programs.
283
 Considered at the time to be the wealthiest member of 
Congress, the Ivy League graduate and Air Force veteran possessed an undeniable 
commitment to social issues and social justice.
284
 His efforts to pass legislation for the 
immigration and naturalization of the Amerasians at the end of the decade reflected his 
reputation as a humanitarian and an advocate for society’s forgotten and invisible 
populations.  
By 1978 Representative McKinney had become a political advocate for the 
Amerasians. He heard “Rosie’s” pleas and understood the consequences of current DoD 
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policies for the Amerasians. On April 4, 1979 McKinney introduced H.R. 3439 the 
United States-Asian Immigration Act, to the House. The plight of the Amerasians, 
McKinney believed, lay in the deliberate practice of “othering” the Amerasians into 
Asians. It was an approach reflected in what he considered a flawed U.S. immigration 
system that forced them to apply to immigrate to America through the non-preference 
category.
285   
Under U.S. immigration law, the Amerasians were already “othered” as outsiders 
and excluded from family reunification. Amerasians who qualified for permanent 
immigrant visas did so not in preference class (1) unmarried sons and daughters of United 
States citizens, or preference class (4) married sons and daughters of U.S. citizens, but 
under the lowest preference class (8), “other qualified immigrants.” 286  
The “othering” of the Amerasians in U.S. immigration policy was an inadequate 
solution to the Amerasian situation according to McKinney, who asserted that because 
the non-preference category attracted a number of applications which exceed the total 
quota limit, “the children of American citizens have little or no chance of entering the 
United States.”287  By excluding the Amerasians from the categories of family 
reunification, American law dictated that very few Amerasians would have the chance to 
immigrate to America.  
McKinney believed the Amerasians to be just as much American as they were 
Asian and his bill would amend the admissions provisions of the Immigration and 
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286 Hart Cellar Act of 1965, Public Law 89-236, 89th Cong., 1st sess., (October 3, 1965). 
287 McKinney’s unsuccessful United States-Asian Immigration Act proposed to the House on April 4, 1979 to allow preferential 
treatment in the admissions of Amerasians, would become the framework for the 1982 Amerasian Immigration Act. United States-
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Nationality Act to provide them preferential treatment.  In promoting the bill, McKinney 
appealed to American humanitarianism, the inclusionary character of American 
democratic ideology and American paternal responsibility. He emphasized the 
importance of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) like the Buck Foundation in 
providing the Amerasians opportunities to live in the “more tolerant culture” of the 
United States; securing “a better future for these sons and daughters of U.S. citizens.”288 
He also pointed to the inability of the Amerasians to assimilate into Asian society, as he 
explained, most of their countrymen considered them to “exist outside the mainstream of 
that society.”289 As second-class citizens, McKinney continued, the Amerasians faced 
limited opportunities for education or employment and, therefore, a bleak future.  
In the post-civil rights era, American policymakers were all too familiar with the 
challenges that second-class citizenship posed to an American ideology that espoused 
that “all men are created equal.” Perhaps, this was McKinney’s justification for 
concluding this reference with a call for American humanitarian and paternal 
responsibility for these children of American citizens. It is because of the U.S. presence 
in Asia, he asserted, that the Amerasians exist, and due to U.S. immigration laws that 
categorize them as “other” applicants, that they continue to live in such dire 
circumstances.
290
 
In his passionate support of the bill, McKinney invoked the notion of family 
unification and reunification. After all, McKinney reasoned, as the sons and daughters of 
American men, the Amerasians were American citizens. However, U.S. law only granted 
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American citizenship to the legitimate children of U.S. fathers born abroad and that 
required a recognized marital union or documented acknowledgement of paternity.
291
 
Since most Amerasians did not know their American fathers outside of perhaps, a first 
name, photograph or place of birth, obtaining an acknowledgement of paternity proved 
almost impossible.  
McKinney’s bill attempted, therefore, to address the weaknesses of US law and 
Directive 1344.3 by placing the United States in the role of national surrogate father, 
mirroring the previous response of the French for their Eurasian children. In Vietnam 
alone, an estimated ten-thousand “fatherless” Amerasians existed with no way to identify 
or locate their specific American father.
292
  Furthermore, in many instances, the 
American father did not even know that he had fathered a child or denied such 
allegations.
293
  
The problem, McKinney argued, was not the plight of the Amerasian whose 
father already had or wanted to legitimatize his child. Rather this bill addressed the needs 
                                                 
291 The process of legitimating Amerasian children through marriage was complicated by bureaucratic red tape and resistance by U.S. 
military officials to approve soldier marriages to Vietnamese women. As a result many American military men lived in common-law 
family units. In 1975, the U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam, Graham Martin excluded common-law wives and their children from the 
definition of “legitimate” family members who could leave Vietnam for the United States at the end of war. Yarborough, Surviving 
Twice, 36.  
292 John Shade Jr., “Developing Programs for Amerasians in Three Countries,” A Project Proposal by The Pearl S. Buck Foundation, 
1979, Amerasian Program 1979-83 folder, no box, Archives of the Pearl S. Buck House, Pearl S. Buck International.  Estimates 
leading up to the 1979 Orderly Departure program varied from a few thousand to twenty-five thousand depending on the source. In 
1979 the Buck Foundation released the following estimates of Amerasians: Japan-3500, Korea-6500, Philippines-9300, Thailand-
4800, Vietnam-11,000, Taiwan-1200. There was never any systematic accounting of the Amerasians in Vietnam and estimates 
continued to rise through the end of the Amerasian Homecoming Act in 1994. More accurate accountings of Amerasians in Korea and 
Thailand did eventually occur. The Buck Foundation reported that the most common methods of locating and accounting for 
Amerasian children were through Venereal Disease Clinics that provided care to some mothers and chaplains often responsible for 
counseling American fathers on their relationships with Asian women. John A. Shade, Jr., “A Progress Report on Caring for the 
Amerasian: A Difficult Task,” The Pearl S. Buck Foundation, Inc., 1978, Amerasian 1978-1984 folder, Box Vietnam, Archives of the 
Pearl S. Buck House, Pearl S. Buck International. 
293 For many American men, their love affair or long-term romance with Vietnamese women often ended with the end of the tour, a 
transfer, the denial of his marriage request, or death. According to Trin Yarborough, U.S. policy during the Vietnam War required 
military members to spend twelve to thirteen months in Vietnam. As more troops were rotated home, more Amerasian babies were left 
fatherless, Yarborough, Surviving Twice, 11. Diana Yoon argues that Vietnamese women were categorically viewed by U.S. military 
officers as acceptable sexual partners but unsuitable spouses for military personnel and thus it established barriers to marriage that 
ensured the illegitimacy of many Amerasian children. Yoon, “Reproducing Citizens Through U.S.  Militarism: Amerasians and 
Descent Based Membership,” 43. Shade insisted that U.S. military policies and practices were to blame for the illegitimacy of 
Amerasians. He argued that the practice of the U.S. military “birth control” included discouraging marriages between American GIs 
and Asian women and shipping home those GIs who did not adhere to this policy. John A. Shade, Jr., “A Progress Report on Caring 
for the Amerasian,” The Archives of the Pearl S. Buck Foundation, Pearl S. Buck International.  
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of the illegitimate Amerasians, children who, in some cases never knew their American 
fathers or had no way to find them. Regardless of the specific circumstances, current U.S. 
policy ensured that biological American fathers had no formal responsibility to children 
they did not claim. McKinney hoped his bill would alleviate such issues. 
By October 1979 the Carter Administration’s Department of Health, Education 
and Welfare, the Department of State and the Department of Justice had reviewed and 
opposed McKinney’s bill. 294  Specifically the Department of State and Justice were 
critical in their comments, denying that the immigration of Amerasians to the United 
States—as married and unmarried sons and daughters of American citizens—qualified 
for “family unification.”295 A troubling disconnect seemed to exist among some 
American leaders who, on one hand agreed with the assumed American paternity of the 
Amerasians and acknowledged the discrimination and abuse the Amerasians faced in 
Vietnam as a result, but insisted that this in itself did not make them children of 
American citizens.  
US immigration and nationality law supported such a stance by policymakers who 
could simply point to both the gender-based distinction in the law that defined the 
Amerasians as illegitimate, and the critical inability of the Amerasians to provide 
evidentiary proof of American paternity. Reinforcing the legal argument for 
policymakers was the perception that there was no distinction between Amerasians and 
other Vietnamese children in post-War Vietnam. The Amerasians were Asian children 
rather than American children. The combination of the legal rationale and the perceptions 
disregarded the clear biological filiation with American fathers and excluded the 
                                                 
294 U.S. Congress, House, H.R. 3439, 96th Cong., 1st sess., April 4, 1979. 
295 United States-Asian Immigration Act,” Oct. 9, 1979, 96th Cong., 2nd sess., Cong Rec. 27567-27568. 
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Amerasians from American borders and citizenship in the tradition of America’s history 
of exclusionary policies against people of Asian descent.  
Unwilling or perhaps unable to acknowledge such racialized exclusion, the 
administration based the majority of its criticism of the bill on two specific issues—the 
determination of American paternity and the potential economic burden on American 
taxpayers. In each case, McKinney struck back. Regarding paternity, the bill proposed the 
creation of a review board to determine claims of paternity using non-traditional 
documentation—government documents, photographs, letters and/or proof of past 
financial support from the assumed American father. To address fears that the 
Amerasians would become economic burdens, the bill required an American financial 
sponsor for each Amerasian applicant. This requirement, McKinney claimed, would 
prevent the Amerasians from becoming public charges.
296
  
But the administration was steadfast in its rejection of the bill.
297
 Rather than 
viewing it as an opportunity to address the plight of half-American children in Asia or to 
give credence to McKinny’s insistence of U.S. responsibility, the administration 
dismissed the bill as a measure that would unnecessarily increase the workload for INS 
officials and place an economic burden on American taxpayers. 
The Carter administration’s rejection of the bill incited McKinney’s ire.298 
McKinney asserted that the administration used bureaucratic rather than humanitarian 
                                                 
296 According to the bill, the American sponsor was financially responsible for the Amerasian for a period of five years. Cong. Rec., 
House, H.R. 3439, 96th Cong., 1st sess., April 4, 1979. 
297 Although Jimmy Carter was known as the “human rights President” his inaction on behalf of the Amerasians is symptomatic of the 
bigger geopolitical concerns during the period. By 1979 Carter faced increasing tensions with Vietnam over the invasion of Cambodia 
and US-China relations, the failure to normalize relations, and increasing pressure regarding American MIAs and domestically rising 
concerns over immigration and refugee admissions. The Carter administration supported the ODP as a solution to the Amerasian issue. 
Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, RAC Project Number NLC16-118-3-42-5; 16-13-2-22-4; 16-27-1-49-1. 
298 In April 1979 the House referred the bill to the House Judiciary Committee where members discussed the bill. It failed to move out 
of committee and therefore died in October 1979. 
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eyes in its blatant dismissal of the bill. It was a clear contradiction of America’s 
fundamental inclusionary core that framed the American immigration narrative of open 
shores and shelter for the plight of the less fortunate. Overlooking such an important 
piece of the American fabric was especially problematic in this case, according to 
McKinney because, while the United States has not always caused the plight of the less 
fortunate, the situation of the Amerasian was “a problem caused by citizens of our 
Nation.”299  
The Buck Foundation also criticized the administration for its inaction on the 
Amerasian issue. Between 1979 and 1981, Executive Director John Shade sent numerous 
requests to President Carter inviting him to visit the Buck House in Perkasie, 
Pennsylvania and to live up to his reputation as a humanitarian and a Christian by 
becoming the first president to publically acknowledge the Amerasian issue.
300
 Carter did 
not accept Shade’s invitations. Shade also requested that the DoD show the M.A.S.H. 
episode to all new US military arrivals to Asian posts, informing American soldiers of the 
potential consequences of their actions. This request too, never materialized. By October 
1980, H.R. 3439 was dead.
301
 
The Orderly Departure Program  
 
The apprehension of the Carter Administration towards McKinney’s bill reflected 
the changing geopolitical environment by the end of the decade and increasing concerns 
about immigrants and refugees. In response to Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in 1978 
                                                 
299 House, United States-Asian Immigration Act, 96th Cong., 2nd sess., Oct. 9, 1979.  
300 Letter, John Shade Jr. to Jimmy Carter, 7/16/79. White House Central File, Name Files, Pearl, Q-Z folder, WHCF-Pearl, Jimmy 
Carter Library. 
301 H.R. 3439 spent much of 1980 in the Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees and International Law of the Judiciary Committee. 
John Shade blamed its ultimate failure on bad timing and the 1980 Presidential campaign. Letter to Jimmy Carter from John Shade, 
May 16, 1980, Pearl Q-Z folder, WHCF-Pearl, Jimmy Carter Library.   
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the Carter administration immediately ceased efforts to normalize relations.
302
 At the 
same time, the U.S. government faced constant pressure from policymakers, media and 
the American public to address the growing problem of immigrants and refugees from 
Latin America, the Caribbean and Southeast Asia.
303
  
Policymakers framed the impending debates over immigrants and refugees in 
Cold War terms. Senator Samuel I. Hayakawa (R-CA) called for expanded immigration 
laws to meet the needs of Southeast Asian refugees, reminding Americans that Asians 
were “good” immigrants who were ambitious and did not abuse welfare. Assisting these 
refugees and immigrants, he insisted was the “charitable and humane” way to attain a 
moral victory from the Vietnam War and to expose Vietnam’s communist government as 
“the totalitarian, racist tyranny that it is.”304 
There was an international call to action for the ‘boat people” of Vietnam which 
led to the creation of the Orderly Departure Program (ODP).
305
 Established in 1979 as a 
Memorandum of Understanding between the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees and the government of Vietnam, the ODP provided a safe, orderly, predictable 
and legal means for people to leave Vietnam.
306
  Senator Kennedy praised the ODP as the 
                                                 
302 Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, RAC Project Number NLC-16-118-3-42-5. 
303 After 1965 the largest number of immigrants came from Mexico with the next four countries being the Philippines, Korea, China 
and Vietnam. Chan, Asian Americans, 145. 
304 Mark Stevens, “US Should ‘Lift Lid’ on Immigration—Hayakawa,” The Christian Science Monitor, 7/9/79,  [Refugees] 
Children/Unaccompanied Minors 2/79-7/79 folder, Box 34, Stephen Aiello Ethnic Group Files, Jimmy Carter Library. 
305 Mary McGrory, “Refugees from Haiti May Become the ‘Right’ Kind of Boat People,” The Washington Star, 11/13/79, 
Immigration & Naturalization Service folder, Box 11, Civil Rights and Justice, White, Jimmy Carter Library. 
306 Judith Kumin argues that in addition to helping manage the mass exodus of boat people from Vietnam, the ODP also allowed 
Western countries a vehicle for family reunification and to bring back to the US specifically, people left behind after the war: former 
employees, inmates of reeducation camps and Amerasians. In addition she posits that the ODP also enabled the United States to 
engage with Vietnam through the UNHCR in a non-political manner, as the ODP was intertwined with issues of US-China-Vietnam 
relations stemming from Vietnam’s dealings with its ethnic Chinese population. Judith Kumin, “Orderly Departure from Vietnam: 
Cold War Anomaly or Humanitarian Innovation?” Refugee Survey Quarterly 27, No 1, (2008). 
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proper humanitarian response to the “urgent plight of the ‘boat people’ floundering 
throughout Southeast Asia.”307  
The agreement allowed immigrants and refugees from Vietnam to depart for 
family reunification and humanitarian reasons.
308
 The ODP relieved the flow of refugees 
to first asylum countries like the United States while saving the Vietnamese government 
any embarrassment caused by the disorderly and illegal exodus of thousands of its 
citizens by boat.
309
 The ODP also took the pressure off of the United States regarding 
Vietnam’s boat people by internationalizing the issue.  As Secretary of State Cyrus Vance 
explained, the boat people were a “world problem which forces us to fashion a world 
solution.” 310 The program opened U.S. borders to Vietnamese citizens designated either 
as immigrants or as one of three categories of refugees: I) family members of United 
States citizens, II) former employees of the U.S. government, or III) other persons closely 
associated or identified with the U.S. presence in Vietnam before 1975.
311
 
The issue of family reunification was critical both for the UNHCR, which 
considered reunification to be one of its basic functions, and for the United States, trying 
to rectify its humanitarian image gravely damaged by the Vietnam War.
312
 Although the 
                                                 
307 Secretary of State Cyrus Vance estimated that the number of boat people fatalities were in the “tens and tens of thousands.” The 
exodus according to Vance was largely the result of the Vietnamese government pushing out ethnic Chinese who composed two-thirds 
of those leaving by boat, economic hardships in postwar Vietnam, and from refugees created by Vietnam’s intervention of Cambodia. 
Opening statement of Senator Edward Kennedy, The Refugee Crisis in Southeast Asia, Hearing, 7. 
308 According to the report, 375,000 refugees from Vietnam lived in refugee camps in Southeast Asia by 1979. Subcommittee on 
Immigration, Refugees, and International Law, Committee on the Judiciary, The Orderly Departure Program from Vietnam, 101st 
Cong., 2nd sess., 1990, Government Accounting Office.  
309 Ibid. 
310 On November 12, 1979, the UNHCR and the Philippines agreed to construct a Refugee Processing center to accommodate the 
massive numbers of refugees from Southeast Asia and alleviate the burden on first-asylum countries like Thailand and Malaysia that 
had started to turn refugees back to sea. The Philippines Refugee Processing Center opened on January 21, 1980 with a holding 
capacity of 17,200 persons. Statement of Hon. Cyrus Vance, The Refugee Crisis in Southeast Asia, Hearing, 4; “Refugee Processing 
Center: Bataan, the Philippines,” Report to Peter W. Rodino, Jr., February 6, 1981,  
311 According to Kumin, the prima facie recognition of Vietnamese boat people as refugees and their automatic resettlement lasted 
until 1989 when the UNHCR launched its Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) on Indochinese Refugees which replaced 
resettlement with individual status determination and the compulsory return of non-refugees. Kumin, “Orderly Departure from 
Vietnam,” 116-117; Subcommittee, The Orderly Departure Program from Vietnam. 
312 Kumin, 111 
  70 
ODP officially identified Vietnam’s Amerasians as the children of American servicemen 
fathers, it failed to include them in category I of the program: family members of United 
States citizens. Rather, the Amerasians qualified for the program only in category III: 
other persons associated or identified with the U.S. presence in Vietnam. The 
Amerasians were refugees, not relatives of American citizens. This distinction reinforced 
the understanding, already embedded in US immigration policy, that Amerasians were 
not American children but Asian, and served to validate and justify the exclusion of birth-
right citizenship over the next decade.  
Winning the Vietnam War 
 America’s refugee policy has historically reflected the American narrative of 
humanitarianism toward the displaced, persecuted or threatened.
313
 The repeal of the 
national origin quota system in the 1965 Immigration and Naturalization Act was still 
rather new to Americans in 1979 as were the increasing numbers of Asian and Latin 
American immigrants and refugees. For American policymakers and an American public 
yet to recover from America’s military failure in Vietnam, the refugees from Southeast 
Asia were especially troubling.  
In the six months after the Communists took South Vietnam in April 1975, 
125,000 Vietnamese refugees entered the United States. By 1979, America welcomed 
14,000 refugees from Southeast Asia each month.
314
 The Southeast Asian “land people” 
                                                 
313 The author recognizes that the numerous examples throughout US history in which American humanitarianism towards refugees 
did not prevail complicates the narrative. Two of the more horrific examples being the failure of the US Congress in 1939 to pass a 
bill allowing 20,000 Jewish children to immigrate to the United States to escape Nazi Germany and the refusal of US President 
Franklin Roosevelt that same year to admit the 630 Jewish passengers aboard the German ship the St. Louis to enter the United States 
to escape persecution.  Roosevelt’s decision forced the passengers to return to Europe where 254 died in the Holocaust. The 1948 
Displaced Persons Act opened American shores to 400,000 refugees from Europe and the 1953 Refugee Relief Act accepted 200,000 
including a number of refugees from the Chinese Revolution and some Amerasian children from Japan and Korea. The 1965 INA 
established the first permanent statutory basis for refugee admissions to the United States specifically targeting refugees fleeing 
Communist countries. Hing, Making and Remaking Asian America, 125. 
314 Ibid., 126. This number includes all of Southeast Asia: Laos, Cambodia, Thailand.  
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and “boat people” composed the “‘largest nonwhite, non-Western, non-English speaking 
group of people ever to enter the country at one time.’”315  
While educated, often English speaking, skilled, urban and middle class 
Vietnamese families composed most of the initial post-War wave of Vietnamese refugees 
resettled across America, the second wave brought a very different demographic.
316
 Not 
only was the second wave composed of increasing numbers of ethnic Chinese, 
Cambodians and Laotians, but this wave of Southeast Asian refugees was also filled 
largely with poor, single men, women and children, uneducated and unskilled.
317
 Unlike 
the first wave, these new refugees required government assistance upon their arrival, 
making them competitors for housing, jobs and welfare with lower and working class 
Americans.
318
   
Yet some policymakers saw the refugee crisis as an opportunity to resurrect 
American humanitarianism and redeem its failures in Vietnam. Supporters of U.S. 
refugee policy stressed the symbolism of achieving some success in Vietnam, even if it 
was humanitarian rather than military. In 1979, California Congressman, Democrat 
Henry A. Waxman, referenced an article in the Los Angeles Times explaining that the 
humanitarian efforts of the United States on behalf of the Vietnamese refugees  was an 
opportunity for all Americans, and particularly the young, to regain the pride that existed 
prior to the Vietnam War. According to Prager, “The saving of Vietnamese and 
                                                 
315 Ibid.,130-135. 
316 On April 18, 1975 President Ford established the Interagency Task Force to coordinate the resettlement of the first wave of 
Vietnamese refugees, the majority of whom entered the United States between 1975 and 1980 through the parole authority of the US 
Attorney General. The 1952 INA awarded such authority to “parole” into the United Sates any alien and it was used to allow over 
400,000 refugees from Southeast Asia to enter the country. Hing, Making and Remaking American Immigration Policy, 124-135. 
317 Ibid., 135. 
318 Ibid., 130-135.  
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Cambodian lives can help reverse some of the terrible consequences of that war.”319  In 
the Senate, Strom Thurmond reminded policymakers of American humanitarian greatness 
by declaring that as the “flow of refugees from Southeast Asia has become a torrent of 
suffering, death, and human disaster,” America “has been at the forefront” of the global 
response and that “this was and is proper.”320 
In reminding Congressional leaders of America’s tradition of global humanitarian 
leadership, Vice President Walter Mondale evoked the fatal memories of Adolf Hitler’s 
unsuccessful challenge to the world in 1938 to, “save” the ill-fated Jews of Germany and 
Austria. The world did not listen then, he exclaimed, but America would lead now in 
Indochina, fulfilling its role as the “Mother of Exiles,” welcoming the Indochinese 
refugees whose talents and energies will enrich the nation.
321
  
While Thurmond and Mondale reinforced America’s image of global 
humanitarianism and narrative of immigration, opponents questioned the role of race. 
The new wave of legal and illegal immigrants and refugees who were racially, culturally, 
and linguistically different from mainstream America exposed the vulnerability of 
America’s borders to many Americans.322 House Republican C.W. Young (FL) explained 
his concerns with continuing to assist the Indochinese refugees considering the difficulty 
he was having assisting a constituent trying to bring a friend from Ireland to the United 
States.
323
 Likewise African American leaders questioned the racist undertone of US 
                                                 
319 Representative Henry A. Waxman of California speaking in support of American assistance for Indochinese refugees, on June 26, 
1979, 96th Cong.,1st sess. Cong. Rec. 125: 16774-16776. 
320 The Refugee Crisis in Southeast Asia, Hearing, 4. 
321 Ibid., 69. 
322 During the decade, 4.5 million legal immigrants, the majority from Latin American entered the United States. Daniel J. Tichenor, 
Dividing Lines: The Politics of Immigration Control in America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002) 238. 
323 The Irish were one group particularly affected by the 1965 INA as the relative absence of close family ties in the United States and 
job skills necessary for immigration preference resulted in a declining immigrant numbers from Ireland and the rest of Western 
Europe. Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Committee of Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies 
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policies committed to assisting the “boat people” of Southeast Asia while discriminating 
against the black “boat people” fleeing Haiti.324 
The wave of new immigrants coupled with the economic recession facing the 
country by 1979 led to growing support for more restrictive immigration policies, 
employer sanctions to protect American workers and the establishment of the Select 
Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy (SCIRP) to make recommendations on 
immigration and refugee policy reform.  
Washington Post journalist William Raspberry challenged America’s motives 
regarding the refugees from Southeast Asia, criticizing America’s commitment to causes 
outside its borders while American citizens faced tremendous domestic economic 
challenges. For Raspberry, America’s motive was a direct result of the guilt growing out 
of the Vietnam War, a guilt which, he argued, should be directed toward alleviating 
economic inequality at home.
325
 Some policymakers shared Raspberry’s sentiment. 
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Related Agencies in the 
House, Clarence D. Long (MD) exclaimed in his concerns over American assistance to 
the Southeast Asian refugees, “I think Americans are getting awfully tired of the cost of 
this Vietnam War. It is the most expensive war we ever lost.
326
 
 In his 1958 book, A Nation of Immigrants, future President John F. Kennedy 
wrote, “This was the secret of America: a nation of people with the fresh memory of old 
traditions who dared to explore new frontiers, people eager to build lives for themselves 
                                                                                                                                                 
Appropriations, 95th Cong., 1st sess., September 15, 1977. Congress amended the 1965 INA in 1976 to allow a 20,000 annual limit for 
each country in the Western Hemisphere. Tichenor, Dividing Lines, 235.  
324 For more information see Collection MS2070: General files 1960-1990, Walter E. Fauntroy Papers, Special Collections Research 
Center, The George Washington University. 
325 Senator Walter Huddleston of Kentucky speaking on the high cost of refugee resettlement, on July 12, 1979, 96th Cong., 1st sess., 
Cong Rec. 125: 18285-18287. 
326 Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations, Hearing. 
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in a spacious society that did not restrict their freedom of choice and action.”327 American 
history has continuously highlighted the journeys and contributions of the immigrant—
those individuals and groups who came to America of their own free will to settle, work 
and contribute.  
Yet there are critical differences in American lore between the immigrant and the 
refugee. While the immigrant wants to come to America and therefore willingly assumes 
the responsibility of assimilation, the refugee needs to come. Americans perceive the 
immigrant as a potential real American who will become US citizens, while viewing the 
refugee as a temporary guest, a victim of the evils of the world abroad.
328
 While the goal 
of the immigrant is to become an American, the purpose of the refugee is simply to 
survive. 
The ODP provided perhaps the perfect compromise for policymakers unable to 
accept the Amerasians as real American children but feeling the humanitarian pressure or 
guilt from the war, to take some kind of action on their behalf. By categorizing them as 
other refugees, the ODP evoked Said’s orientalism framing the Amerasians in the East-
West binary that distinguished between the American “us” and the Asian “them.”329 
Thus, the ODP reinforced the perception that the Amerasians were foreign children, 
victims of persecution spurred by the intolerance of both a communist regime and a 
Vietnamese society intolerant of difference, rather than Americans.  
                                                 
327 John F. Kennedy, A Nation of Immigrants (1964;repr., Harper Perennial, 2008) 
328 Prior to the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980, the term “refugee” in American policy applied specifically to those persons facing 
persecution from a communist government.  The 1980 Act expanded the definition to align with that of the United Nations—any 
person with “a well-founded fear of being persecuted.” The United States continued to favor refugees from countries with communist 
governments—Southeast Asia, Cuba, and Jews from the Soviet Union. Refugee Act of 1980, Public Law 96-212, 96th Cong., 2nd sess. 
(March 17, 1980); for more information see Chan, Asian Americans, 164. 
329 Said, Selections from Orientalism in Williams and Chrisman. 
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As the first official policy enacted recognizing the American paternity of the 
Amerasians, the designation as “other persons” in the ODP reflects the complicated 
relationship that American policymakers would maintain with Vietnam’s Amerasians 
over the next decade.
330
 In essence, policymakers were confused and conflicted by the 
transnational makeup of the Amerasians. Products of war and mixtures of race and 
nation, the Amerasians stood in opposition to the perceived order of modern society that 
rested upon clean cut delineations of black and white, Asian and non, American and 
foreign, us and them. Categorical distinctions had evolved out of a colonial ideology and 
a history of racialized policies that deemed non-white populations inferior, and that had 
excluded people of Asian descent from American citizenship. Policymakers, unable to 
“fit” the Amerasian “mix” into an American category, acknowledged that Amerasians 
were the progeny of American fathers, but could not recognize them as real American 
citizens.  
The Shifting Tide 
In 1980, Journalist Bill Kurtis published, “The Plight of the Children Abandoned 
in Vietnam” in the New York Times. Kurtis revealed to the American public, the chilling 
reality that when America left Vietnam in 1975, it also left on the streets of Saigon, 
thousands of Amerasian children, “the living reminders of the war.”331  In an era defined 
by increasing social and economic conservatism and anticommunist nationalism, the six 
to eight million immigrants and 166,000 refugees living in the United States by 1980 
                                                 
330 The ODP remained in effect until January 1, 1986 when Vietnam suspended the interviewing and processing of applicants for 
resettlement in the United States after a backlog and growing tensions with the United States over the MIA/POW issue. On July 15, 
1986 the U.S. Congress passed a concurrent resolution requesting the government of Vietnam to reinstitute the program and 
specifically to permit the departure of re-education camp prisoners, Amerasian children and other persons of special humanitarian 
concerns to the United States. Senator Solarz Fascell on the Sense of the Congress on Resumption of U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees Orderly Departure Program for Vietnam, on July 15, 1986 to the Senate, 99th Cong., 2nd sess., Cong. Rec. 132, E3366. 
331 Bill Kurtis, “The Plight of the Children Abandoned in Vietnam,” The New York Times, 2 March 1980. 
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placed a large strain on the U.S. economy with its seven million unemployed Americans 
and an unemployment rate hovering at 7.1%.
332
  To many Americans, it seemed that the 
nation’s immigration problem was out of control. More people demanded a restrictive 
immigration policy.
333
 
The challenge for the newly elected Reagan administration was to honor the 
American tradition of providing a beacon of hope to the world’s oppressed, hopeless and 
poor while meeting the demands of the conservative political environment.
334
  President 
Ronald Reagan addressed this challenge in his 1981 statement on U.S. Immigration and 
Refugee Policy by evoking the American “myth of universalism.” This myth portrayed 
the nation as inclusive and open to outsiders: “’We shall continue America’s tradition as 
a land that welcomes peoples from other countries….At the same time, we must ensure 
adequate legal authority…to enable us, when sudden influxes of foreigners occur, to 
decide to whom we grant the status of refugee or asylee.”335  
Among the “influxes of foreigners” to America by 1981, were the Vietnamese. 
For many Americans with personal connections to the Vietnam War, it was difficult to 
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335 “President Ronald Reagan’s Statement  on U.S. Immigration and Refugee Policy, July 30, -1981” in LeMay and Barkan, U.S. 
Immigration and Naturalization Laws and Issues, 276. 
  77 
disassociate these new immigrants from the “enemy.” Even half a decade removed from 
the war, many Americans still associated Asians with the “gook,” the Viet Cong enemy, 
an alien, a foreigner, and a threat.
336
 Unlike the initial post-war wave of Vietnamese 
immigrants who, as collaborators or supporters of the U.S. war effort, often arrived in 
America as highly educated, English-speaking, skilled, literate and middle-class family 
units, Vietnam’s “boat people,” were mostly uneducated and illiterate single men, 
women, and parentless children.
 337
 Their perceived foreignness, association with the 
Vietnam War, and immediate dependence on American social welfare services awakened 
colonialized notions of Asia, Asians and Asian-Americans as foreign and dangerous. 
Historian Paul Spickard describes the Vietnam War as the “nexus between racism, 
colonialism, and migration” in which terms like “gook” and “slope” jaded the ways in 
which Americans interpreted the post-war immigration.
338
  To many Americans the 
Vietnamese refugee once again represented the dreaded “yellow peril” threatening to 
destroy America by economically sucking the nation dry.
 339
  
Many American policymakers extended the perception of the dangerous Asian 
foreigner to the Amerasians who they viewed to be Asians, not Americans. Although 
McKinney’s bill had failed to garner enough political support in 1979, it did create the 
foundation for the 1982 Amerasian Immigration Act (AIA) and the 1987 Amerasian 
Homecoming Act (AHA).  In order for either bill to pass however, McKinney and his 
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supporters would have to successfully change the perception that the Amerasians were 
Asian children. Policymakers and the American people had to accept the notion that the 
Amerasians were American children and that America had a parental and paternal 
responsibility for them.  This shift would occur through the use of inclusionary rhetoric 
that would redefine the Amerasians as an American problem. 
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CHAPTER 3 
BLOOD POLITICS: THE AMERASIAN IMMIGRATION ACT 
On November 17, 1981, members of the House of Representatives Subcommittee 
on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law began discussing the proposed 
Amerasian Immigration Act (AIA) and Representative Barney Frank’s H.R. 3405. Each 
bill addressed the immigration rights of illegitimate children fathered by American 
citizens abroad. Among those in attendance were the young, but outspoken 
Massachusetts Democrat, Barney Frank and the first female Congressional 
Representative from Colorado, Democrat Pat Schroeder.
340
 
 Frank’s bill challenged existing U.S. immigration law and the sex-based 
distinction that required illegitimate children tied to the status of their mother “to acquire 
or transmit certain immigration benefits by reason of its relationship with its natural 
father.”341 The AIA, also challenged the sex-based distinction addressing those children 
without legitimacy from their father by providing Amerasians admission to the United 
States as “sons and daughters” of American citizens.  
Finally, after over a decade of refusing to formally recognize the plight of the 
Amerasians, and the failure of McKinney’s H.R. 3439 only a couple of years earlier, 
Congress accepted the challenge.  It did so, however, while grappling with the issues of 
race and nation in its perceptions of the Amerasians and framing the issue in a discourse 
of blood politics.  
                                                 
340 Schroeder was elected to the House in 1972 as an anti-Vietnam War candidate. Raised in a military family and very active on 
military issues during her Congressional tenure, Schroeder was the first woman on the Armed Services Committee and dedicated her 
efforts to improving and protecting the lives of military spouses and families.  
341 Although exclusive to children whose father’s would legitimate them, Frank’s bill posed a direct challenge to the U.S. policy at the 
heart of the Amerasian issue, Section 309 of the 1952 INA. HR 3405 and HR 808, Hearings, 858. 
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By 1980, increasing media coverage for Vietnam’s Amerasians, led some 
American policymakers to view the Amerasians as unique. This resulted not only from 
their racial differences and assumed American paternity, but because of the opportunity 
for Americans to finally come to terms with America’s military defeat. American 
journalists and non-governmental organizations such as the Buck Foundation flooded the 
American media with images of freckle faced and curly haired “American” children, 
victims of the war, calling on America to take responsibility for its war babies, and “give 
our children the right to come home.”342  
For Representative McKinney, co-sponsor of the AIA in the House, and 
Amerasian supporters and advocates like the Buck Foundation, as well as Fathers Alfred 
Keane and Alfred Carroll, both of whom worked with the Amerasians in Korea, 
responsibility meant citizenship. In his 1980 testimony before Congress, Father Keane—a 
Maryknoll Missionary and the Head of the St. Vincent’s Home for Amerasian Children in 
South Korea— depicted the injustice of the Amerasians in Korea.343 Without Korean or 
American citizenship, these children, he claimed, were stateless. As the children of 
American citizen fathers, Father Keane carefully explained, U.S. law should grant the 
Amerasians U.S. citizenship which would facilitate an American identity.
344
  
In his speech to the House in January 1981, Representative McKinney reminded 
American policymakers of the actions of other Western countries regarding their mixed-
race war babies. McKinney, as had many before him, pointed to the French, British and 
                                                 
342 Ibid., Testimony of Father Alfred Keane, 901.  
343 By 1981 Father Keane had arranged an estimated 900 adoptions of Amerasians to American families. St. Vincent’s Children’s 
Home supported 17 Korean Amerasian students in the United States, most at Gonzaga University. The funding for the home came 
from private donations and from Americans for International Aid. Bill Webb to Kate De Losso, October 1, 1981. Other Agency Info 
folder, no Box, Archives of the Pearl S. Buck House, Pearl S. Buck International. 
344 Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, Semiannual Report to Congress, 96th Cong,. 2nd sess., March 1, 1980, H55. 
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the Dutch who had granted “no-fault” citizenship to their Eurasian children while 
criticizing the United States for ignoring its “bastard sons and daughters.” 345  
Those in opposition to the bill expressed concerns about needlessly implicating 
individual American soldiers as fathers who had most likely moved on with their 
American lives. Although there was no official political stance on the AIA from any 
specific Veterans organization, many Vietnam veterans, according to Greg Kane of the 
Vietnam Veterans of America, feared the passage of the bill. Veterans were petrified, 
according to Kane, “that they were gonna have some Amerasian kid knock on their door 
and they were gonna have their family all around them.”346 In fact proponents advertised 
that the “AIA does not make any attempt to identify individual fathers or reunite them 
with children,” in order to garner support.347 
Political opponents also feared that such legislation would open a “backdoor” to 
fraud and more illegal immigration. U.S. government agencies like the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS), spoke out against the legislation expressing concerns with 
changing U.S. laws. In response to Father Keane’s request for citizenship for the 
Amerasians, Leonel J. Castillo, the former Commissioner for the INS explained that three 
basic principles structured current immigration law—family unification, labor needs, and 
political asylum. Father Keane’s argument regarding the Amerasians, did not fit into any 
of these principles.”348 
                                                 
345 The Warriors Children, Representative Stewart McKinney Extension of Remarks, HR 808, 97th Cong., 1st sess., January 29, 1981, 
H1327-28. 
346 According to Bobby Muller and Greg Kane of the Vietnam Veterans Association, the VVA did not have an official position on the 
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recognizing them as a shameful legacy of the war, the majority of veterans focused on issues considered to be more pressing like 
Agent Orange and MIA/POWs. Greg Kane, interview by author, telephone, October 21, 2013; Bobby Muller, interview by author, 
telephone, December 7, 2013. 
347 “The Children We Left Behind,” Americans for International Aid, nd.c1982, 50-35, Gary Hart Papers, Archives, University of 
Colorado Boulder. 
348  Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, Semiannual Report, H55. 
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In opposition to both amendments, the Reagan administration, as had the Carter 
administration, pointed to evidentiary problems inherent in verifying paternity for the 
Amerasians who lacked the documentation to prove paternity by blood.
349
  The 
administration argued that proof of paternity for the Amerasians was rational, “based on a 
valid governmental interest in limiting fraudulent alien entry into the United States on the 
basis of questionable blood relationships.”350  
Consequently, regarding Frank’s bill, opponents worried that it would allow 
unacceptable foreigners to sneak into the United States by persuading an unrelated 
American male citizen to claim paternity. The State and Justice Departments also 
opposed the AIA, again pointing to the possibility of fraud inherent in the bill, the lack of 
probative evidence, and the reality that there was, no “natural father asserting 
paternity.”351  
Thus, Frank’s bill concerned policymakers who believed that foreigners would 
exploit American men as fake fathers. While policymakers feared that with the AIA no 
father existed, or at least there was no evidence to prove one existed. Consequently there 
was no way in the AIA to legitimize any claim to paternity.  
Representatives Frank and Schroeder quickly criticized the administration’s 
opposition. Both argued that neither bill opened a backdoor to immigration since the 
Amerasians would be included among the numbers of all immigrants from their specific 
homeland. In addition, they condemned the irresponsibility of the administration which 
                                                 
349 Evidentiary proof varied in each Asian country. Usually, the father’s absence meant there was no formal evidence that the 
Amerasian existed. The mothers and families of Amerasians in Vietnam destroyed documents: birth certificates, letters, photographs 
etc that proved paternity out of fear that they and/or their children would be killed for having had relationships with Americans during 
the war.   
350 Regarding H.R. 3405, the State Department referenced the 1977 Supreme Court decision in Fiallo vs. Bell which upheld the sex-
based distinction between the rights of an illegitimate child derived through its natural father as opposed to its natural mother. HR 
3405 and HR 808, Hearing, 858.  
351 Ibid. 
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they claimed was endorsing the proliferation of military babies.
352
 However, the 
administration remained adamant in its position that without scientific evidence, there 
could be no absolute proof that the fathers of the Amerasians were in fact American. 
Therefore, they argued, both bills simply encouraged illegal immigration.
353
  
The insistence on scientific evidence for the AIA seemed odd to many supporters, 
especially in light of the physical and undeniable proof visible on the very bodies of the 
population in question.  In addition to the photographs that appeared in reputable media 
sources, like The New York Times, the administration’s acknowledgement of the large 
military presence in Vietnam during the war and its own recognition that the Amerasians 
faced discrimination due to their American paternity seemed to undermine its argument 
regarding their questionable paternity.
354
  
Clearly troubled by the administration’s position, Schroeder reminded the 
committee that no such problem of proof existed in Asia, where their ability to identify 
the Amerasians as American, had resulted in their subjection to tremendous 
discrimination.
355
 Testimony from John Shade, Father Keane and former State 
Department and Americans for International Aid employees reaffirmed Schroeder’s 
claim: “There is no problem in identifying the Amerasian; for example their hair, eyes, 
color of skin, facial features and other characteristics are evident.”356 It was nonsensical 
in the eyes of Frank and Schroeder, for the administration to acknowledge that the 
                                                 
352 Ibid., Statements of Representative Pat Schroeder, 876. 
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discrimination suffered by the Amerasians in the countries of their birth was a direct 
result of their American looks, while denying that such evidence proved American 
paternity.  
Frank aggressively challenged the requirement of scientific evidence asserting 
that the heart of the problem for the administration was one of race and race mixture. The 
administration’s real concern, he said, was clearly not that children fathered by non-
American European or Australian men would sneak into the country illegally, but rather 
that children mothered by Asians would.
357
 In other words, while insisting that the 
physical characteristics of the Amerasians made them American, Frank seemed to 
suggest, that because of their maternity, the administration had deemed the Amerasians, 
as Asian and thus non-American. Such a designation extended the historical practice in 
America of relegating the bi-racial child to the status of its non-white parent, to the bi-
national child, assigned the status of its non-American parent.   
Yet, race and race mixture were also problematic for Frank and Schroeder. While 
both criticized the administration for its apparent racialization of the Amerasians as Asian 
because of their maternal filiation, Frank and Schroeder also employed a racial rationale 
that deemed the Amerasians to be American because of how they looked. Fundamentally, 
such assumptions, although well intentioned in this case, were also troubling as they 
depended upon subjective, preconceived and racialized notions of what an American and 
what a non-American actually “looked like.” In this case, the “American” looked black or 
white and the “non-American” looked Asian.  
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Almost a decade earlier, Dr. James R. Dumpson, Dean of the School of Social 
Service at Fordham University and a member of the Edward Kennedy Study Mission to 
South Vietnam discussed the rationale behind assumptions of race and nationality for the 
Amerasians. Considering the composition of US military forces in Vietnam during the 
war, it was logical to assume, according to Dumpson, that white or black Americans 
fathered the majority of Amerasians.
358
 However, Dumpson also pointed to the 
limitations of American racial categories explaining, “I think we are so accustomed in our 
country to say white and black, that we forget that we have other ethnic groups too. I am 
sure some of those children [Amerasians] were fathered by Puerto Ricans or Asian 
Americans. When we say black, we mean nonwhite.”359 
Americans were not just black or white however and many issues exist in 
grouping all non-whites as black and conflating race with nationality.  Considering the 
heterogeneity of the United States population, the limits of such racial rationale 
inevitably excluded Amerasians who had Latin American or Asian American fathers and 
whose “American” looks were more difficult to identify.  Consequently, the arguments of 
both Frank and Schroeder and the administration shared a racial rationale used 
simultaneously as both evidence of filiation and difference.   
Under increasing pressure by Representative Frank to produce a solution for the 
evidentiary problem, and quick to deny his assertions of racism, the administration 
introduced the blood test. Known today as DNA, the test was in its infant stages in 1981. 
Yet the administration claimed that it could determine, by examining the antigens in the 
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blood, whether or not the blood of an individual was American blood.
360
 Not only would 
such a test be useful in scientifically determining the individual father, the administration 
argued, but more importantly, in cases where there was no father to test, the blood of the 
child could determine in which part of the world the child originated.
361
  
According to Cornelius Scully, the Director of the Office of Legislation, 
Regulations and Advisory Assistance in the Bureau of Consular Affairs, the test could tell 
if “an individual who now lives in Seoul was fathered by an American rather than by a 
Frenchman or rather than by a Moroccan, or rather than by somebody else.”362 The test, 
they posited was so specific that it “may be able to differentiate between a Kentuckian 
and a New Jerseyite.”363 Documents later submitted by the Center for Disease and 
Control (CDC) quickly disproved the claims of the administration that a blood test could 
determine whether or not someone was American.
364
  
However the nature of the assertion, the impending debate surrounding it, and the 
shocking failure of Frank and Schroeder to question the validity of such a blood test, 
reeked of an outdated and troubling colonial and racial ideology. The underlying 
assumption that people have different kinds of blood and the assertion that blood can 
determine nationality was extraordinarily misguided and reflected the arguments of early 
20
th
 century eugenicists against racial degeneracy implicit in miscegenation.
365
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The Priest and the Missionary  
 
From his office at Gonzaga University in Spokane, Washington, Father Alfred 
Carroll, the head of the Korean Amerasian Program, initiated a massive Congressional 
letter writing campaign in efforts to gain political support for the AIA.
366
 In each case, 
including his plea of support to President Reagan, Carroll appealed to notions of nation 
and family. “I beg of you” Carroll implored, “to support this legislation which will allow 
these youngsters the rights of their paternal heritage. These youngsters who…have the 
virtues to become good Americans.”367  
Thirty-four years later, sitting in the cafeteria at Gonzaga University’s Jesuit 
House in 2013, the life and light in Father Carroll’s big brown eyes remained vibrant as 
he discussed the beloved program he developed in 1979. Carroll’s wide mischievous 
smile deceived the lines of age and wisdom that danced across his face and the frail body 
that frustrated him with the unavoidable limitations of its 84 year old frame. “Inspired by 
God” while watching Saigon fall to the Communists in April 1975, Father Carroll first 
initiated the Vietnamese Refugee Program. The program provided Vietnamese refugees 
filling the refugee camps in Washington State with scholarships to Gonzaga 
University.
368
 
 In 1979, Father Carroll turned his attention and mission to the Korean 
Amerasians after psychology professor and counselor Joseph Moisan asked for his 
                                                 
366 Father Alfred Carroll, interview by author, Spokane, Washington, May 24, 2013. 
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assistance in obtaining a scholarship for a Korean Amerasian student his family planned 
to host. According to Carroll, Moisan explained that coming to America and attending 
school was the only way this young Amerasian man “could be in contact with his father’s 
heritage, learn English, [and] gain a superior education.”369  
Father Carroll agreed to pray about Moisan’s request and “the misery of 
Amerasians, the moral responsibility of Americans and the need to cooperate with the 
goodness of Mr. Moisan.”370  By 1980, Father Carroll had become a champion of the 
Amerasian cause. He paired with Father Alfred Keane, to bring other Korean Amerasian 
“sons and daughters” of American citizens “home.”371 Keane, the Director for Amerasian 
Affairs for Americans for International Aid, was a leading figure in the push for 
transnational adoptions believing it was the best solution, specifically for the younger 
Amerasians. Keane lobbied relentlessly for McKinney’s H.R. 3439, calling on over 
twenty-five congressmen to support the bill.
372
 The fundamental belief of both priests, 
that the Amerasians were in fact American citizens and therefore should have the “right 
to come home,” remained the driving force behind their activism.373  
American citizenship was the initial focus of these efforts, according to Father 
Carroll. It only made sense that the children of American citizen fathers would in fact be 
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American citizens. However, because of the growing concerns over the flood of 
foreigners coming to America and about welfare, Congress “wouldn’t have anything to 
do with it.”374  
Such concerns were valid for policymakers who often heard the discontent, and 
sometimes the racism in the opposition to Vietnamese immigrants and refugees after the 
war. John and Pauline Motay of Greenwich, Connecticut explained to their Congressman 
Stewart McKinney that the Vietnamese immigrants were not “of the same caliber of the 
immigrants of the early 1900’s who sought freedom and had pride in themselves to work 
and provide for themselves. They sought no financial aid—quite a comparison to what 
these immigrants are demanding today.”375 Other complaints were more hostile citing the 
tax burden and unemployment that accompanied refugees, and pointing to their 
connection to the war, “these people didn’t have the guts to fight for their own country. 
They are lazy, corrupt and cowardly…we have too many Orientals now. We are losing 
our national character.”376  
Father Carroll received a number of letters expressing similar concerns and 
extending the same kind of vitriol to the Amerasians. “Haven’t you heard of 
unemployment in this country?” asks one letter, “who is going to support these 
bastards?”377 “We’re going to send every Asian brat right back where they came from, 
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and you with them” Threatens another letter, “we’re going to rid the country of foreign 
trash.”378 
With citizenship off the table, Father Carroll’s efforts focused on amending U.S. 
immigration law to allow easier access to America for the Amerasians wanting to come. 
Having had success with the Amerasians from Korea on his campus, he became 
dedicated to providing that same opportunity for other Amerasians.  
 In Washington, D.C. Father Keane spent 1980 and 1981 on Capitol Hill lobbying 
support for the AIA. Having had his own push for citizenship consistently rejected, 
Father Keane too understood that this was a losing battle.  Instead, he focused on 
amending U.S. immigration law while constantly reminding members of Congress that 
the Amerasians “are children of U.S. citizens.”379  
Although he had lived in Asia since 1958, Father Keane’s first introduction to the 
Amerasians did not occur until Christmas Eve, 1970. After noticing a group of children, 
described by his parishioners as the “outcasts,” warming themselves at a stove near the 
back of his chapel, Father Keane took up the cause of Korea’s large Amerasian 
population. 
380
  
Father Keane regretted the U.S. government’s failure to accept national paternal 
responsibility for the illegitimate Amerasian children. As did other Amerasian advocates, 
Father Keane understood that the patrilineal culture of many Asian countries including 
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Korea and Vietnam necessitated paternal legitimacy. “In Asia,” Father Keane explained, 
“children belong to their father.”381  
In the case of the Amerasian, abandoned by or unknown to the individual 
American father, the curse of illegitimacy meant the absence of an identity through name, 
nationality, ancestry, clan, family relationship all of which directly determined access to 
education, marriage and jobs.
382
 In daily life, the illegitimacy of the Amerasians 
manifested itself in their abuse, harassment, discrimination and ostracism. As in 
Vietnam—where “American-faced” children were considered the “dust of life,” in Korea, 
they were ai-ee-no-koo, “person who belongs to no one.” At least, Father Keane believed, 
American citizenship could address the issue of illegitimacy by depicting a formal 
recognition of national paternal responsibility.
383
  
The Flight Attendant 
Later in her life, Christian motivational speaker Zig Ziglar described Jodie 
Darragh as a typical middle-class mother and homemaker: smart, pretty, compassionate, 
and energetic.
384
 A flight attendant for Eastern Airlines during the 1970s, Darragh 
witnessed the miserable conditions of the Amerasian children in Vietnam while 
volunteering to chaperone Vietnamese and Amerasian orphans to the U.S. for adoption. 
As with Fathers Carroll and Keane, faith inspired Darragh to act on behalf of the 
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children.  In 1975, she and her husband, Richard “Dick” Darragh, a ticket office manager 
for Eastern Airlines, founded Americans for International Aid, an international volunteer 
agency based in Marietta, Georgia.
385
  
Through this organization, volunteer flight attendants used their free travel passes 
to escort children from third world countries, including Vietnam, to adoption agencies, 
relief missions, hospitals, and American families awaiting the chance to adopt.
386
 In 
1975, Darragh played a critical and controversial role in the evacuation of Vietnamese 
and Amerasian orphans during Operation Babylift.
387
  
At some point in her efforts, Jodie met Father Keane whom she appointed the 
Director for Amerasian Affairs for Americans for International Aid in 1978.  Passionate 
about her faith, Jodie believed that rescuing the children was “God’s work.”388 In 1979, 
her organization supported McKinney’s United States-Asian Immigration Act and in 
1982, Darragh advocated for the AIA by insisting that “Amerasians are humans who 
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deserve all the rights US citizenship could afford them.”389 Darragh would remain an 
important non-political proponent of the Amerasians, testifying before Congress in 
support of the 1982 AIA and supporting subsequent proposed revisions leading up to the 
1987 Amerasian Homecoming Act.
390
  
It was Father Keane and the Darraghs who initially brought the plight of the 
Amerasians to the attention of Senator Jeremiah Denton, McKinney’s co-sponsor of the 
AIA.
391
  
The NGO 
Others also joined the fray. Born in 1892 in Hillsboro, West Virginia, Pearl S. 
Buck, the daughter of Presbyterian missionaries, grew up in China. Buck brought her 
experiences in China to Americans in her novels for which she won international 
acclaim.
392
 In 1930, Buck coined the term “Amerasian” to describe the half-American 
half-Asian children that began to surface in China, “‘a new group of human beings, a 
group that Asians do not know how to deal with, illegitimate as well as mixed in 
race.’”393  
While much of the Western world grappled with debates on racial inequality, 
blood contamination, racial purity and eugenics, Buck took a more progressive stance on 
race. Rather than viewing the Amerasians as racially inferior consequences of blood 
contamination and degeneration, Buck saw them as the perfect blend of race and nation; 
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the ethnic culmination of East and West—a mixture that produced superiority rather than 
inferiority.
394
 It was an approach that historian Emma Teng terms the “eugenic 
experience” in which the racially mixed are assumed a racial improvement.395 Mixed 
blood children, according to Buck, overall are “smarter and better looking than full-
bloods of either parent’s race. Most certainly they are tougher.”396 
In 1949, Buck established Welcome House, a permanent foster home for mixed 
race children that would eventually evolve into the Buck Foundation, an international 
adoption agency specializing in Amerasians.
397
  As U.S. involvement in Vietnam 
increased under the Johnson Administration, the Buck Foundation began to push for the 
adoption of Vietnamese and Amerasian orphans affected by the war. In 1967, the first 
year of inter-country adoptions between the United States and South Vietnam, the Buck 
Foundation successfully placed thirteen South Vietnamese children in American 
homes.
398
 
 That same year Buck implemented Father’s Anonymous, a program designed to 
collect child support contributions to assist the plight of the Amerasian children in Japan, 
Korea and Vietnam. Concerned Americans could donate monies anonymously for the 
care, education and welfare of the Amerasians. Largely ineffective, the program yielded 
only 151 responses in its short duration, the majority from the wives and mothers of U.S. 
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military personnel and one from a future inductee whose family offered to “pay now and 
sin later.”399   
By 1971, as President Nixon’s “peace with honor” failed to materialize in 
Vietnam, the Buck Foundation found itself publically at odds with the U.S. government 
over the Amerasian issue.
400
 Frustrated with the refusal of the administration to recognize 
American responsibility on the issue, Buck exclaimed, “In all my years of urging, I’ve 
never come close to getting the government to do anything. Now I’m convinced that 
we’ll never get moral about it, but I hope and pray we’ll get practical about it. There is 
nothing more important, she added, for our nation right now, for our image in Asia, than 
for our government and people to respond to these helpless babies and say, ‘We 
recognize our responsibilities.’”401  
Until her death in 1972 at the age of eighty, Buck adamantly believed that the key 
to America’s responsibility for the Amerasians was to recognize them as American 
citizens. By granting the Amerasians citizenship, America could leave no doubt that it 
accepted its children and acknowledged the actions of its soldiers, while giving the 
Amerasians a boost in providing legitimacy. 
From the headquarters of the Buck Foundation in Perkasie, Pennsylvania, John 
Shade the Director of the Buck Foundation from 1978 to 1984, classified the Amerasian 
                                                 
399 Thompson, “Japan’s Rejected: Teenage War Babies Face Bleak Future,” Ebony. 
400 That same year, the Government of South Vietnam passed a decree banning mass adoptions of Vietnamese or Amerasian children 
forcing the Buck Foundation to halt its work in Vietnam. Judy McCann, “Welcome House Considers S. Vietnamese Adoptions,” The 
Daily Intelligencer, 2 April 1973, News Articles 1975-2000 folder, Box Vietnam Operation Babylift, Archives of the Pearl S. Buck 
House, Pearl S. Buck International. 
401 Tom Tiede, “U.S. Passes Buck on GI Babies,” Adoption and Vietnam, SB 2497, S13857. In addition to the resistance of the US 
government to recognize the Amerasians, the Buck Foundation confronted numerous obstacles in the international adoption process 
specifically in working within the laws of the South Vietnam Government and in collaboration with the Vietnamese Ministry of Social 
Welfare. Testimony of Dr. James R. Dumpson, Relief and Rehabilitation of War Victims in Indochina Part II: Orphans and Child 
Welfare, Hearing. 
  96 
issue a “human rights violation.”402 In the vein of Buck herself, Shade publically 
criticized a history of military irresponsibility regarding GI babies and reminding other 
Americans, “America cannot continue fathering thousands upon thousands of mixed-race 
children each year and abandoning them when they see life.”403 He often pointed to 
America’s poor historical record of abandoned G.I. children in Asia, beginning with the 
Filipino mestizos in 1898, as well as the French example of how best to approach the 
issue. 
Critical of what he termed “US military birth control”— non-fraternization 
policies that overlooked brothels, the military practice of discouraging GIs from marrying 
Asian women and the quick return home of those American soldiers desirous of 
legitimating their overseas relationships— Shade accused American officials of refusing 
to officially recognize ‘the flesh of our flesh and the blood of our blood.’”404 The 
Amerasians, Shade asserted, were half-Americans and “half-Americans, are 
Americans.”405 
For Shade, the issue incorporated fatherlessness, race, and age. The absence of the 
father was the key to the plight of the Amerasians. Children in Asian societies without 
fathers, according to Shade, do not legally exist. Race compounded the issue of 
illegitimacy. Easy to identify as a result of their racial mixtures, the Amerasians disrupt 
the largely homogenous Asian societies and “represent disorder in an otherwise ordered 
                                                 
402 John A. Shade, Jr. “Amerasian Kids: Problem for Congress,” November 1981, Amerasians, 1978-1984 folder, Box Vietnam, 
Archives of the Pearl S. Buck House, Pearl S. Buck International.   
403 Ibid. 
404 Cong Rec., “The Amerasian Children,” 96th Cong., 2nd sess,” June 11, 1980, 14046. John A. Shade, Jr., “A Progress Report on 
Caring for the Amerasian: A Difficult Task,” 1978, Amerasians 1978-1984 folder, Box Vietnam, Archives of the Pearl S. Buck 
House, Pearl S. Buck International. 
405 John A. Shade Jr., Executive Director, Pearl S. Buck Foundation, Inc.  “The Forgotten Child—The Amerasian in Indochina,” 
Conference for the National Organizations Advisory Council, May 8, 1980. Amerasians 1978-1984 folder, Box Vietnam, Archives of 
the Pearl S. Buck House, Pearl S. Buck International. 
  97 
world.”406  In Vietnam specifically, Shade claimed, the Amerasians exist as a racial and 
cultural intrusion as well as “an uncomfortable memory or war.”407 Thus, the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam does not recognize the mixed-race children of its former enemy as 
citizens. The Amerasians exist as “non-persons,” absent even the basic provisions of 
life.
408
 
The rapidly maturing population also required quicker action on the issue of 
adoption and American citizenship. The Amerasians who were already reaching 
adolescence, according to Shade, recognized their stateless existence and the older they 
became, the more difficult it would be for Americans to accept the notion that these 
“children” deserved citizenship.  
Additionally, most Amerasians became aware of their mixed identities between 
six and fourteen years of age with a growing awareness of phenotypic differences of skin 
color, features, and hair along with the absence of their biological fathers.
409
 The 
consequences of illegitimacy, Shade argued, already gripped many Amerasians as they 
“understand their origins and know that acceptance and integration within their Asian 
home countries will be slow and hardcoming.”410  
Many Amerasians realized their “uniqueness” through the harsh words and hard 
punches of family members and classmates.  One Amerasian girl became aware that her 
eye shape, hair color and skin tone were different from her classmates only after they 
began to tease her: “Maybe 7 or 8 years old they started calling me half breed, you know, 
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and then I realized oh I have a Vietnamese mother and American soldier father. And my 
face was different, you know, my nose was higher because over there most people have a 
flatter nose, their eyes are smaller, and I have bigger eyes.”411 
During his tenure at the Buck Foundation, Shade provided a loud and aggressive 
non-political voice to the push for the AIA. He characterized America’s failure to take 
responsibility for the Amerasians through more reasonable adoption policies and easier 
paths to American citizenship to be a bi-partisan failure of epic proportions. Amidst the 
contentious debates in America over immigration, Shade reflected Buck’s personal 
commitment to the Amerasians. He believed it was illogical that the Amerasians should 
even be in the same discussion with other immigrants or refugees considering they were 
the children of American fathers.  In 1981, Shade explained that because the Amerasians 
are Americans, they “‘have more right to be citizens of this country than Cubans and 
Haitians.’”412  
In his testimony before Congress regarding the proposed AIA in November, 1981, 
Shade continued his assertion that the Amerasians were American citizens. By 
recognizing the Amerasians as children of American fathers and assumedly expediting 
their departure to the United States, the AIA, Shade claimed, was “in line with the 
traditional formal US Government position that basic human rights are obligations owed 
by all governments to its citizens.”413 Shade’s dedication to the issue on behalf of the 
Buck Foundation was central to the ultimate passage of the AIA. 
The Politicians 
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When Stewart McKinney first met the Darraghs and Father Keane in 1978, he 
was already familiar with the Amerasian issue. In a 1973 letter to a constituent, 
McKinney expressed his support for the Vietnam Children’s Care Agency proposed by 
Congressmen Williams, Hatfield and Hughes, and his specific concern for the 
Amerasians in Vietnam.
414
 At the center of his advocacy in1973 and his failed United 
States-Asian Immigration Act in 1979 was a personal sense of responsibility for a 
population which he understood to exist only as the result of U.S. foreign policy.  In his 
1982 testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, McKinney explained “I have a 
difficult time after all these years even using the word ‘immigration’ in the same sentence 
with these [Amerasian] children. In essence, these are not immigrants. These are 
American children.”415  
By virtue of U.S. parentage, McKinney reasoned, the Amerasians should have the 
right to immigrate and claim U.S. citizenship. According to McKinney, “There is no 
argument, including all the ones expounded upon by the administration, for this Nation to 
deny what has always been its policy, that a child born of an American parent is an 
American child—either parent, father or mother.”416 It was this understanding of the issue 
and perhaps a wishful interpretation of US citizenship law that motivated McKinney to 
propose the AIA. 
 McKinney’s Republican colleague in the Senate and future co-sponsor of the 
AIA, Senator Jeremiah Denton (AL) was a Vietnam veteran who had survived seven 
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years as a prisoner of war in North Vietnam.
417
 A native of Mobile, Alabama, Denton 
attended the United States Naval Academy and earned a graduate degree from George 
Washington University in 1964 before deploying to Vietnam. In July 1965, after only one 
month of flying combat missions in Vietnam, enemy forces shot down his plane, 
capturing Denton.  
 After almost a decade as a POW, Denton finally found himself on a flight home in 
1973 as part of Operation Homecoming. Fortuitously, Jodi Darragh accompanied him.
 418
 
Perhaps in the midst of friendly conversation, Darragh revealed to Denton her 
experiences transporting Vietnam War orphans to America and the plight of the 
Amerasians. Although Denton was primarily concerned at that time with his own 
reintegration into American society, Darragh and Americans for International Aid, kept 
him informed over the next decade.
419
  
 After his election to the US Senate in 1981, the devout Catholic, right wing 
conservative, and father of seven became the first Republican from Alabama elected to 
the United States Senate since Reconstruction. Denton gained a reputation in Washington 
for his passionate commitment to restoring American morality with a specific focus on 
children, teenage chastity, adoption and the preservation of the nuclear family.
420
 Senator 
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Denton also remembered the Amerasians. He spoke again to his old acquaintance, 
Darragh, who introduced him to Father Keane, whose faith-based work on the 
transnational adoptions of the Amerasians and focus on family she knew would spark 
Denton’s interest.421 
 Consequently, Denton agreed to partner with McKinney and co-sponsor the AIA. 
As a war veteran, Denton knew that the problem of illegitimately fathered children 
overseas was real. Like McKinney, Denton vehemently believed in the moral 
responsibility and obligation of the United States to the Amerasians. It was an issue of 
morality, family, and faith. According to Denton, the Amerasians “must not be 
abandoned by this Nation as they were abandoned by their fathers.”422  
 However Denton’s biggest contribution to the bill itself was his support of the 
administrations’ insistence to amend the language of the bill regarding the fathers. Rather 
than the House version of the bill which identified the potential father as an active 
member of the US military Denton suggested a more general definition that would affect 
a broader population of Amerasians—replacing the military requirement for paternity 
with the less specific “US citizen.”423  It is probable that the esteemed member of the 
Veteran’s Affairs Committee spoke for many of his military brethren  concerned with 
protecting the individual identities of potential American fathers, and the image of the US 
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military and Vietnam veteran’s in particular as he reminded the Senate that many of the 
Amerasians were fathered by non-military and non-Governmental personnel.
424
  
 Denton’s concerns certainly mirrored those of the administration which, having 
had its evidentiary argument for blood tests debunked, had become less opposed to the 
AIA by June 1982.  Seven months removed from the fiery exchanges in the House, the 
administration’s main concern, according to Ambassador Ascencio was the requirement 
that the father was a “member of the US Armed Forces at the time of conception.”425 
Stewart McKinney’s immediate clarification that the AIA did not make any effort to 
“identify the actual father” but only to establish that the child was the offspring of a US 
citizen father, had little effect.
426
 The administration remained adamant that civilian US 
citizens fathered “substantial numbers of these children” and that in order for the 
administration to support the bill, the language must change.
427
 
 No longer concerned apparently with fraud and immigration, the administration 
carefully centered its position on the bill around protecting the image of US servicemen 
abroad and in turn, maintaining a policy of irresponsibility.
428
 When asked by Senator 
Alan Nelson (R-WY) if the administration might consider a long-term solution to the 
Amerasian problem considering the continued presence of US troops in Asia, Ascencio 
replied with laughter: “I just can’t imagine what that could be” before continuing with the 
very vague, “I think we would have to take the effects of stationing troops abroad as a 
given, and adjust accordingly.”429 Nelson did not push for further explanation. 
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 Still, Denton’s sponsorship of the bill placed the conservative politician in an 
unlikely alliance with the liberal media, currently garnering American sympathy for the 
issue through television documentaries, photographs and stories. Even liberal columnist 
Mary McGrory, who had blasted the administration for its “shameful treatment” of the 
Amerasians, commended Denton for his commitment to the issue.
430
   
 Likely the result of his Southern political roots, however, the conservative 
politician used the term “citizenship” more cautiously than his political counterpart in the 
House. Even without specifically stating that the Amerasians deserved US citizenship, 
Denton advocated their right to live in the country of their fathers where they would have 
a better life. Denton claimed that the AIA would “give the Amerasian children the same 
immigration preference enjoyed by other children of American citizens,” and provide 
“these children of Americans the benefit of their birthright.”431 His commitment to the 
Amerasians reflected a political career dedicated to “caring about the born,” and Denton 
strongly believed that it was time for America to “bring these children home.”432  
The Veterans  
 One of the most tragic consequences of the Vietnam War was the fate of the 
Vietnam veteran. They returned home to an unsympathetic public that did not honor them 
for their sacrifices as had been done with the veterans of World War II, but rather, chose 
to forget them. Historian George Herring describes this process as “a self-conscious 
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collective amnesia.”433 Men who had experienced horrendous combat and suffered from 
both physical and psychological consequences from the war faced challenges readjusting 
and re-assimilating into American society.
434
  
In 1978, Vietnam veteran Bobby Muller founded the Vietnam Veterans of 
America (VVA). Muller, an intelligent, charismatic and tough talking New Yorker had 
suffered paralysis from the chest down after a bullet severed his spinal cord in combat in 
1968.
435
 The VVA sought to lobby for congressional legislation to assist veterans and to 
address the larger meaning of the Vietnam experience.
436
 Although a number of other 
veterans groups would emerge in the post-Vietnam War era, the VVA would become the 
largest and most politically powerful organization.
437
 
 In 1981, the VVA had finally gained political leverage for its efforts to assist 
veterans trying to reconcile the meaning of the war.
438
 For Muller this required a return to 
Vietnam where, despite the absence of diplomatic relations between the two countries, 
Muller believed a resolution could occur between American and Vietnamese veterans on 
issues such as the effects of Agent Orange and the MIAs. The purpose, Muller explained 
was “to relate to the Vietnamese as people instead of relating to them as…gooks.”439 In 
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December 1981, Muller and three other combat vets flew to Hanoi, accompanied by New 
York Times reporter Bernie Weinraub who wrote a series of articles about the trip.
440
  
On December 27, 1981, Weinraub published his fifth report, “Tears as the Past is 
Remembered,” describing the “swarms of begging half-American children” that 
surrounded the vets whenever they left their hotel in Ho Chi Minh City.
441
 Framed as 
another tragedy of the war, Weinraub’s story caught the attention of Times publisher 
Arthur Sulzberger, whose interest in the Amerasians led to a series of editorials. The 
publicity by such a reputable media source increased public awareness and support from 
the American public to help the half-American kids.
442
  
The timing could not have been better.  Weinraub’s article appeared a month after 
the November Hearings in the House on the AIA. While those hearings had exposed 
greater congressional support for the bill than McKinney had acquired in 1979, the AIA 
too, seemed destined for failure in light of the Reagan administration’s arguments of 
paternity, fraud and blood tests.  
 Bill Kurtis’s 1980 expose, had invoked a wave of public sympathy for the 
Amerasians by framing the children as victims of communism. Their exclusion from 
Vietnamese society reflected the injustice of a cruel Communist government. In Kurtis’s 
portrayal, Americans had not abandoned the Amerasians. Rather, they were children 
whose fathers the Viet Cong had killed or who Vietnam’s Communist government 
prevented from retrieving their offspring.
443
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Weinraub’s reports changed the discourse. Rather than depicting the Amerasians 
as victims of a brutal war that most Americans wanted desperately to forget, Weinraub 
presented them as one of the unresolved problems from the war, along with the effects of 
Agent Orange and the twenty-five hundred American MIAs. Thus, while Weinraub’s 
coverage was not “new” reporting in 1981, it differed by directly associating the 
Amerasians with American veterans 
In “Tears as the Past is Remembered,” Weinraub included numerous photographs 
of Amerasian children with the VVA vets. Captions of these photos emphasized the 
Americanness or the desire to be American. One caption explained how the children 
touched the arms of the Veterans, “besieged them with photographs and letters, struggled 
to speak English and gazed at the four with awe.”444  
Weinraub’s reports skillfully linked the Amerasians with the unreconciled issues 
of American veterans; this was one that America could fix. He implied throughout his 
articles that, like the missing servicemen from the war, the Amerasians too, were 
American children. It was America’s responsibility to bring them home.  
Consequently, Weinraub’s reports helped refocus the blame for the Amerasians 
from the evil Communist to the irresponsibility of the American government. It was not, 
the New York Times reported in July 1982, that Vietnam will not let the Amerasians “out” 
as previously argued, but that “America won’t let them in.”445 
The VVA took its second trip of reconciliation to Vietnam in May 1982. This 
time however, the VVA agenda listed the Amerasians with Agent Orange and MIAs as 
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topics to discuss with Vietnamese officials.
446
 Joining the VVA trip was CBS news 
reporter Mike Wallace. Shortly after arriving in Ho Chi Minh City, young Amerasian 
street kids surrounded Wallace and the VVA members and asked them if they were their 
fathers. Among the group was ten-year old Le Van Minh, a handsome, freckled faced 
hazel eyed Amerasian whose physical disfigurement by the effects of polio burned 
images difficult to forget.
447
  
 Wallace successfully captured the street life of the Amerasians, many of whom 
surrounded him that first day, along with an Emmy nomination for his 1982 Sixty 
Minutes documentary, “Honor Thy Children.” His report also garnered sympathy and 
support for the Amerasian cause at a critical point for the AIA. Building off of 
Weinraub’s narrative of blame, Wallace focused on the moral necessity of bringing the 
Amerasians to America.  
 While depicting the discrimination the Amerasians faced in Vietnam because of 
their American characteristics, Wallace profiled the frustrated efforts of two American 
servicemen whose attempts to retrieve their Amerasian children had been ignored by 
American officials.
448
 Throughout his report, Wallace presented evidence that the 
Amerasians were more American than Vietnamese. One boy, he explained, claimed to be 
an American, “he felt like an American he said because he had an American father.” 
American veteran Roger Bott’s frustration with the U.S. government’s unwillingness to 
                                                 
446 Kane, interview; “U.S. Veterans’ Group on its Way to Vietnam,” Special to the New York Times, 28 May 1982. 
447 Kane, interview. Initial reports of Minh associated his physical disability with the effects of Agent Orange. It was not until Minh 
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assist in bringing his Amerasian son home, clearly appeared in his interview as he 
explained, ‘It seems the older he gets the more….the more American he looks.’”449  
 Bott’s frustration mirrored that of other American veterans who blamed the 
Reagan administration for deliberately keeping their children in Vietnam. A few months 
prior to Wallace’s report, veteran Gary Tanous of Washington state sent a handwritten 
plea to President Reagan to intervene in bringing his Amerasian daughter, Jeanna Mare 
Tanous, an American citizen, to the United States.
450
 Even though Tanous had 
legitimated his daughter and Jeanna possessed a US passport, Hanoi would not grant her 
an exit permit.
451
 Only a few months later and having never received a response from 
President Reagan, an exasperated Tanous explained, “‘I have received absolutely no 
cooperation from American authorities. They don’t want anything to do with a 
Vietnamese and they keep reminding me that Jean Marie is half Vietnamese.’”452 
Wallace also interviewed Shade. Shade explained to a captivated American 
audience that regarding “the children we fathered in wedlock and out of wedlock in Asia, 
we have had a silent policy of child abandonment, because that’s what it is, it is child 
abuse in regard to the Amerasian children.”453  
At the end of his report, amidst an array of photographs of Amerasian children 
with undeniably “American” features, Wallace explained to his audience the futile 
situation for the Amerasians in Vietnam. “Only a handful of Amerasian children,” 
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Wallace described, “perhaps a dozen, have been able to immigrate to the United States 
from Vietnam.” The AIA, Wallace reminded his viewers, was currently under 
consideration in Congress and Vietnam was willing to release all the Amerasians.
454
  
Wallace’s report aired on September 19, 1982. For many Americans in the 
audience, the report was a powerful visual reminder of the war itself and of America’s 
responsibility to the Amerasian children. The visual images were undeniable and the sad 
stories of American veterans who missed their children, difficult to ignore. Thus, through 
his report, Wallace, as had Weinraub’s coverage, greatly contributed to the growing 
public pressure to pass the AIA. 
 One week later Senator Denton reminded his colleagues of the public attention 
this latest television documentary brought to the issue and its emphasis on passing the 
AIA in the current congressional session. Denton stated that, “With each day that we 
delay[the passage of the S1698], the Amerasian children, who are our responsibility 
because they are half American, are further away from escaping the discrimination that is 
caused by their mixed heritage.”455 On September 28, 1982 the AIA unanimously passed 
the Senate. To ensure its passage in the House Denton urged House members to also 
consider the Sixty Minutes report and the importance for Congress to pass the AIA 
without delay. 
456
  
The House did pass the AIA on October 1, but not before amending the Senate 
version of the bill to insure the safety of the children once in the United States and to 
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protect them from exploitation.
457
  The amendments, according to Senator Mazzoli, 
preserved “the spirit of the bill” while eliminating potential problems.458 The House 
version of the bill included:  safeguards to ensure the legitimacy of the sponsorship 
process, required the involvement of State child welfare agencies and public and private 
agencies familiar with intercountry adoption and placements. The bill also directed the 
Attorney General to file regular reports regarding the bill and its effects specifically on 
family separation and dislocation.
459
 Members of the House lauded the bi-partisan victory 
and commended the efforts of McKinney whom Hamilton Fish (R-NY) labeled, “the 
conscience of the Congress,” for bringing the Amerasians to the forefront of public 
attention.
460
 
Their Plight is in Their Name 
On October 22, 1982, the Amerasian Immigration Act became law.
461
 The Act 
gave priority to Amerasian children under the age of twenty-one with guaranteed 
financial support from an American sponsor to immigrate to America.
462
 The rhetoric 
surrounding its passage was inclusionary, officially recognizing America’s paternal 
responsibility.  Congressman William Lehman of Florida declared that America “must no 
longer choose to forget our own sons and daughters in Asia.” Congressman James K. 
Coyne of Pennsylvania affirmed that “some of America’s children are finally coming 
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home.”463 Benjamin Gilman, Congressman from New York, professed “To these children 
we say, your fatherland embraces you.”464 President Reagan deemed the bill a “good and 
humane law” that “recognizes the rightful claim of Amerasian children to American 
citizenship.”465  
However citizenship was not part of the bill. While Congress criticized Vietnam 
for denying the Amerasians the “dignity and rights of true citizenship,” and for its 
treatment of the Amerasians as “nonpeople,” members failed even to discuss awarding 
them American citizenship.
466
 Thus the inclusionary rhetoric of the bill that posed the 
Amerasians as children of American fathers failed to turn the rhetoric into action. Such a 
hypocritical approach to the Amerasian issue exposed the inability of policymakers to 
fully reconcile the Amerasian mixture with US law. While the welcoming words 
recognized that a filiation between the Amerasians and America did exist, it was not 
enough to amend US citizenship law.  
The AIA did allow the Amerasians to immigrate to the United States as the 
children of American citizens but avoided making the Amerasians themselves American 
citizens. In his support of the bill, Senator Samuel Ichiye Hayakawa expressed the 
paradox, “Their very name—Amerasian—tells of their plight. They are not completely 
American, but not really Asian either. Their Western physical traits, while not enough to 
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make them citizens of the United States, are more than enough reason to their Asian 
countrymen to ostracize and persecute them.”467 
Evident in Hayakawa’s statement was the inability of policymakers to fit the 
Amerasians cleanly into a racial and national category within American society. They 
were American enough to garner statements of inclusion, sympathy and immigration 
preference, but not enough American to be citizens. Thus while the AIA did provide the 
appearance that the United States was finally taking national paternal responsibility for its 
war babies in Vietnam, the bill failed to resolve an issue American policymakers were 
not yet fully ready to address.  
Additionally, there were other problems with the AIA. Due to the absence of 
diplomatic relations with Vietnam, the AIA had very little effect on the Amerasians 
there.
468
 Although the Act designated qualifying Amerasians as immigrants, only those 
who had guaranteed financial support from an American family or private charitable 
agency were able to take advantage of it. Most Amerasians neither knew a family nor an 
agency willing to sponsor them, nor did they possess the resources required to make 
those connections.  
Furthermore, in 1982 the majority of Amerasians were still children and the AIA 
only allowed for the Amerasians themselves to immigrate; it did not include their 
biological mother or family members. As Michael Nebeker, Thailand director of the Pearl 
S. Buck Foundation, stated “Congress wrote the bill as it if were saying ‘Let’s make a 
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nice gesture toward the Amerasians—but don’t really let the bastards in.’”469 More work 
remained from citizens and government officials. 
Nonetheless, the AIA provided a pathway for the Amerasians of other Asian 
nations to immigrate to America. Furthermore, it served as formal recognition by the U.S. 
government of the Amerasians as the offspring of American fathers.   
By 1981 American policymakers and the American media shared an 
understanding of certain key facts regarding the Amerasians. They were the children of 
American fathers, conceived as a result of US presence in Vietnam during the War.  
Their American paternity dictated the abuse, discrimination and exclusion that defined 
their existence in Vietnam. The majority of them did not know their fathers and were 
therefore illegitimate. They were largely poor, uneducated, undernourished and getting 
older. They were one of the most shameful consequences of an American military failure 
that many Americans hoped to forget.  
In Vietnam, their “connection” to America ensured their exclusion from society 
while their “American blood” prevented their acceptance as Vietnamese. Policymakers 
understood that in Vietnam, “They think of Amerasians as trash…Amerasian is like the 
left over trash from the U.S….when we have a chance to go…to the US and some of 
them say, ‘well the trash is finally getting picked up, but slowly, not fast enough to clean 
the country.’”470  
This understanding of the sad existence of the Amerasians in Vietnam shaped an 
evolving discourse among American policymakers of inclusion as discussions over the 
AIA progressed. Policymakers hoped this discourse would help reconcile America’s 
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military loss, designating the Amerasians as “‘our children,’” and the “’forgotten sons 
and daughters of U.S. citizens.’” 471 The discourse was critical to garnering public 
attention and political support for the AIA. Advocates like Father Keane knew that in 
order for America to act, Americans had to view the Amerasians as familiar rather than 
foreign, American children not Asian.  
Understanding that citizenship was not an issue policymakers were willing to 
address, advocates like Keane, Father Carroll and John Shade, committed to an 
inclusionary rhetoric to reshape the image of the Amerasians into American children. 
While lobbying congressmen to support the AIA in 1982, Father Keane stopped using the 
term “Amerasian,” referring to the children instead as “abandoned Americans left in 
Asia.”472 Congressmen McKinney and Denton followed in Keane’s footsteps. In the June 
1982 Senate Hearings on the AIA, Senator Denton even explained that, “The word 
‘Amerasian,’ of course, derives its first two syllables from ‘America,’” in reinforcing the 
necessary acceptance of the Amerasians as American children.
473
  
The plight of the Amerasians united all parties: priests, missionaries, politicians, 
flight attendants, NGOs, and veterans.  Each advocated the acceptance of the Amerasians 
as America’s responsibility. They were America’s children through immigration and for 
citizenship, promoting the belief expressed by the adoptive mother of two Amerasian 
girls, “‘America owes these children a chance to become good citizens in the country of 
their fathers.’”474 Yet, the efforts of Father’s Carroll and Keane, Jodie and Dick Darragh, 
the Pearl S. Buck Foundation, the VVA and Congressmen McKinney and Denton, to gain 
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national recognition that the Amerasians were American children and therefore 
America’s responsibility were undermined by a policy that, through the exclusion of 
citizenship, continued to mark them as foreigners.  
In his plea to reconfigure the bill, McKinney explained that by establishing a 
special immigration category for the Amerasians, the bill had failed to “admit that these 
are our children and establish for them the same rights enjoyed by all other children of 
U.S. citizens.”475 The resistance of the Reagan administration dictated such an approach. 
Even in its passage of the Act, the administration remained adamant that without 
evidentiary proof of their “American blood,” the Amerasians were not really American.  
Over the next three years, Vietnam’s Amerasians would fall victim to increasing 
diplomatic tensions between the United States and Vietnam. Tensions centered largely on 
the MIA issue which polarized the nation and prevented a total national reconciliation of 
the war. Both countries continued to politicize the Amerasians. Vietnam pointed to the 
failure of the AIA to allow the mothers or other family members of Amerasian children 
to immigrate with them to the United States and condemned the absence of American 
citizenship. The United States continued to use the Amerasians’ poor treatment in 
Vietnam as evidence of the evils of Communism and the Vietnamese government.
476
  
Through all of the finger-pointing and name calling however, conditions for the 
Amerasians did not improve in Vietnam, and neither did the opportunity to immigrate to 
America through the AIA. Thus the few Amerasians from Vietnam, who did come to 
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America after 1982, did so as refugees through the ODP rather than the AIA. Over the 
next four years, the ODP would prove inefficient for the Amerasians and all other 
refugees from Vietnam. Both governments blamed the other for the program’s 
inefficiency and both ignored the effect on the Amerasian children, victims of the entire 
process.
477
  
                                                 
477 Before 1986 the ODP functioned through an office in Bangkok, Thailand with UN officials acting as processing liaisons in 
Vietnam. Under this system bureaucratic morass, intensive document requirements and checks, and significant time delays 
characterized each level of Amerasian processing. When these operational inefficiencies resulted in a significant case backlog, 
Vietnam installed a unilateral moratorium on processing. DeMonaco, “Disorderly Departure,” 644.   
  117 
CHAPTER 4 
WINDOW DRESSING 
When President Reagan signed the Amerasian Immigration Act into law on 
October 22, 1982, he described the act as a reflection of American humanitarianism and a 
commitment to family reunification. Reagan declared the AIA a “major step” in 
America’s challenge to meet its moral responsibility to children who, “through no fault of 
their own,” have “frequently lived in the most wretched of circumstances and often have 
been ostracized in the lands of their birth.”478 The AIA, he claimed, would reunite “these 
children with those who will love and care for them.”479  
Surrounding Reagan at the ceremony were Senator Denton, Representative 
McKinney, Judy Keane—the sister of Father Alfred Keane, and Keane’s two adopted 
Amerasian nieces. Others included two Korean Amerasians sent by Father Carroll—
Eddie Choi and Jini Choi (unrelated), Jodie and Dick Darragh, and John Shade. Three 
days after signing the AIA, President Reagan sent congratulatory letters to all of the 
major political actors involved in passing the bill and to Father Keane. Reagan 
commended Denton and McKinney for their efforts regarding the children, whom he 
described as “forgotten by our laws, but not by our people,” reiterating that the AIA was 
“the first step toward welcoming these children home.”480 
For the Amerasians of Vietnam, however, the AIA failed to fulfill any 
humanitarian charge, nor did it enable them to reunite with their American fathers. Much 
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of the discussion and debate within Congress preceding its passage focused on the 
humanitarian necessity of getting the Amerasians out of Vietnam. However, in the 
absence of diplomatic relations, the Act provided no practical means to implement the 
program in that country.  
Rather, the AIA had the biggest effect on the Amerasians of Korea who faced 
much more promising prospects than their Vietnamese counterparts. For a decade, the 
Korean government had accepted Amerasians as Korean citizens, exempted them from 
military service, and provided a monthly stipend, school tuition, and assistance with the 
legal family registries that officially recognized their existence.
481
 In contrast, the 
Amerasians in Vietnam had no such treatment and faced a difficult existence in a society 
that considered them inferior.
482
 
 While many applauded the AIA as a positive step toward the recognition of 
national American paternity, supporters quickly highlighted its limitations and the 
consequential low numbers who could take advantage of it, even among Korean 
Amerasians. Its requirements—strict financial and legal commitments for American 
sponsors, the exclusion of accompanying family members and no American citizenship—
ensured that the AIA would benefit very few Amerasians.  
                                                 
481 According to the Pearl S. Buck Foundation the Republic of Korea (ROK) granted Amerasians exemption from military service. In 
the mid-1970s the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (MHSA) began providing monthly stipends to each registered Amerasian 
through local government offices. In 1982 the Buck Foundation administered the stipend program and in 1984 the MHSA provided 
full school tuition for all middle and high school student Amerasians. The ROK also established special procedures to help 
Amerasians who had errors in family registers and provided free passport services for those immigrating to the United States. James L. 
Dunnet to Father Alfred Carroll, Pearl S. Buck Foundation Newsletter, January 1986, Dunnet folder, Box 3B.2.2 Al Carroll, S.J. 
Amerasian Program, Jesuit Oregon Province Archive. Spokane, Washington. 
482 The perceptions of the Amerasians as racially, culturally and socially inferior in Vietnam depicts an inverted application of the 
East-West binary central to Edward Said’s Orientalism. Rejected from society because of their biological connection and assumed 
cultural connection to America, the physical appearance of many Amerasians prevented them from blending into Vietnamese society 
or achieving cultural acceptance. Valverde posits that in addition to their physical differences, most Vietnamese assumed Amerasians 
to be poor and uneducated. Valverde, “Doing the Mixed-Race Dance” in Williams-Leon and Nakashima, 133-134. 
  119 
Additionally, although the AIA was a piece of federal legislation, by design it 
depended entirely on private support—American sponsors limited to private charitable 
organizations and individual American citizens. Thus, there was no federal obligation to 
assist Amerasians in their emigration. That burden and all of its costs fell entirely upon 
non-governmental groups and individuals and reflected the continued privatization of 
public responsibility. Indeed, by 1985, after three years of implementation, only 165 
Amerasians had immigrated to the United Stated under the AIA, 156 from Korea and 
only four from Vietnam.
483
  
The requirement in the AIA that only the Amerasian child could immigrate to the 
United States contradicted the tenets of American Immigration Policy and American 
humanitarianism by dividing families and separating children from their birthmothers. In 
practice, this meant that for children to benefit from the legislation, they had to leave 
their mothers and move to a foreign country where they did not speak the language or 
understand American culture. For Vietnamese officials in particular, such a requirement 
reinforced the perception that American policymakers were not really committed to 
cooperation on the issue.      
 Prior to the passage of the AIA, the Vietnam government had voiced concern 
over this proposed requirement, emphasizing to American officials that Vietnam’s 
cooperation in expediting the departure process for Amerasians depended upon 
America’s willingness to keep families together.484 Donald Colin, the Head of the U.S. 
Refugee Program responsible for the departure of Amerasians prior to the passage of the 
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AIA, noted: “Hanoi will not allow Amerasian children to leave alone, ‘they don’t intend 
to cooperate if the mothers are split from their children.’”485 Many mothers of 
Amerasians felt equally as strong that they should be included in the bill. When CBS 
reporter Mike Wallace asked some mothers if they would let their Amerasian children go 
to America without them, one mother replied, “No, if they say that, then we keep it, the 
children, the mother and the children go together.”486 Another mother gave a more 
emotional response explaining, while on the verge of tears, “He’s my only son.”487 After 
the passage of the AIA, a group of seven mothers wrote US officials explaining that they 
too, were victims of discrimination and abuse because of their Amerasian children and 
asked the US government to “save us out of the present miserable living” in Vietnam.488 
One could question Vietnam’s motives in its insistence that the mothers, women 
who had betrayed their country by sleeping with the enemy, be included in the 
legislation. American policymakers, in fact, did. Nonetheless, the humanitarian value of 
the idea seemed self-evident. The blatant disregard of this request in the AIA hindered 
any opportunity to form bilateral collaboration between the two governments on the 
issue, ensuring that the AIA simply, “cannot be made to work in Vietnam.”489  
In addition to the intentional failure of the bill to address the issue of American 
troops continuing to father Amerasian children, there was also much concern over its 
exclusion of American citizenship.
490
 In a letter to President Reagan a month after the 
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passage of the AIA, John Shade of the Pearl S. Buck Foundation, commended the bill as 
a “milestone” and “positive movement.” However, he asserted, one of its most serious 
flaws was its denial of birthright citizenship to the Amerasians.
491
  
The choice to exclude citizenship, Shade acknowledged, likely arose from the 
bill’s political role as a “humanitarian remedy” to the Amerasian situation. While the bill 
allowed Amerasian children adopted by American families or sponsored by American 
citizens an easier path to naturalization, it largely ignored the majority of Amerasians 
who neither knew a family, nor had an agency willing to sponsor them, nor possessed the 
resources required to make those connections.  Without birthright U.S. citizenship, such a 
“remedy” failed to consider most Amerasians who, by 1982, were too old for adoption or 
whose Asian mothers believed them too young to send to America alone.
492
 The AIA did 
nothing, Shade asserted, to assist in these cases.
493
  
Underlying Shade’s criticism were concerns that although the AIA officially 
recognized the Amerasians as children of American citizens, it continued to deny them 
the rights given to all other children of American citizens.
494
 Shade’s accusations 
challenged the relationship between the notions of belonging expressed in the 
inclusionary rhetoric of the AIA and the sex-based distinction in US law that legally 
justified the exclusion of citizenship. Thus, while providing politicized humanitarian 
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window dressing for the administration hoping to capitalize on the assertion of its own 
good deeds, by failing to award citizenship, the AIA continued to exclude the Amerasians 
from formal membership. 
The exclusion of citizenship from the bill revealed the contradiction between 
American humanitarian values and the legacy of US law. The inclusionary rhetoric 
evoked images of open borders, inclusion and assimilation, that welcomed and embraced 
the Amerasians as American children. Yet, situated within the exclusionary nature of the 
policy, was the complicated relationship within US law between race and nation via 
citizenship. While the AIA created the legal category of “Amerasian” which formally 
recognized these individuals as children of US citizens who could come to America as a 
result of their paternity, such recognition did not extend to membership.
495
 Consequently, 
the failure to award citizenship ensured that the Amerasians did not really belong in 
America.
496
 In essence, this irony revealed that although US policymakers and US policy 
determined the Amerasians were “American enough” to be recognized as the children of 
American fathers, they were not “American enough” to be American citizens.497  
Under the AIA, Amerasians could only earn American citizenship through the 
U.S. naturalization process. According to the Buck Foundation, it was “unfair, unethical 
and morally wrong” for the AIA to demand that an “Amerasian child give up his family 
to obtain his American citizenship; citizenship not afforded by birthright, but by a 
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citizens.”Amerasian Immigration Act, PL 97-359, 97th Cong., Oct 22, 1982.  
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naturalization process.”498 Such a requirement reinforced the notion that the Amerasians 
were not American children, because American children would have birth-right 
American citizenship. Rather, Amerasians joined other foreign immigrants and refugees 
in earning their citizenship through residency and passing the citizenship test.
499
 
As a result of these limitations, the majority of Amerasians immigrated under the 
Orderly Departure Program, not the AIA. Perhaps understanding the inevitable 
limitations of the bill prior to its passage, Vietnamese authorities began permitting the 
regular processing for immigration of Amerasians and their immediate family members 
through the ODP in September 1982.
500
 This would be the first official effort by Vietnam 
to enable its Amerasians to depart the country en masse. Although between 1982 and 
1985 1,983 Amerasians and their family members entered the United States as a result, 
this effort went underreported by American media and unrecognized by American 
policymakers. Instead, policymakers continued to criticize Vietnam for the absence of 
diplomatic relations that they blamed for preventing implementation of the AIA.
501
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Refugee Policy of the Committee on the Judiciary, Refugee Consultation, 97th Cong., 2d sess., September 29, 1982, 96; Hearing 
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Senate, 100th Cong., 1st sess, June 30, 1987, 138. 
501 On March 21, 1985 Representative Christopher Smith (R-NJ) introduced the Amerasian Children Relief Act which would amend 
the AIA to allow mothers or guardians of Amerasians to irrevocably release them for adoption and emigration. The bill sought to 
address the standing requirement that adoption only applied to orphaned or abandoned Amerasians and thus to expand the teeth of the 
AIA. The House referred the bill to the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees and International Law where it 
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The Reagan administration understood the limitations of the bill and specifically, 
its uselessness in Vietnam even prior to its passage. In fact, the Buck Foundation began 
lobbying policymakers and Vice President George Bush in the weeks leading up to the 
Senate vote for recognition as a Refugee Resettlement Agency specifically for the 
purpose of continuing to assist the Amerasians in Vietnam. The AIA, John Shade 
insisted, did not apply in Vietnam due to the absence of diplomatic relations which left 
the Amerasians no other option but to immigrate through the ODP as refugees.
502
 Among 
the issues the president was to address in his daily press briefing on September 21, 1982, 
was the administration’s support of the AIA. Included in his briefing memo regarding the 
legislation was the statement that the AIA, “does not automatically benefit Amerasians in 
Vietnam.”503 In a 1986 Congressional review of the ODP and the AIA, James Purcell of 
the Bureau of Refugee Programs, testified that the State Department had communicated 
to Congress in 1982 that although the AIA would work in some countries, it would not 
work in Vietnam given the lack of diplomatic or consular relations.
504
 
Politically, however, the Amerasians and the AIA served a purpose for the 
administration. During his first term in office, Reagan’s advisors had continuously voiced 
their concerns about the president’s humanitarian image, or lack thereof.  In 1982, 
Reagan’s trusted advisor Lyn Nofziger sent a memo to White House staffers explaining 
the importance of the AIA in convincing the American public that Reagan worried about 
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503 Memo, Richard Childress to William P. Clark, September 21, 1982 ID #091930, IM161533  WHORM: Subject File, Amerasian 
Children, Ronald Reagan Library. 
504 Midyear Consultation on US Refugee Programs for Fiscal Year 1986, Hearing, 103.  
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human issues, and especially the plight of children and families. “One of the President’s 
problems,” Nofziger explained, “is that the public thinks he doesn’t care about people.” 
By supporting the AIA, President Reagan could show the American public that in fact, he 
“cares a little bit about people.”505 
The Reagan Era 
Reagan had acquired this reputation honestly. The “Great Communicator” had 
entered office in 1981 riding the rising tide of American conservatism. By the end of the 
Carter administration, a miserable economy, deindustrialization, divisions in the 
Democratic party, demographic shifts in the conservative South and Southwest, and 
increased political participation among evangelicals shifted the political landscape in 
America.
506
 For the first time since 1954 conservatives controlled the Senate and 
defenders of the Vietnam War, including Senator Jeremiah Denton, replaced its liberal 
critics in Congress.
507
  
With the political power of his party behind him, Reagan, the former New Deal 
Democrat had a clear mission—to dismantle the social welfare apparatus which he 
directly associated with Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society to which he pointed as evidence 
of the problems of big government and the primary cause of the country’s economic 
struggles.
508
 Throughout his administration, Reagan’s efforts to reduce the reach of the 
federal government through economic and social policies consistently damaged the 
interests of America’s racial minorities, women and lower classes.  
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IM161533, WHORM: Subject File, Amerasian Children, Ronald Reagan Library. 
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His first presidential term, defined by massive tax cuts and increased defense 
spending, had successfully reduced inflation and increased employment.
509
 However, the 
resulting economic prosperity failed to “trickle down” to the majority of Americans and 
the economic expansion affected only a select few. In reality, Reaganomics had 
disastrous effects on social service assistance through the reduction of federal aid to 
programs like Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and school lunch 
programs for low-income children.
510
  
By the end of his first term, the growing disparity between America’s rich and 
poor further alienated specific segments of the population and resulted in the tripling of 
America’s debt, stagnant wages, and a growing and massive disparity between rich and 
poor. Reaganomics succeeded in creating the perception of a nation divided into what 
historians Michael Schaller and George Rising term, “tax payers and tax takers.”511  
Among the alleged tax takers were poor women and racial minorities, both vilified by the 
administration in the image of the “welfare queen,” to mobilize popular support against 
public assistance.
512
 By villainizing this segment of the American population Reagan 
convinced many American voters that his human concern had a price tag and a color.
513
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512 Helen Heran Jun argues that the Reagan administration’s attack on social welfare programs and publicly funded institutions was an 
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Ignoring the reality that the majority of welfare recipients during the period were white women, the administration produced the 
“welfare queen” as the image of “black female reproduction as a pathological excess” sustained by welfare. Jun, Race for Citizenship, 
126. For further discussion of belief during the period that black mothers passed inferior traits and deviancy to their children and the 
representation of the black mother as the welfare queen who deliberately bred at the expense of the taxpayer, see Dorothy Roberts, 
Killing the Black Body: Race, Reproduction, and the Meaning of Liberty (New York: Pantheon Books, 1997). 
513 In 1976 Reagan used the term “welfare queen” to describe Chicago woman Linda Taylor whom he fictionalized, reporting she had 
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year. The GOP had previously used the term “welfare queen” to describe Taylor after she bilked the government out of $8000 using 
  127 
Failed Diplomacy 
Thus, it was important for the Reagan administration to present the AIA as a 
major political and humanitarian success. However the limitations of the policy proved 
contradictory to any notion that the administration actually wanted to solve the 
Amerasian problem or normalize relations with Vietnam. Even so, after its passage, the 
administration continuously reminded the American people that efforts to obtain the 
release of the Amerasian children were a high priority and that the state had taken the 
lead in creating innovative legislation to ease the entry of “non-citizen Amerasian 
children” into the United States.514  
As a result of such positive coverage of the AIA, between 1982 and 1986, much 
of the attention previously focused on the Amerasians and the AIA waned. There were of 
course, those Amerasian advocates who remained committed to the cause after the 
passage of the bill, increasing their support for American responsibility for its Amerasian 
children amidst criticism that the AIA excluded the Amerasians of Vietnam. Many 
became angry once they realized the false advertising of the bill. Small pockets of public 
criticism emerged, ranging from accusations of American racism to proof of political 
inhumanity. Concerned citizen Mary Ellen Finnerty Nachbur exclaimed: “I am usually 
proud to be an American, but when I realize that the racism and close-mindedness of 
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overpaid bureaucrats is what is keeping hungry Amerasian children from warm loving 
homes. I am ashamed to say I am a citizen of the same country.”515  
However such backlash was too small to be effective or widely publicized and 
most Americans and policymakers, who had supported the AIA, viewed the bill as a 
success. Policymakers posited that by recognizing the role of the United States in the 
Amerasian situation, the AIA permitted America to finally have some closure from the 
war. Florida Congressman William Lehman (D-FL) argued that the AIA allowed 
America to “rewrite the last page of the diary chronicling her actions in Asia,” finally 
empowering Americans to “close the cover with honor.”516   
Furthermore much of the media coverage during the period reflected the false 
advertising by the administration that the AIA had solved the issue by constantly 
crediting it with the immigration of Amerasians that actually occurred under the ODP—a 
UN program rather than an American one. In April 1984, The New York Times reported a 
significant increase of Amerasian children from Vietnam coming to America since the 
passage of the AIA.
517
 In reality, the AIA did not result in an escalation. The emigration 
of the nine orphans depicted in the story was no different than the twenty-four American 
citizen Amerasians who had also immigrated to the United States before the passage of 
the bill, both groups arriving through the ODP.
518
  
The Reagan administration addressed concerns regarding difficulties 
implementing the AIA in Vietnam by positing that the ODP would provide a sufficient 
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solution to that specific Amerasian problem.
519
 However, for a refugee generating 
country in the post-Vietnam War era, the ODP in Vietnam was neither sufficient nor a 
solution. Between 1982 and 1986 only 3,552 Amerasians entered the United States from 
Vietnam as refugees under the program.
520
  Nonetheless, believing that the AIA had 
taken care of the bui-doi “problem,” many Americans turned their attention to other more 
pressing issues of the decade, specifically immigration, communism, and the 2500 
Americans listed as MIA/POW. 
 A Magnet for Millions 
In 1980, Washington Post writer Margot Hornblower called the United States “A 
Magnet for Millions,” drawing millions of immigrants and refugees, an unknown number 
of whom “will sneak over the Mexican border or fly into Dulles airport as ‘tourists,’ and 
melt into the economy as illegal aliens.”521  Although worried Americans accused 
foreigners of taking jobs from hardworking Americans and exploiting the American 
welfare system, the real concern, according to Hornblower, was that the “invading” 
immigrants were from Third World countries—including half a million from Southeast 
Asia—and therefore posed a more threatening challenge than economic competition or 
drain.
522
 These new immigrants, with their darker skin, foreign languages and inclination 
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to “cling” to their culture, tested the racial and cultural tolerance of American society and 
contributed to the heightened fears of an “immigrant invasion.”523   
Policymakers in Washington sought to balance such fears with efforts to fulfill 
America’s humanitarian obligation to provide a haven for the oppressed by initiating a 
dual approach to immigration. To promote the economic and foreign policy benefits of 
welcoming certain foreigners through America’s front door, policymakers expanded legal 
immigration and refugee admissions, while simultaneously shutting the “back door” by 
cracking down on illegal immigration.
524
 
Rather than abating the anxieties of Americans about the newcomers, the Reagan 
administration encouraged them by juxtaposing the “good” immigrants and refugees from 
Southeast Asia against the “bad” from Cuba, Haiti and Latin America.525 Although 
historically, people of Asian descent in America had often occupied the category of the 
“bad” immigrant—unassimilable, unskilled, undesirable and racially inferior—a 
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designation reflected in the exclusion laws of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the 
emergence of the Asian as America’s “model minority” after World War II re-racialized 
Asians into “good” immigrants. 526 By 1980, the flood of Asian immigrants and refugees 
onto American soil, including large numbers fleeing Vietnam, found themselves pushed 
under the model minority umbrella.
527
   
Historian Yen Le Espiritu argues that in the effort to reconstruct the Vietnam War 
as a moral victory for America, it became necessary to recast the Vietnamese refugee into 
the narrative of “rescue and liberation.” Thus the “good refugee” indebted to the “good” 
American warrior as savior, became the post-war version of the model minority, the 
“desperate-turned-successful.”528  
Many Americans assumed that the Vietnamese refugee successfully overcame the 
obstacle of war to achieve economic self-sufficiency—the American Dream—because of 
the quick assimilation into American cultural values.
529
 Yet, Americans lauded the 
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“model minority” not as an example of achievement for all Americans, but rather only 
the template of success for other racial minorities. Particularly juxtaposed against African 
Americans, the model minority Asian represented the heights to which minority 
populations could rise with hard work and strong cultural values.
530
 While Americans 
viewed “other” racial minorities and racialized immigrants and refugees as competition 
for jobs and housing and, pariahs of America’s social welfare system, Asians became the 
“racial solution.”531 Americans viewed the achievements of the Vietnamese refugees as 
the result of a culture of strong work ethic and a focus on education and family values 
rather than an expectation of social welfare assistance or government aid.
532
  
Despite the claims by some Asian American activists and leaders like Harold T. 
Yee that the “model minority” was a fabrication that failed to reflect the true experience 
of Asian Americans by ignoring different Asian American groups or cultural factors, the 
Reagan administration seemed content to continue the narrative.
533
 As Asian Americans 
and Asian immigrants exemplified the achievement of American assimilation, the 
administration lauded the rehabilitated Vietnamese refugee as the fruit of American 
humanitarian success.
534
 In 1985 the New York Times reported on the quick assimilation 
                                                                                                                                                 
American Dream: Race, Class, and the Soul of the Nation (Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University Press, 1995), xvii; Jun, Race for 
Citizenship. 
530 Jun argues that the construction of the Asian model minority occurred as a domestic racial discourse and an expression of the 
neoliberal principles that emerged after the civil rights movement. Jun, Race for Citizenship,128. 
531 Yu, Thinking Orientals, 7-8. 
532 Central to the model minority myth were assumptions of an innate Asian American intellectual ability which researchers qualified 
through studies of educational achievements and intelligence testing like the IQ. Researchers credited hard work, rote memory and 
good study habits for the academic achievements of Japanese Americans who were consequently cast as intellectually inferior to 
European Americans but superior to other racial minorities. David K. Yoo, “Testing Assumptions: IQ, Japanese Americans, and the 
Model Minority Myth in the 1920s and 1930s,” in Remapping Asian American History, ed. Sucheng Chan (Walnut Creek: Altamira 
Press, 2003), 69-86. 
533 Yee was a Chinese American known for his community and political activism in the Asian American community. During the 1970s 
Yee was a member of the Chinese American Democratic Club which focused on community empowerment, opposition to the Vietnam 
War and normalization of relations with China. In 1971, he founded ASIAN, Inc., and advocated voter registration and supported 
Asian American political candidates and issues that affected the Asian American community. Harold T. Yee, “The General Level of 
Well-Being of Asian Americans,” Asian-American Service Institute for Assistance to Neighborhoods, San Francisco, CA. October 6, 
1977. Civil Rights & Justice, Gutierrez  folder Asians, Box 3, Domestic Policy Staff Files, Jimmy Carter Library. 
534 Ibid. In 1983 the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) validated Yee’s criticism, reporting that Indochinese refugees 
had a higher unemployment rate than both the general U.S. population and the Cuban refugee population. In 1982 HHS reported that 
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and success of Vietnamese refugee children able to overcome the scars of their horrible 
past and who learned English in three months, earned straight As, “play soccer and go 
roller-skating with their American friends.”535 
Only six months into his Presidency, however and in stark contrast to the “good” 
refugee from Southeast Asia, Reagan identified the two greatest problems facing his 
administration as “the Haitians and the criminal Cubans.”536 The Haitian “boat people” 
epitomized the “bad” immigrant for Reagan. Deemed “economic migrants” rather than 
refugees from persecution, many Haitians entered America illegally; they arrived—poor, 
uneducated, low-skilled, and black.
537
 Absent any political or Cold War benefit to accept 
the first Black migrant group into the United States, many Americans deemed the 
Haitians as unassimilable and potential burdens on the nation.
538
  
The 125,266 Cuban refugees, who arrived in the United States in 1980 as part of 
the Mariel Boatlift, also challenged the tenets of U.S. refugee policy. Cuban leader Fidel 
Castro’s deliberate “infiltration” of the boatlift with Cuban criminals and other social 
“undesirables” served to escalate American anxieties over the newcomers.539 American 
                                                                                                                                                 
56% of Southeast Asian Refugees were in the labor force and 76% of those were able to find jobs compared with 90% of the general 
U.S. population. The unemployment rate for Southeast Asian refugees was 25% for men and 23% for women, reportedly lower than 
the U.S. population, while Cuban refugees reported a higher employment and lower unemployment rate than the general U.S. 
population. The image of the Vietnamese refugee as the “good” refugee would shift during 1980s as unemployment rates and 
dependence on social welfare increased, reflecting the changing profile of the second wave of Southeast Asian refugees.  
535 Deirdre Carmody, “Boat Children from Vietnam are Getting A’s in Assimilation,” New York Times, May 10, 1985. 
536 Douglas Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), 30. 
537 Under Carter and Reagan Haitian immigrants were legally admitted to the United States through parole or asylum. Most Haitians 
did not qualify for asylum however. Those granted parole were given “entrant” status—temporary refuge—which provided some 
employment and social welfare benefits. Ruth Ellen Wasem, “U.S. Immigration Policy on Haitian Migrants,” Immigration Policy 
Domestic Social Policy Division, CRS Report for Congress, January 21, 2005. 
538 To address the massive flow of illegal Haitian immigrants, and in contrast to the U.S. approach to the boat people of Southeast 
Asia, and in mutual agreement with Duvalier, Reagan instituted a policy of detention—interdiction—and return Interdiction 
authorized the U.S. Coast Guard to intercept and search, by force if necessary, Haitian boats suspected of carrying illegals. If 
discovered, the Coast Guard returned the alien to Haiti. Between 1981 and 1989, the U.S. Coast Guard spent $30 million annually to 
intercept and return over 29,000 Haitians to Haiti. Christopher Mitchell ed. Western Hemisphere Immigration and United States 
Foreign Policy (University Park: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992),142-145; “Reagan to Stem Illegal Immigration Flow,” 
Ellensburg Daily Record, September 30, 1981. Ruth Ellen Wasem, Specialist in Immigration Policy Domestic Social Policy Division, 
CRS Report for Congress, “U.S. Immigration Policy on Haitian Migrants,” January 21, 2005. 
539 Despite the fact that the number of violent criminals who entered the United States during the boatlift was small, the negative 
publicity of the “criminal” Cubans overshadowed the reality of Cuban immigrant success in America, inciting fear about all new 
Cuban immigrants and all foreign arrivals. Media reports justified American fears by profiling the changing nature of the Cuban 
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angst regarding the black and brown Haitians and Cubans conflicted with notions of the 
model minority attributed to Asian immigrants and refugees. 
Refugee and social service programs specific to Southeast Asian immigrants and 
refugees intensified this divide by appearing to make them a “privileged group,” favored 
specifically for housing, compared to “needy” American citizens, minorities and other 
immigrant groups.
540
  Fissures between these groups now competing for 
immigration/refugee/resettlement benefits and resources in America often resulted in 
violence. In Denver, Colorado, tensions erupted when twenty-four Southeast Asian 
families moved into apartments in a Chicano housing project seemingly bypassing a 
waiting list of other Latin Americans. While making room for the “good” Southeast 
Asian occupants, the housing owners announced they would not accept any Cuban 
applicants.
541
  
As Reagan pondered how to send the Cuban criminals he described as “jailbirds 
and maniacs” back to Cuba, Americans reconsidered the dangers of America’s “open 
borders,” and the kinds of immigrants and refugees drawn to the United States.542 The 
porousness of American borders, the expanded refugee admissions that resulted from the 
1980 Refugee Act and the “changing face” of legal immigration incited calls for more 
                                                                                                                                                 
refugee. Unlike earlier Cuban arrivals who were educated professionals, the new Cuban exiles were poor, rural and uneducated. US 
News & World reported that “At least 5,000 have admitted prison records, and many are avowed homosexuals,” and most of them 
“probably were misfits in Cuba. Such media coverage reinforced notions that Cubans were dangerous, criminal, and unassimilable. 
They were not “good” immigrants. The Cuban case scarred the expansive nature of a U.S. Immigration and Refugee policy that had let 
such “bad elements” into the country and jaded the perception of many Americans regarding which immigrants and refugees were 
“good” and which were “bad.” William L. Chaze, “Refugees: Stung by Backlash,” U.S. News & World Report, October 13, 1980, 
reprinted in McClellan, 46. 
540 Briefing Paper, “Current Procedures for Refugee Resettlement,” Los Angeles Regional Hearing, February 5, 1980, Immigration 
Law folder, Box22, Public Affairs File, Records of the Cuban-Haitian task Force, RG220, Jimmy Carter Library. 
541 William L. Chaze, “Refugees: Stung by a Backlash,” U.S. News & World Report, October 13, 1980, 60-3, reprinted in McClellan. 
542 Brinkley ed., The Reagan Diaries, 72. How to address the problem of the “marielitos,” was a political and humanitarian concern for 
Reagan. He did not want to lose the political support of the growing Cuban-American population. Reagan received ninety-percent of 
the Cuban vote in 1980. Additionally, Reagan faced concerns that Cuba would torture and persecute Cubans returned by the 
administration.  Adolfo Leyva de Varona, “The Political Impact of Cuba-Americans in Florida,” in Cuban Exiles in Florida: Their 
Presence and Contributions, ed. Antonio Jorge, Jamie Suchlicki, and Adolfo Leyva de Varona (Coral Gables: University of Miami, 
1991), 86. 
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restrictive immigration policies.
543
 Some Americas advocated replacing America’s “open 
door” policy with a “screen door” meant to police entrance into the country by taking into 
consideration the domestic economic conditions, and the “abilities, attitudes or motives 
of those seeking admission.”544 Others reverted to more traditional notions of America’s 
“open door,” stressing the importance of assimilation.545 “Unless immigrants ‘want to 
learn to be Americans,’” twenty-one year old Cindy Lane declared, “‘they shouldn’t be 
here.’”546  
For members of the Congressional Black Caucus, assimilation into America 
carried a racial component. 
547
Asserting a racial kinship between African Americans and 
Haitians, African American leaders like the Chairman of the Congressional Black 
Caucus, Representative Walter Fauntroy (D-DC) condemned the administration’s harsh 
and discriminatory policies against the Haitian immigrants as an extension of its domestic 
policies against American racial minorities.
548
  Leaders pointed to the difference between 
the “generous welcome” given to the non-black Southeast Asian “boat people” by the 
federal government complete with refugee benefits and legal status, and its treatment of 
the black Haitian “boat people” whom the government “did not wish to admit, as typical 
                                                 
543 Tichenor, Dividing Lines, 241. 
544 Kathryn Christensen, “Panel of Midwesterners Advocates Selectivity in Taking Newcomers,” Wall Street Journal, October 14, 
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housing and resources while simultaneously the brunt of the consequences of Reagan’s social and economic policies. In 1982 Black 
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relationship see David F. Schmitz, Brent Scowcroft: Internationalism and Post-Vietnam War American Foreign Policy (Washington, 
D.C.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011); “The Case of the Haitian Refugees, The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1983,” Center 
for Afro American and African Studies, the University of Michigan, May 20, 1983, MS2070 Series 1, General Files 1960-1990, 
Walter E. Fauntroy papers, Special Collections Research Center, The George Washington University. 
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of an administration with racist policies.”549  In her critique of American refugee policy, 
journalist Mary McGrory posited that in America there are “the right kind of boat people” 
who come from Vietnam and for whom Americans raise money, offer asylum and weep, 
and the “wrong kind” from Haiti who, upon their arrival in America, were sent back to 
the oppressive fascist regime or thrown in jail.
550
  
Yet while African American leaders insinuated that race was at the center of such 
policy discrepancies, they failed to extend the same racial kinship offered the Haitian 
refugees to the black Amerasians.
551
 Although the race of the assumed fathers of black 
Amerasians and the harsh treatment and discrimination they faced in Vietnam as a result, 
were undeniable, no mass social or political action on the part of the black Amerasians 
ever emerged from African American political leaders.
552
 Even the requests of advocates 
like Father Carroll and John Shade for African American leaders to recognize their racial 
kinship with the black Amerasians, urging leaders to embrace the black Amerasians as 
their own, failed to garner a response.
553
 Although sixteen of the nineteen African 
American members of Congress did co-sponsor the AIA, their voices are silent on the 
issue in the political record.
554
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Such silence was striking, by 1985, considering the reports that thirty-percent of 
all Amerasians in Vietnam were black Amerasians.
555
 They remained the most visible 
reminder of the Amerasian issue during the decade, undermining the argument by those 
who questioned the validity of American paternal responsibility by asserting that 
Amerasians could be the progeny of other “white” European fathers.556  Additionally, by 
mid-decade, resettlement agencies like the United States Catholic Conference began 
releasing reports regarding the negative mental health and psychosocial effects that 
resettlement was having on all of the Amerasians but specifically, the black Amerasians. 
Issues of parental abandonment, poverty and discrimination compounded by racial 
rejection and confusion over racial identity were common among black Amerasians who 
suffered more often from depression, distress and psychiatric disorders.
557
  Black 
Amerasians also entered the United States under the ODP alone, as “unaccompanied 
minors,” at higher rates than other Amerasians. Consequently, many of them ended up in 
the U.S. foster care system.
558
 
Black Amerasians, unlike the Haitian refugees, had actual kinship ties to an 
African American father, yet there was an absence of collective political or community 
action on their behalf. Moreover, many of the black Amerasian children found their 
refuge within a foster care system, already overloaded by disproportionate numbers of 
                                                 
555 The State Department admittedly failed to keep racial statistics on the Amerasians. According to John Shade the percentage of 
black Amerasians in Vietnam directly correlated with the percentage of African American troops associated with the Vietnam War 
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African American children.
559
 Rather, the inaction of African American leaders reflects a 
paternal and a racial disconnect with the black Amerasians. Leaders did not or could not 
perceive of the black Amerasians through a shared racial lens. Instead leaders grouped 
them with all the other Amerasians as part of the bigger Southeast Asian immigrant 
population that benefitted from the administrations’ policies. 
Ultimately, the Reagan administration also grouped the Amerasians amongst all 
Southeast Asian immigrants. Understanding the limitations of the AIA, the administration 
deferred to the ODP as a path for Amerasian immigration while publicizing the successes 
under the AIA banner. Even though, Reagan’s record on immigration had done little to 
rehabilitate his humanitarian image, the positive publicity of the AIA could be seen to 
provide proof, in contrast to other examples of callousness that Reagan did care about 
people. Furthermore, the issues and debates surrounding US immigration and refugee 
policy occupied the attention of an American public no longer concerned about the plight 
of the Amerasians.  Thus, while acknowledging their paternity and the discrimination and 
poverty they faced in Vietnam, the Reagan administration did little to actually address 
their condition and seemingly had little intention nor faced much political pressure to do 
so. By keeping the majority of Amerasians in Vietnam, Reagan could appear to care 
about them without further opening American borders.  
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The Amerasians were politically beneficial to the administration. As Cold War 
pawns, their “American” faces were evidence of the injustice of communism. They were 
also politically advantageous for Reagan, who could counter accusations of his 
inhumanity by pointing to his efforts to save the Amerasians. Thus the Amerasians 
provided a promising Cold War narrative in which “good guy” Americans could rescue 
the innocent “American” children from the clutches of “bad guy” Communists. This 
narrative only worked however, as long as the children needed rescuing. 
The Evil Empire 
In addition to immigration, American attention during the 1980s again turned to 
the dangers of communism and the Cold War. Reagan personally contributed to the 
escalation of the Cold War during the early part of the decade through his aggressive 
anti-Communist rhetoric and his commitment to increased defense spending to restore 
America to military dominance. In 1983, in one of his more famous condemnations of 
communism, Reagan called the Soviet Union the “Evil Empire,” breathing new life into 
the ideological Cold War conflict between democracy and communism, believed by some 
Americans to be the battle between good and evil.
560
 
 Both the United States and Vietnam regarded the Amerasians favorably in terms 
of international relations and diplomacy. In negotiations over political prisoners and 
missing or dead American soldiers, the Amerasians represented the human toll. Unlike 
prisoners or missing soldiers, they lived and breathed, many on the streets of Vietnam’s 
largest cities. Their stories resonated with the American public which made them 
convenient tools for negotiation by leaders from both countries. Thus, while relying upon 
                                                 
560 Reagan gave his “Evil Empire” speech on March 8, 1983 in an address to the National Association of Evangelicals in Orlando, 
Florida. 
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the power of their human element for diplomatic purposes, the United States and Vietnam 
simultaneously dehumanized the Amerasians and turned them into political pawns used 
to expose the fissures and falsehoods in their opponents’ ideology.  
As part of the effort to write an American moral victory into the Vietnam War and 
to reinforce the Cold War narrative, it was imperative that Americans recognized 
Amerasians as “America’s children.” By ascribing an American identity, America could 
properly “save” them from the evil clutches of Communism.561  In lobbying efforts for 
the AIA, policymakers engaged in a campaign of inclusionary rhetoric designed to target 
the hearts of Americans by evoking notions of transnational kinship. Senator Denton 
described the bill as an opportunity deserved by the Amerasian children “because they 
are American children” and, the AIA allowed them to “claim their birthright.”562 Senator 
Mark Hatfield called the Amerasians an “American tragedy” to which Americans must 
now respond, while Representative Donnelly described them as “the children of 
America,” and Senator Samuel I. Hayakawa urged the Senate to “bring our children 
home.” 563  
Vietnam also engaged in America’s politics of inclusionary rhetoric, insisting that 
the Amerasians were American children. Vietnam officials agreed America had an 
obligation to remove this population of American offspring from Vietnam and resettle 
them in the United States. 
564
 The failure of the Reagan administration to do so met with 
                                                 
561 In the conflict between Democracy and Communism during the Cold War era, America presented its position as a fight between 
good and evil. The Amerasian children provided yet another opportunity to reinforce the Cold War divide and enhance America’s 
humanitarian reputation. Within this context it became essential for Americans to recognize the Amerasians as children of American 
fathers while pointing to the victimization they faced under Communism. 
562  “Admission of Certain Children of U.S. Armed Forces Personnel,” SB 1698, 97th Cong., 2d sess., Cong. Rec., September 28, 1982. 
S25338-25341. 
563 Ibid.; “Preferential Treatment in Admission of Certain Children of U.S. Citizens,” HR 808, 97th Cong., 2d sess., October 1, 1982: 
H27269-27273. 
564 The Philadelphia Inquirer, 9 October 1986. 
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quick condemnation from American advocates and the Vietnamese government.  In his 
1986 critique of the failures of the AIA, one journalist, insinuated that the Amerasians 
were victims of political and economic tensions between the two countries and that, 
although the AIA was good propaganda, the only reason it passed was because it “cost 
the government nothing.”565 Some Americans even accused the U.S. government of 
deliberately hindering the departure of Amerasians to America, preferring to use them as 
a way to embarrass the Vietnamese while portraying the evils of Communism.
566
 
In its response to accusations by American veteran Gary Tanous, unable to bring 
his American citizen Amerasian daughter to the United States from Vietnam, that he had 
received “absolutely no cooperation from American authorities, and that the Reagan 
administration had “washed its hands” of the Amerasians, the administration blamed 
Vietnam.
567
 John Tucker of the Office of Refugee Admissions disregarded Tanous’ 
complaint that American authorities would not issue his daughter a US passport unless 
she was present to sign it—an impossible requirement. Rather, Tucker explained, the 
blame was on Vietnamese authorities who were responsible for granting exit permits.”568 
The Reagan administration responded to such accusations by reminding the 
Vietnamese that their actions were to blame for the lack of diplomatic relations and thus 
the Amerasian problem. It was Vietnam’s incarceration of political prisoners after the 
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567 Bob Beck, “Quest for Daughter in Vietnam Getting Increasingly Futile,” The Columbian, nd; Letter to Ronald Reagan from Gary 
Tanous, nd. , ID #070522, IM161533, WHORM: Subject File, Amerasian Children, Ronald Reagan Library. At the time of Jeanna 
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war, Vietnam’s refusal to provide a full accounting of America’s missing soldiers, and 
Vietnam’s invasion and occupation of Cambodia that prevented the normalizing of 
relations. The Amerasian children, American leaders asserted, were victims of Vietnam’s 
inhumanity, not America’s.  
Still, American actions on behalf of the Amerasians fell far short of American 
rhetoric. Leaders did very little after the passage of the AIA to move forward with a 
solution for the Amerasians in Vietnam. Rather, between 1982 and 1986, the Reagan 
administration continued to justify its failure to fulfill the idealistic promises of its 
inclusionary rhetoric with real action. Until normalization, the administration was content 
to allow Amerasians from Vietnam to enter America through the ODP while promoting 
its commitment to bring all of the Amerasians to the United States, once Vietnam 
behaved.
569
 
As the AIA and the ODP proved largely ineffective in bringing the Amerasians of 
Vietnam to the United States, by mid-decade, the Reagan administration increased the 
promotion of its humanitarian and moral commitment to the Amerasians, labeling them 
as a “special humanitarian concern.”570 On September 11, 1984, Secretary of State 
George Schultz released the statement that “Because of their undisputed ties to our 
                                                 
569 In 1984 Richard D. English, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Refugee Admissions with the Bureau of Refugee Programs, reported 
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country,” over the next three years, the United States will “accept all Asian-American 
children and their qualifying family members presently in Vietnam.
571
  
That same year, a New York Times report challenged the administration’s 
commitment to resolving the issue. Vietnam, the story claimed, wanted to discuss the 
problems that had hindered the immigration and resettlement of the Amerasians. 
Reportedly, U.S. officials rejected the request stating, “‘We don’t really see any necessity 
for talks. The orderly departure program is the only program set up to take Vietnamese 
refugees, and it is working.’”572   
But the ODP was not working for Amerasians and in response to the demands to 
“open the doors which should never have been shut,” the Reagan administration 
introduced two “special initiatives.”573 The first was the resettlement in the United States 
of all remaining reeducation camp prisoners, and the other, to fulfill Shultz’s promise, to 
admit to the United States all of the remaining Amerasians from Vietnam and their family 
members by 1987.
574
   
In the tradition of the AIA however, this too, faced complications posed by an 
absence of diplomatic relations. Vietnamese authorities agreed to the proposal resulting 
in the immediate increase of the number of Amerasians approved for the ODP. Yet rather 
than praising Vietnam for its cooperation, Shultz pointed to its failure to meet the 
numerical goal of 5000 Amerasians per year set by US officials.
 575
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The official designation of the Amerasians as a special population for 
consideration in the ODP process did not result in a separate program for admission. 
Rather, the Amerasians fell under the general admission numbers allotted for the entire 
program, 8500 per year.
576
 Subsequently, the Amerasians became subject to the 
increasing tension between the United States and Vietnam over the processing of all ODP 
applicants. Thus, when Vietnam faced an ODP backlog of 60,000 cases, it blamed the 
United States, suspended the program, and ordered all Westerners to leave.
577
 The only 
path to immigration for the Amerasians in that country had disappeared. 
More problematic for the administration committed to resolving the Amerasian 
problem was increasing pressure to shift the family reunification cases from Indochina 
from refugee flows (ODP) to immigration channels.
578
 While such a shift would require 
admitted refugees to become American citizens in order to file immigration petitions for 
their relatives, encouraging naturalization, many humanitarian and resettlement 
                                                                                                                                                 
Less than fifty-percent of those released, immigrated to the United States—in FY 1984, 937 and  in FY 1985 1,498. Between FY 1982 
and 1986, 3,552 Amerasians total entered the United States as part of the ODP. The idealistic expectations of US officials that the 
Vietnamese could locate all of the remaining Amerasians for the program failed to consider the enormous task of  disseminating the 
information and locating Amerasians, specifically those residing in rural areas, within a three year period. Mid-Year Consultation 
Refugee FY 1986, Hearing, 105; U.S. Congress, Senate, Annual Refugee Consultation, Hearing, Sept 17, 1985, 6; Asian-American 
Conference, October 4-5, 1984, American Council of Voluntary Agencies in Foreign Service Committee on Migration and Refugee 
Affairs, 11, Subject Files, Amerasian folder: Box 132, Stewart B. McKinney Papers. Archives and Special Collections at the Thomas 
J. Dodd Research Center. University of Connecticut Libraries.[total fiscal year statistics] 
576 During the decade Congress became less tolerant of accepting high numbers of refugees. By 1986 increasing pressure existed to 
change the family reunification cases from Southeast Asia from refugee flow to immigrant channels. As a result, many policymakers 
like Alan Simpson advocated for a reduction in the refugee admission numbers. Regarding the ODP there was a push for future 
applicants to utilize the US immigration channels instead—allowing a relative in the United States to petition for their immigration 
through the appropriate immigration channels. In FY 1985, 69,000 refugees entered the United States and in FY 1986 62,000, a 
decline of eight-percent. Southeast Asian refugee arrivals in FY 1985, 49,853 and FY 1986, 45,391, a nine-percent drop reflected in 
the admissions ceiling that year of 45,500, however the monthly flow of Southeast Asian refugees remained fairly stable throughout 
the decade. The annual ODP admission ceiling remained at 8500 for FY 1985 through FY 1987.  US Department of Health and 
Human Services, Refugee Resettlement Program, 100th Cong., 1st sess., January 31, 1987, 7. 
577 Prior to 1986 the ODP functioned through an ODP office in Bangkok, Thailand with UN officials acting as processing liaisons in 
Vietnam. Under this system bureaucracy, intensive document requirements and checks, and significant time delays characterized each 
level of Amerasian processing. When these operational inefficiencies resulted in a significant case backlog, Vietnam installed a 
unilateral moratorium on processing. DeMonaco, “Disorderly Departure,” 644. 
578 The shift was a response to the 1985 Ray Panel report which highlighted the importance in global “burden-sharing” of the refugee 
problem—allowing other countries to accept more of the burden—in light of impending budget cuts from the 1986 Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings bill. Specifically regarding the refugee flow from Southeast Asia the Department of State agreed that it was time to move 
from a reliance on refugee resettlement to a “more balanced use of refugee and normal immigration mechanisms.” Statement of James 
N. Purcell, Bureau of Refugee Programs, June 20 1986 Mid-Year Consultation, 7-9. For more on the Ray Panel see “Summary of 
Findings and Recommendations,” Congressional Record Extension of Remarks, June 26, 1986, 99th Cong., 2nd sess., Vol 132, No. 89. 
E2358. 
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organizations expressed concerns about the time required by such a process.
579
 
Specifically for the refugees from Indochina, whose “fragile existence” mandated their 
expedited departure, “it is neither practical nor appropriate for them to be subjected to the 
normal immigration processing delays.”580 Yet neither resettlement organizations nor 
policymakers even considered the opportunity such an approach presented for the 
Amerasians. Granting citizenship to the Amerasians who had settled in the United States 
and who still wanted to come, could have allowed policymakers to truly solve the 
Amerasian dilemma and provide some relief to the refugee flow that by June 1986 had 
facilitated the immigration of 3,552 Amerasians and 8,618 of their family members.
581
 
However no such consideration emerged. 
Thus even a year after Reagan’s call to action for the Amerasians, there was still 
little progress. Rather, Vietnam’s Foreign Minister, Nguyen Co Thach again indicated 
Vietnam’s desire to resolve the issue, this time by declaring a willingness to work with 
private Americans to speed up the process to bypass the constraints attached to 
diplomatic situations. Despite its rhetoric, however, the Reagan administration had a 
bigger matter to resolve with Vietnam. This issue also dealt with the sons and daughters 
of American citizens—the missing and the dead—and one that would become the main 
obstacle in normalizing relations by the end of Reagan’s presidency. 
   
                                                 
579 In 1986 a number of humanitarian and resettlement organizations including the Indochina Resource Action Center, the U.S. 
Catholic Conference Migration and Refugee Service and the World Relief Refugee Services endorsed the “Critique of the Report of 
the Indochinese Refugee Panel,” and the concerns expressed regarding US refugee policy. “Critique of the Report of the Indochinese 
Refugee Panel,” Mid-Year Consultation FY 1986, Hearing, 61-66.  
580 Ibid. 
581Approximately eighty-percent of all Amerasians who entered the United States through the ODP did so as refugees. Asian-
American Conference, October 4-5, 1984, American Council of Voluntary Agencies in Foreign Service Committee on Migration and 
Refugee Affairs, 11, Subject Files, Amerasian folder: Box 132, Stewart B. McKinney Papers. Archives and Special Collections at the 
Thomas J. Dodd Research Center. University of Connecticut Libraries; Mid-Year Consultation FY 1986, Hearing, 105. 
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Diplomacy of the Dead, MIA and Amerasian 
 By Reagan’s second term it was clear that at the end of the war, US forces had left 
behind two groups of Americans in need of rescue: the Amerasians—visible, real, yet 
largely ignored, and American MIAs—hidden, perhaps deceased, and the subject of 
much emotion and debate among many Americans. In his 1985 testimony before the 
Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs regarding the American MIA/POW issue, 
former Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lt. General Eugene F. Tighe, Jr., 
called attention to America’s moral obligation from the Vietnam War. Tighe referred not 
to America’s duty to the Amerasians, but to the 2500 American soldiers Missing in 
Action and reportedly languishing in Vietnamese prisons. He described America’s 
commitment to this cause as “a great tribute to the human concern of the greatest nation 
on earth.” 582  
Throughout his Presidency, Reagan used the MIA/POW issue as he did the 
Amerasians—evidence of the evils of Communism and the goodness of America. Reagan 
considered the resolution of the MIA/POW issue through a full accounting of each and 
every missing and unaccounted for American, the highest national priority and the major 
obstacle in normalizing relations with Vietnam.
583
  In 1985, Reagan declared that 
“relations between the Governments of Vietnam and Laos will not improve unless and 
until this issue is resolved.” 584 Considering the nature of war in general, but the Vietnam 
War in particular, filled with heavy artillery, bombings, and plane crashes that literally 
obliterated human remains, such a demand seemed rather idealistic and largely 
                                                 
582 Hearing Before Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Americans Missing in Southeast Asia, 99th Cong., 1st sess., June 27, 
1985, 19. Tighe also posited that the United States should establish diplomatic relations with Vietnam in order to resolve the 
MIA/POW issue. 
583 Ibid.,10, 28. 
584 Ibid., 10, 28-38. 
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unattainable. Thus, as with the Amerasians, Reagan’s insistence regarding the 
MIA/POWs was less about resolution than it was extending the ideological Cold War 
battle with Vietnam. 
In no previous war had America imposed such requirements and in this case, the 
push seemed driven largely by Cold War politics. In comparison to the 78,000 missing 
Americans and 8,500 unidentified after World War II, and the 8,000 still missing from 
the Korean War, the 2500 MIA/POW from Vietnam seemed a rather unimpressive 
number.
585
 Upon his entrance into office, Reagan understood the need of many 
Americans to reconcile fears that they had abandoned their brethren and feelings of guilt 
associated with losing the war.
586
 Committed to resurrecting American exceptionalism 
and to rewriting the Vietnam War narrative as an American victory, Reagan conveniently 
disregarded the findings of previous administrations, including the Woodcock 
Commission under Carter, that there were no American POWs in Vietnam.
587
 
President Carter in fact, had commended Vietnam on its post-war cooperation on 
the MIA issue and efforts to retrieve the bodies of fallen American soldiers. He viewed 
Vietnam’s efforts as critical to the resolution of the war and to reestablishing diplomatic 
relations.
588
 Unfortunately, such feelings of cooperation soured when Vietnam invaded 
Cambodia in 1978. The invasion and subsequent occupation placed the United States and 
                                                 
585 Michael J. Allen, Until the Last Man Comes Home. 
586 Ibid. Allen argues that America’s infatuation with the MIA/POW issues and specifically captivity and recovery, was the way 
Americans addressed the military defeat in the Vietnam War. 
587 Shortly after the fall of Saigon, the Congressional committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia held a major investigation of 
the POW/MIA issue in December 1976, and concluded there were no POWs in Indochina. 
588 Jimmy Carter, Presidential Commission on Americans Missing and Unaccounted for in Southeast Asia, Remarks on the Results of 
the Commission’s Trip to Vietnam and Laos, March 23, 1977. Initial cooperation on the MIA issue is largely credited to the efforts of 
the Woodcock Commission sent to Vietnam by Jimmy Carter to investigate the MIA issue. The commission returned to the United 
States with twelve bodies (only eleven proved to be American) ported that all of the POWs had been returned or were deceased. 
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China at odds with Vietnam and the Soviet Union in a complicated Cold War conflict, 
halting any chance of relations or any further cooperation on the MIA/POW issue.
589
 
Reagan however, forgot Carter’s praise of Vietnam’s cooperation and the official 
reports that claimed no American POWs remained in Vietnam, as he, and Hollywood, 
deliberately wove stories of captive Americans and an uncooperative Vietnamese 
government back into American memory. Ignoring even his strongest advocates who 
testified that there were no POWs remaining in Vietnam, Reagan continued to promote 
unsubstantiated claims and “evidence” that Americans were alive in that “that d- -n 
Communist sink hole.”590 On Memorial Day in 1985 Reagan reminded a hopeful crowd 
that the war in Southeast Asia “still haunts” the families of the missing and that it will not 
end without a full accounting. “Today,” Reagan demanded, “a united people call upon 
Hanoi with one voice: Heal the sorest wound of this conflict. Return our sons to America. 
End the grief of those who are innocent and undeserving of any retribution.”591 Bobby 
Muller, the leader of the Vietnam Veterans Association at the time criticized the intense 
emotion Reagan created over the MIA/POW issue, seeing it as nothing more than the 
result of political propaganda used to justify the war after the fact by confirming the 
evilness of the Vietnamese.
592
 
In rewriting America’s Vietnam War narrative, it was important to many 
American leaders not just that Americans view communism as evil and the Vietnamese 
                                                 
589 Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia reignited Cold War tensions within a new Cold War framework. The invasion resulted in a brief 
war with China at a time when US-China relations were on the mend. Thus, the US supported China and joined the rest of the 
international community in condemning Vietnam for its actions. Any opportunity for the United States and Vietnam to establish 
relations in the post-Vietnam War era disappeared. Thus after 1978, lines of democracy and communism no longer clearly shaped the 
Cold War battle. Rather, the United States accepted communist China as an ally while strengthening its resolve against Soviet 
communism and Vietnam.  
590 Brinkley, The Reagan Diaries, 128. 
591 Ronald Reagan, “Remarks at Memorial Day Ceremonies Honoring an Unknown Serviceman of the Vietnam Conflict,” May 28, 
1984, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1984/52884a.htm (accessed January 1, 
2015). 
592 Muller, interview. 
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as the enemy, but that the American public see its soldiers as heroes and their sacrifices, 
worthy of attention. Reagan described the war, not as a military failure but as a “noble 
cause,” and Vietnam veterans not as “baby killers” but as “heroes.”593 Even Jeremiah 
Denton in the midst of his campaign for the AIA in July 1982 employed the Cold War 
rhetoric infused with the emotion of his own POW experience at the POW/MIA 
Recognition Day:  
Let the Southeast Asian communists understand that the American 
people do hold them responsible for past and continuing atrocities 
and aggressions. We cannot appeal to the morality of those who 
have no morality. We cannot rely on the goodwill of those who 
have no goodwill. We cannot depend on the civilized impulses of 
those who behave as barbarians….They respond only to the 
determination and, if necessary, the force to hold them responsible 
for their actions…we will get the accounting of our MIAs.594 
 
 Under Reagan, Vietnam veterans participated in ceremonies of memory such as 
parades, reminding them as they marched, that, ‘you guys are heroes and you fought a 
good war.’595 On Veterans Day, 1984, a massive crowd of 100,000 attended the 
dedication of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial. The shiny black granite wall in the shape 
of a V held the names of all those who had died in the war and those still missing. 
Although the memorial, designed by twenty-one-year-old Yale University student Maya 
Linn, initially faced harsh criticism from veterans and politicians condemning the 
aesthetics from its color to its shape and the race of its Asian-American creator, it was not 
long before the American public and Vietnam veterans embraced it as a place of healing 
                                                 
593 In efforts to rewrite the war as a noble crusade, Reagan attempted to enshrine it in public memory as such. Marilyn B. Young, “The 
Vietnam War in American Memory,” in The Vietnam War: Vietnamese and American Perspectives, ed. Jayne S. Werner and Luu 
Doan Huynh (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharp, 1993), 253. 
594 Remarks by Senator Jeremiah Denton, US Senator, POW/MIA Recognition Day, July 9, 1982, Denton folder, Box 34/151, 
Personal Papers of Jeremiah Denton. Auburn University Archives. 
595 According to Kyle Longley, throughout the 1980s the Vietnam veterans sense of betrayal diminished as more memorials and events 
commemorated their service and sacrifice in the war including parades--New York City, Houston, and Chicago—and memorials in 
Clifton, Arizona and San Angelo, Texas. Longley, Grunts, 188-189. 
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and reconciliation.
596
 Reagan too presented the wall as proof that America had begun the 
process of healing from the war and silently hoped that it would finally make up for the 
way Vietnam veterans had been treated when they came home.
597
 
The administration’s insistence that Vietnam held and mistreated living 
Americans while deliberately withholding the remains of thousands of missing American 
soldiers reinforced the Cold War narrative of the Vietnamese enemy. Hollywood 
capitalized on this new narrative with movies such as Rambo and Missing in Action, 
which elicited images of heroic American POWs surviving the most dreadful and 
tortuous conditions and treatment held captive in bamboo cages by their Vietnamese 
captors.   
Wealthy businessman Ross Perot perpetuated the Rambo storyline with radical 
speech and radical actions. In 1979 Perot had acted out his own “Rambo fantasy” by 
rescuing employees from his company, Electronic Data Systems, imprisoned in Tehran, 
Iran. Shortly after, Perot—arguably obsessed with the MIA/POW issue and his own 
power to “keep the forces of darkness at bay”—began funding secret, and unsuccessful, 
“forays” into the jungles of Vietnam to find and free POWs.598 By 1986 Perot had earned 
an impressive reputation among the radical wing of MIA advocates known as the 
“Rambo set.” He joined Eugene Tighe in criticizing the administration’s failure to bring 
POWs home, accusing it of conspiring to cover-up evidence that American POWs were 
                                                 
596 The official unveiling of the wall memorial occurred on November 12, 1982 and the formal dedication on November 11, 1984. 
Longley, Grunts. For more information about the Vietnam Veterans Memorial see Kristin Haas, Carried to the Wall: American 
Memory and the Vietnam Veterans Memorial (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1998). In 2000, Maya Lin discussed the role 
that racism played in the opposition to the design and construction of the wall. Lin points specifically to a Washington Post article that 
described her design as “An Asian Memorial for an Asian War.” It was then, she explains, that “I knew we were in trouble.”  Maya 
Lin, “Making the Memorial” The New York Review of Books, November 2, 2000, 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2000/nov/02/making-the-memorial/ (accessed February 1, 2015). 
597 Brinkley, The Reagan Diaries, 277; Ronald Reagan, “Remarks at Dedication Ceremonies for the Vietnam Veterans Memorial 
Statue, November 11, 1984. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=39414 (accessed January 1, 2014). 
598 Sidney Blumenthal, The Mission, New Republic, July 6, 1992; Allen, Until the Last Man Comes Home, 255. 
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still alive in Vietnam.
599
 Not wanting to offend America’s second richest citizen who also 
contributed millions to the administration, Reagan tolerated Perot and his escapades until 
1987 when it appeared that such accusations were hurting the MIA/POW efforts.
600
 
According to Reagan, Perot had become a “loose cannon on the POW matter.”601 
For many Americans who remembered the War or who had fought or lost a 
relative or friend in the War, accepting the Rambo narrative was easy. For the families of 
the missing, Reagan’s commitment proved refreshing.  Arguably the most politically 
influential group during the period was the National League of Families of American 
Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia (NLFAPM). Led by Director Anne Mills 
Griffiths, the sister of an MIA, the NFLAPM became a critical political partner in the 
administration’s campaign to raise public awareness on the issue.602 In 1979 then Defense 
Intelligence Agency director Tighe granted Griffiths access to classified information and 
to attend classified briefings that she eventually used to gain a seat on the Inter-Agency 
Group on MIA/POW affairs, the “focal point of US policy formulation on the MIA/POW 
issue” during the 1980s.603 Under Reagan, Griffith’s political influence grew and so did 
the administration’s commitment to the MIA/POW issue. Griffiths and the NLFAPM had 
become a “fully functioning partner” in the administration’s efforts to account for the 
missing.
604
 
                                                 
599 Allen, Until the Last Man Comes Home, 256. 
600 In his address to the annual meeting of the National League of POW/MIA Families, Secretary of State George Shultz responded to 
the accusations of a government conspiracy calling them misinformed and rumors to which “not an ounce of proof has been offered.” 
Such rumors, Shultz exclaimed hurt the missing, by undermining the “effectiveness of our joint efforts, they erode the bonds of trust, 
and they undermine our unity.” “Resolving the POW/MIA Issue,” State Department, Bureau of Public Affairs, July 18, 1987. 
601 Ronald Reagan, Douglas Brinkley (ed), The Reagan Diaries (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), 493. 
602 “Final Interagency Report of the Reagan Administration on the POW/MIA Issue in Southeast Asia,” Department of State and 
Department of Defense, January 19, 1989. 
603 Allen, Until the Last Man Comes Home, 206-207. 
604 “Final Interagency Report of the Reagan Administration on the POW/MIA Issue in Southeast Asia,” Department of State and 
Department of Defense, January 19, 1989. 
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As with the Amerasians, Vietnamese officials challenged Reagan’s assertions 
regarding the MIA/POWs and continuously expressed their devotion to resolving the 
issue.
605
 It was in Vietnam’s interest to normalize relations considering the economic and 
diplomatic embargo that had hindered its self-sufficiency since the war ended.
606
 
Furthermore, Vietnam had its own post-war problems—hundreds of thousands of 
Vietnamese MIA whom they lacked the resources to find or identify, and the horrendous 
humanitarian impact that the war had inflicted on the Vietnamese people and on war 
veterans, many suffering the effects of Agent Orange. The normalization of relations may 
not have been possible regarding disagreements over Cambodia and the political 
prisoners, but it was possible in the case of the MIA/POWs. 
Yet, the administration continued to insist that Vietnam was hiding the requested 
information on MIA/POWs in order to prolong the conflict. Despite the recognition by 
administration experts that the majority of “live sightings” were false or pertained to 
Americans or Europeans who were not prisoners of war, the administration persisted in 
its commitment to get a full accounting of the missing and the dead.
607
 In 1985, the 
Assistant Deputy Director of the DIA responsible for investigating the claims of 
American MIA/POW sightings in Vietnam admitted that there had been only two 
firsthand live sightings reported since 1980. In spite of the publicity campaign by the 
administration and the NLFAPM, he admitted, “we have not been able to prove that 
                                                 
605 Allen claims that Vietnamese officials often insisted on economic assistance in exchange for further cooperation on the issue, 
perhaps to compensate for the billions of dollars pledged to them by President Nixon in the Paris Agreement. Allen, Until the Last 
Man Comes Home, 5. 
606 Also add impact of China and Vietnam’s fear of it. 
607 According to Commodore Thomas A. Brooks, Assistant Deputy Director for Collection Management, Defense Intelligence 
Agency, of the 122 unresolved live sighting reports in 1985, almost half were of Caucasian men walking freely in Vietnam, not under 
guard, some with Vietnamese wives and families and assumed to be Soviet advisers, Western European diplomats or press, etc. After 
eliminating such reports, 43 unresolved reports of American in captivity remained—17 from Vietnam. Americans Missing in 
Southeast Asia, Hearing, 66. 
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Americans are still being held captive in that part of the world.”608 The false reports, the 
administration asserted, were part of Vietnam’s mission of misinformation to divert 
efforts away from investigating real live sightings.
609
  
During Reagan’s second term however, a chorus of criticism grew that the 
administration had used the missing for political gain. Journalist James Rosenthal 
published The Myth of the Last POW, a scathing article in the New Republic magazine 
exposing the administration’s politicization of American MIAs. Rosenthal argued that 
America’s obsession with the 2,477 MIA/POW in Vietnam was not about the missing 
soldiers, but rather the fact that the United States had lost the war. The MIAs, Rosenthal 
explained, “have become a matter of American honor, and their return a symbolic 
restoration of that honor.”610 Still, the cruel truth, Rosenthal contends, was that the 
Reagan administration, like the Nixon administration, was exploiting the issue for 
political gain.
611
  
Even Griffiths, increasingly frustrated by the aggrandizement of the issue by 
radical MIA activists like Perot, criticized the administration, telling Rosenthal that, the 
MIA/POW issue had been used to justify the administration’s foreign policy positions 
and as a scapegoat for its failed policies.
612
 The families of the missing, Griffiths 
exclaimed, “have had their hopes raised by politicians, publishers, filmmakers, and 
                                                 
608 Ibid., 65-67. 
609 Ibid., 65. 
610 James Rosenthal, “The Myth of the Last POWs,” The New Republic, July 1, 1985. 
611 The Nixon administration used the cause of America POWs in Vietnam to rally public opinion in pressuring the Vietcong to obey 
the Geneva principles concerning the rights of POWs. Nixon encouraged the creation of the National League of Families of 
Americans Missing in Southeast Asia, publicizing the pain and anguish of families of American POWs through press conferences, 
speaking engagements and demonstrations. President Reagan reignited this strategy with the MIA issue as he sought to transform the 
memory of the war from tragedy to a noble cause that framed America’s missing as honorable victims of a war from which they could 
be rescued. Allen, Until the Last Man Comes Home, 215-219. 
612 Ibid., 218-222. Many members of the League pushed Reagan for action on the MIA/POW issue, not just symbolism. Action meant 
actually bringing live prisoners home and achieving a full accounting. By his second term, it became more apparent to League 
members that the Reagan administration had little interest in cooperating with Hanoi to achieve a full accounting or acting out its 
promoted commitment to bringing missing Americans home. 
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lawyers in pursuit of self-promotion and profits.” While she maintained that effort to 
account for and recover the remains of Americans killed in Vietnam must continue, such 
efforts were far removed from “sustaining the cruel delusion that there may be Americans 
alive in Vietnam.”613  
The politicization of the MIA/POWs had a critical effect on Vietnam’s 
Amerasians. As the central issue to normalizing relations, the opportunity for Amerasians 
to continue to come to the United States depended upon a full accounting that seemed 
impossible to achieve. When Vietnam officially suspended the ODP in 1986, U.S. leaders 
increasingly incorporated them into their Cold War narrative. The Amerasians, the 
missing American soldiers and reeducation camp prisoners were all evidence of the 
injustice and cruelty of a Communist Vietnam.  
Vietnam countered by pointing to America’s refusal to discuss the issue formally 
or to make any special provisions for the Amerasians beyond the defunct AIA. Critical of 
the Reagan administration’s insistence for a full accounting, Vietnamese officials accused 
the United States of being more concerned about its dead soldiers than its living 
children.
614
  
The Living Children 
While American policymakers focused their attentions on immigration, 
communism and the MIA/POW issue, America’s “living children” in Vietnam were 
getting older. By 1985, the youngest Amerasians were now almost teenagers. Having 
                                                 
613 James Rosenthal, “The Myth of the Last POWs,” The New Republic, July 1, 1985. 
614 Relations between the United States and Vietnam were often strained during the 1980’s as a result of discrepancies and 
miscommunication about American POW’s and MIA’s said to still be living as well as the remains of those killed in Vietnam and 
recovered by Vietnam. The Amerasian issue provided opportunity for Vietnam to accuse the United States of hypocrisy and of being 
untrustworthy. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, American POW/MIA’s in Southeast Asia, 97th Cong., 
2nd sess., 30 September 1982.   
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grown out of the cute button noses, fair skin and baby hair of their youth and into their 
American facial features, freckles, and hair textures, many Amerasians had become 
accustomed to their marginalized status in Vietnam. The stories of rescue, hope and 
opportunity that promoted the AIA alongside photographs of handsome Amerasian boys 
and pretty Amerasian girls excited to come to America, to find their fathers, had largely 
disappeared.   
American Newspaper editors understood that photos of dirty teenagers or stories 
about homeless young adults did not garner the sympathy of American readers, or sell 
newspapers. Besides, most Americans believed the AIA was working, evident in the 
media reports and stories of Amerasians now living in America with their new American 
families and their new American lives.
615
 Still, the Amerasian problem did not disappear. 
Some Americans did question the commitment of the US government to the issue. 
Following the suspension of the ODP, distraught US citizen Donald Dodd wrote the Buck 
Foundation asking “why our representatives can go to Vietnam to negotiate for dead 
MIA’s but cannot or will not or do not negotiate for LIVE CHILDREN?”616  
By 1986, the AIA had failed in its efforts to provide a pathway to immigration for 
the Amerasians in Vietnam and although 3,552 Amerasians immigrated to the United 
States via the ODP, its suspension halted any future movement. The ODP and AIA 
together accounted for an estimated twelve-percent of the thirty-thousand Amerasians 
believed to still be living in Vietnam. Efforts by Stewart McKinney, Father Carroll, the 
                                                 
615 The passage of the AIA effectively alleviated concerns Americans previously held for the Amerasians in Vietnam. Only one year 
after its implementation, the Amerasians were no longer listed among the major points for resolution with Vietnam by American 
Vietnam Veterans organizations. Kane, interview. 
616 Donald Dodd to Pearl S. Buck Foundation, January 18, 1986, Operation Forget-me-not folder, Box Vietnam, Refugee Information, 
Archives of the Pearl S. Buck House, Pearl S. Buck International. 
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Buck Foundation, and the Darragh’s to improve the AIA failed to create real change.617 
Americans had moved on from the Amerasian issue and it would take more than just a 
photo to remind them of their “living children” in Vietnam. 
 
 
 
                                                 
617 Amerasian Children Relief Act, HR 1684, 99th Cong., 1st sess., Congressional Record, vol. 131, (March 21, 1985). 
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CHAPTER 5 
BRIDGING THE GAP 
One might imagine the tenor of hope and expectation swirling around the halls of 
Huntington High School (HHS) in August, 1986. A new school year had started and, 
unbeknownst to the students serving on the HHS student government committee, 
something bigger than college-entrance exams and applications had also begun. This 
school year, HHS would garner the American political spotlight. The idealism of the 
HHS students would supersede the bad blood that had existed between the United States 
and Vietnam since the war, helping to initiate diplomatic relations and bridge the gap 
between them.  
Sixty-three year old Gloria Blauvelt, a public relations worker for the Huntington 
School District, came across Audrey Tiernan’s photograph of Le Van Minh, a fair 
skinned crippled Vietnamese boy crawling on his hands begging for money on the streets 
of Ho Chi Minh City, in Newsday in December 1985.
618
 Like many other Newsday 
readers, the powerful picture struck her hard.
619
 Perhaps idealistic in her own thinking, 
Blauvelt knew she had to do something to help the “crippled boy” in the photo.620 With 
the support of HHS principal Jim Salvatore, Blauvelt showed the photo and the article to 
the HHS student government and challenged them to do something.  Upon seeing it, 
student body president, David Zach, and committee members Marlo Sandler, Sue Forte, 
                                                 
618 Minh was born in September, 1971 in Cam Ranh the site of a US naval base. Minh’s American father “Joe” was a corporal in the 
US Army and spoke Vietnamese and his Le Thi Ba, was a cook in the mess hall. According to Le Thi Ba, she dated Joe for over a year 
and he was present at Minh’s birth. They lost contact after the Viet Cong invaded the area and she fled to Saigon with Minh. Michael 
Luo, “A Beggar No More,” Newsday, July 9, 2000. 
619 Tiernan’s photograph of Minh initially ran in Newsday on November 4, 1986 in Jeff Somers’, “Report from Vietnam.” In February 
1986 additional photographs of Minh appeared in the newspaper. Mark Carfi-Bellerose Terrace, “A Language Barrier,” Newsday, July 
4, 1987. 
620 Reports in Newsday during the period consistently described Minh as the “crippled boy” causing criticism from the disabled 
community.  
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and Tara Scalia (the only junior in the group) gasped out loud. The picture, Zach 
explained, disturbed them, an “image of a contemporary crawling like a crab in ragged 
clothes.”621 
 The students accepted Blauvelt’s challenge, focusing on Minh’s physical 
deformities and the medical care they assumed could save his life.
622
 The task proved 
more formidable, however, than any of the students could imagine. The United States and 
Vietnam did not have diplomatic relations at the time and in January of 1986, Vietnam 
suspended the ODP, shutting down the only means for people from Vietnam to immigrate 
to the United States.  
Undeterred, however, the students initiated a petition drive to bring Minh to 
America for medical treatment. By November, they had successfully collected 27,000 
signatures in support of Minh’s emigration. Now it was time to contact their local 
congressman, New York Democratic Senator and HHS alumnus, Robert Mrazek.
623
 
 Local media sources continued to cover Minh’s story and the efforts of the HHS 
students to “save him,” framing their commitment to his medical condition in a discourse 
of humanitarianism.  Just as Newsday consistently described Minh as the “crippled” or 
“handicapped” Amerasian, the students insisted that they wanted to improve his quality 
of life by providing him the medical care necessary so that he could walk.
624
 
 Mrazek, too, contends that Minh’s medical condition was the sole motivation in 
pushing for his emigration. There was a chance, Mrazek explains, “with our fine 
                                                 
621 Paul Marinaccio, “Students Trying to Help a Boy Half a World Away,” Newsday, November 9, 1986. 
622 During this process, the students at HHS consulted with Dr. Hugo A. Keim, a New York surgeon to diagnose Minh’s medical 
issues. Keim agreed with previous diagnosis that Minh suffered from polio and would need a series of operations to walk properly. 
Paul Marinaccio, “Students Get Help in Bid for Orphan,” Newsday, January 30, 1987. 
623 Irene Virag, “Lawmakers Ask Shultz to Help Amerasian,” Newsday, March 7, 1987.  
624 Robert Mrazek, interview by author, telephone, September 8, 2012; Paul Marinaccio, “Students Trying to Help a Boy Half a World 
Away,” Newsday, November 9, 1986. 
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medicine here in the United States to conceivably do something that could help the boy 
that could not be accomplished in Vietnam. This was an exceptional case.”625 
In fact, however Minh’s case was not really exceptional. By 1986, American 
journalists and humanitarian organizations had reported the sad condition of the 
Amerasians in Vietnam for almost a decade. Bernie Weinraub’s stories in The New York 
Times, Mike Wallace’s “60 Minutes,” “Honor Thy Children,” report on CBS, and the 
numerous stories from American journalists and delegations of Vietnam veterans to 
Vietnam since 1981 had all confirmed the large population of homeless Amerasians 
living on the streets of Ho Chi Minh City—orphaned, abandoned, some maimed and all 
victims of discrimination because of their American paternity.
626
 In July 1983, a 
delegation including the American Council of Voluntary Agencies, the U.S. Catholic 
Conference and the Buck Foundation even proposed the construction of an Amerasian 
processing center in Ho Chi Minh City after counting over 250 Amerasians sleeping on 
the sidewalks.
627
  
But Newsday reports avoided grouping Minh among the tens of thousands of 
other Amerasians living in Vietnam. Rather, they promoted Minh as unique and made 
very few references to his American paternity. Reports focused first on the deaths of his 
mother and stepfather and later, when his story changed, the abandonment and abuse his 
mother inflicted upon him.  
                                                 
625 Mrazek, interview. 
626 Bernie Weinraub, VVA trip of reconciliation series, New York Times, December 1981; “Honor Thy Children,” September 19, 1982. 
627 “Report on the Amerasian Issue,” Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation, August 1989, folder 42, Box 1, Van Le files on 
Southeast Asian refugees. MS-SEA12. Special Collections and Archives, The UC Irvine Libraries, Irvine, California. January 13, 
2012. The proposal was supported by Vietnam who asked for U.S. Assistance in building a processing center for those Amerasians 
attempting to take advantage of the ODP. The United States rejected the proposal. 
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Even these experiences, also common among Amerasians, failed to connect the 
abuse to his American face.
628
 Such an oversight by Newsday reporters seemed to imply 
that the efforts on Minh’s behalf were not because he was an American boy or that he 
represented tens of thousands of other Amerasian kids just like him. Rather, Minh was a 
single boy facing enormous medical challenges that just a little American 
humanitarianism could fix.  
But even in the efforts to frame Minh’s case as based on humanitarian concern for 
his medical condition, Minh’s American paternity appeared undeniable in Tiernan’s 
photograph. Viewed in color, the picture clearly showed Minh’s light brown hair and 
eyes. In black and white, the photograph darkens the color of both.  
Yet, media reports used an inclusionary discourse of racial kinship when 
describing Minh.
629
 Newsday reporters consistently described Minh as having blue eyes. 
In November 1986, reporter Paul Marinaccio described Minh with “straight black hair, 
blue eyes and freckles,” and one month later “A street beggar with blue eyes and freckles 
who crawls on all fours.”630 In March 1987 reporter Irene Virag, in reference to the 
difficulties facing Minh, stated that the absence of diplomatic relations between the 
United States and Vietnam, “makes it impossible to bring a single blue-eyed child to the 
land of his fathers.”631 One month later, Virag described Minh specifically as “the blue-
                                                 
628 Many Amerasians reported suffering physical abuse from family members and peers because they “looked” American. “In Our 
Father’s Land: Vietnamese Amerasians in the United States,” The United States Catholic Conference Migration and Refugee Services, 
1985, folder 2, Box 20, Southeast Asia Resource Action Center records. MS-SEA004. Special Collections and Archives, The UC 
Irvine Libraries, Irvine, California. January 13, 2013. For further discussion see Bass, Vietnamerica, DeBonis, Children of the Enemy, 
and McKelvey, The Dust of Life.  
629 In the case of Minh, assigning him “American” racial markers like “blue eyes,” likely endeared Minh to Newsday  reporters and 
readers by making him more “American.” According to Ann Laura Stoler (Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power), identifiable 
attributes that link national and racial identity are central to the use of inclusionary discourses and exclusionary practices that framed 
the colonial dilemma of the mixed-race individual.  
630 Paul Marinaccio, “Amerasian’s Case Makes Headway,” Newsday, November 30, 1986; “Vow of Help for Crippled Amerasian,” 
Newsday, December 13, 1986. 
631 Irene Virag, “Orphan Becomes a Symbol of Diplomacy,” Newsday, March 25, 1987. 
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eyed boy who lives half a world away.”632 It was not until Virag met Minh in May 1987 
that her description became more realistic, “hazel eyes and severely cropped hair.”633 
 There is no question that, just as policymakers utilized a discourse of inclusion by 
employing an assumption of filiation between America and her Amerasian “sons and 
daughters” to garner the passage of the AIA in 1982, similar methods assisted Minh’s 
immigration. Likely, those reporters who had not seen Minh in person or who had failed 
to examine the color photographs simply projected their own ideas of what Minh looked 
like into their stories, inserting their own assumptions that Minh’s “white” American 
father would necessarily have passed the trait of blue eyes on to his son. They possibly 
knew that such a discourse would garner the sympathy of Newsday readers, ultimately 
selling more papers. Or, perhaps, when reporters looked at Minh, they simply saw what 
they wanted to see: a fair skinned, half-American boy with blue eyes.
634
 
The use of a racialized discourse of inclusion personalized Minh’s medical 
condition for many readers.  Blue eyes may have made Minh seem more plausibly 
“American” and thereby worthy of humanitarian assistance. The very clear connotation 
between blue eyes and whiteness carries bigger questions about Minh’s case. Would the 
reaction from Newsday readers or the students of HHS have been the same had Minh’s 
face not been so familiar? Would the HHS students have perceived Minh as their 
“contemporary” had he been full Vietnamese and “crippled” rather than Amerasian? How 
might they have responded had Minh been a black Amerasian? Minh’s story exposes 
                                                 
632 Irene Virag, “Le Van Minh’s Friends Celebrate,” Newsday, April 28, 1987. 
633 Irene Virag, “Goodbye…and Hello” Newsday, May 31, 1987. 
634 The promotion of the familiar by Newsday reporters is another example of Edward Said’s orientalism in which the eye and hair 
color of Le Van Minh symbolized his place in the familiar Western world of “us” and his displacement in the strange, Eastern world 
of “them.” Edward Said, Orientalism, 43-44. 
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underlying issues of race and nation in a country concerned with immigration and 
resolving the lingering issues of the Vietnam War.  
Furthermore, the increasing frustration among Americans with the immigrants 
and refugees from Southeast Asia by 1986 may have incited a different response from the 
Long Island community had Minh not “looked” so familiar. Vietnam’s suspension of the 
ODP coincided with a growing debate in America over the purpose of the program. Many 
policymakers echoed the sentiments of Jerry Tinker, minority counsel of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee’s subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy, who argued 
that by 1985 the post-Vietnam war refugee flow that had been the initial focus of the 
ODP had shifted to a migratory flow composed of “some refugees, a growing number of 
family reunification cases, and an even larger economic migrant component.”635  
According to some policymakers these new migrants lacked any direct ties to the 
United States. Rather than fleeing persecution, they simply wanted better living 
conditions and opportunities in America. By utilizing the ODP, they contributed to the 
backlog of applicants and the rising costs of the program, and they hindered the ability of 
the political prisoners in Vietnamese re-education camps and the Amerasian children to 
fully benefit from the ODP.
636
 Such criticism bolstered the Reagan Administration’s 
declaration that same year that “the refugee crisis in Southeast Asia is over.”637 Rather 
                                                 
635 Bernard Gwertzman, “The Debt to the Indochinese is Becoming a Fiscal Drain,” The New York Times, March 3, 1985; Action 
Alert: Refugee Admission, Jerry Tinker, “U.S. Refugee Policy: Coping with Migration,” March 1985, SEARAC Box 1, Folder 1, Ad 
Hoc Working Group on Refugee Admissions and Protection, Correspondence and Memoranda, 1986-1989. Southeast Asian Archives, 
UC Irvine Special Collections and Archives. 
636 Bernard Gwertzman, “The Debt to the Indochinese is Becoming a Fiscal Drain,” The New York Times, March 3, 1985; “The 
Orderly Departure Program: The Need for Reassessment,” Migration and Refugee Services, U.S. Catholic Conference, Migration and 
Refugee Affairs, American Council for Voluntary International Action, November 1986. By 1987 the ODP supplanted illegal escape 
by boat as the predominant means of exit from Vietnam. Between 1979 and September 1986, the UNHCR reported that 50,426 
Vietnamese had entered the United States through the ODP. Appendix IV of Midyear Consultation on Refugee Programs Fiscal Year 
1987, Hearing.  
637 “U.S. Refugee Program in Southeast Asia” April, 1986, folder 1, Ad Hoc Working Group on Refugee Admissions and Protection, 
Correspondence and Memoranda, 1986-1989, Box 1,  Southeast Asia Resource Action Center records. MS-SEA004. Special 
Collections and Archives, The UC Irvine Libraries, Irvine, California. January 13, 2013. 
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than continuing to hold American doors open for refugees from Vietnam, Congressional 
leaders like Alan Simpson (R-WY) began advocating for the repatriation of Southeast 
Asian migrants.
638
  
Thus, by October 1986, as the students of HHS gathered signatures to support 
bringing Minh to America, America’s role in creating the ODP backlog of 26,000 
applicants in Vietnam, including 3000 Amerasians, reflected the growing resistance 
among policymakers to maintain open American borders for a population that many 
believed was no longer a humanitarian necessity.
639
  
In their efforts to revive the ODP after its suspension in 1986, American 
policymakers further politicized the program by focusing on how a functioning ODP 
could benefit specifically political prisoners and Amerasians.  They encouraged all other 
applicants in Vietnam to use traditional American immigration channels, instead of the 
ODP, to come to America. Such channels denied them refugee status and benefits and 
required them to meet the standards of family reunification.
640
 
                                                 
638 Senator Alan Simpson played a curious role in the Amerasian issue. An army veteran who served in the German occupation after 
World War II and chairman of the Veteran’s Affairs Committee from 1981 to 1987, Simpson was a conservative who believed in 
limited government regulation and restrictive immigration policies and, as a result, he became a major antagonist against expansionist 
immigration policies. He specifically targeted the category of family unification which largely benefitted Vietnamese immigrants.  
Memo from Le Xuan Khoa, Indochinese Resource Action Center, April 11, 1986; “U.S. Refugee Program in Southeast Asia,” April 
1986, folder 1, Ad Hoc Working Group on Refugee Admissions and Protection, Correspondence and Memoranda, 1986-1989, Box 1,  
Southeast Asia Resource Action Center records. MS-SEA004. Special Collections and Archives, The UC Irvine Libraries, Irvine, 
California. January 13, 2013. 
639 “The Orderly Departure Program: The Need for Reassessment,” Migration and Refugee Services, U.S. Catholic Conference, 
Migration and Refugee Affairs Committee of Interaction, American Council for Voluntary International Action, November 1986.  The 
report listed 26,379 persons on backlog to United States with 12, 422 previously approved. Appendix IV of Midyear Consultation on 
Refugee Programs FY 1987, 117, 185. According to the report the backlog included persons released for exit by Vietnam and 
interviewed by the United States which had yet to review the applicants. Vietnamese authorities first expressed concern over the 
backlog in April 1985 and without a solution, suspended the ODP to the United States in January 1986. Accordingly, U.S. policy 
shifted allowing only those previously approved applicants who met the standard of family reunification to immigrate while punishing 
those previously approved applicants who did not meet this standard. 
640 At its inception, the focus of the ODP was family reunification. It allowed an approved family to travel to the United States 
together at the same time, including members not immediately eligible for immigrant visas, by approving their admission as refugees. 
During the spring of 1986 the US changed this practice to admit only those family members approved for immigrant visas. Members 
who could not qualify as immigrants were unable to enter the United States as refugees which placed them at the mercy of the family 
reunification category. Increasingly only family members who immigrated and achieved naturalization in the United States could 
apply for their family members to join them as immigrants. This process often took years. 
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In response, Vietnam officials continued to publically declare their willingness to 
cooperate on the issue. They reiterated the commitment expressed in October 1985, by 
Vietnam’s Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach to a delegation of American war veterans, 
“These are your children. I would welcome anyone to come and take them away.”641 
Secretly fearing that cooperation on the Amerasian issue with Vietnam would 
undermine American efforts to frame Vietnam’s treatment of the Amerasians as evidence 
of the evils of Communism and part of Vietnam’s post-war anti-American policy, 
American officials continued to resist collaboration. Rather, they viewed the Amerasians 
as a critical tool in negotiations with Vietnam for American MIA/POWs and political 
prisoners. Furthermore, Communist Vietnam remained part of the “evil empire” and the 
Reagan administration meant to ensure that the United States held its ground even if it 
meant sacrificing the welfare of half-American children. 
There is no question that the HHS students sincerely wanted to help Minh. It is 
curious however that media coverage or even general awareness of the issue by Newsday 
reporters did not situate Minh into the bigger Amerasian debate. Instead, Minh’s case 
would play out within the walls of HHS, where the student government sought to give 
American medical care to an Amerasian teenager who perhaps looked a bit like them. 
The Congressman and the Amerasian Boy 
 To the rescue came Robert Mrazek (D-NY). Mrazek had been elected to the 
House of Representatives in 1982, only a few weeks after the passage of the AIA. Before 
entering politics, the Cornell graduate served in the US Navy (1967-68) during the 
Vietnam War. By 1986, Mrazek had served a four year stint as a member of the House 
                                                 
641 Barbara Crossette, “Hanoi Asks to End Amerasians’ Issue” New York Times, Oct. 20, 1985. 
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Appropriations Committee and the Foreign Operations Subcommittee which oversaw 
foreign aid and immigration and naturalization services.  
Nonetheless, Mrazek was unaware of the Amerasian issue when he picked up his 
copy of Newsday in 1985 and saw Tiernan’s photograph of Minh. It was, Mrazek 
exclaimed, “one of those very arresting photographs which I remembered, of this 
strikingly handsome little boy.”642  
But a visit from the students of HHS, Mrazek’s alma mater, would forever 
connect him to Minh and to the Amerasian issue.  In November, 1986 Zach, Forte, 
Sandler, and Scalia presented Mrazek with the 27,000 signatures they had collected in 
support of bringing Minh to the United States for medical treatment. Aware that Vietnam 
had suspended the ODP and of the contentious relationship between the two 
governments, Mrazek had doubts about the prospects for success.
643
 However, the 
hopeful idealism of the HHS students touched him: “you have these teenagers looking at 
you with open wide doe eyes thinking you know, you’re the Congressman, you can pull it 
off. I felt I had to at least follow through to see if there might be something I can do.”644  
And “follow through” Mrazek did. Within a few weeks, Mrazek and the HHS 
students visited the New York office of Nguyen Dang Quang, the first Secretary of the 
Vietnamese Mission to the UN.
645
  Quang endorsed the effort to bring Minh to America, 
                                                 
642 Mrazek, interview.  
643 Marc Kaufman, “Diplomats Agree on Outline of Plan to Release Amerasians,” Houston Chronicle, October 12, 1986. In October 
1986 U.S. and Vietnamese officials Richard Childress, a senior National Security Council official and John C. Monjo, State 
Department officer in the Bureau of East Asia and the Pacific held a “secret” meeting with the Vietnamese Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Vo Dung Giang to discuss the possibility of a bi-lateral agreement to allow Amerasians to leave Vietnam for the United 
States. The meeting was in response to the suspended ODP which halted immigration of Amerasians as well as other Vietnamese. The 
proposed bi-lateral agreement would establish a new program independent of the UNHCR in which American officials would 
interview applicants and approve Amerasians to immigrate to the United States regardless of the status of the ODP. 
644 Mrazek, interview. 
645 Although diplomatic relations between the two countries did not exist in 1986, Vietnam was part of the United Nations and 
Vietnam did have a representative office in New York City. Paul Marinaccio, “Vow of Help for Crippled Amerasian,” December 13, 
1986; Mrazek, interview. Mrazek met with Quang in December 1986, prior to the meeting between the students and Quang. In the 
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announcing that Vietnam would make an exception to the suspended ODP and grant him 
an exit visa.  
For Vietnam such a humanitarian gesture meant positive publicity at a time of 
high diplomatic tensions as the United States constantly accused it of humanitarian 
violations regarding the Amerasians, American MIA/POWs and political prisoners. It 
also meant a possible breakthrough in getting the Amerasians out of Vietnam.  The 3000 
Amerasians included in the ODP backlog were now mostly teenagers and young 
adults.
646
 Largely unemployed, uneducated, and many homeless, these Amerasians 
gathered in Ho Chi Minh City where they conducted criminal acts and proved a public 
problem for Vietnamese officials.
647
  
Amerasians who begged Western visitors for food and money also brought 
negative publicity to the country. Some reports suggested that the Vietnam government 
institutionalized many Amerasians living on the streets of Ho Chi Minh City, in 
orphanages, or labor camps.
648
  Thus, Minh was an opportunity that Quang could not 
overlook. He professed Vietnam’s willingness to cooperate on the Minh case while 
pointing to the bigger Amerasian problem in Vietnam and urging the US Government to 
expedite the relocation of all other Amerasian youth to the United States.
649
  
 The US State Department, however, was not quite as willing to jump on the Minh 
bandwagon. In response to Vietnam’s concessions, the State Department rejected the 
                                                                                                                                                 
meeting Mrazek and Quang discussed the possibility of diplomatic cooperation on Minh’s case. They agreed that both countries could 
potentially benefit from the positive publicity of bilateral cooperation on such an “humanitarian” case.   
646 Paul Marinaccio, “Amerasian’s Case Makes Headway,” Newsday, November 30, 1986; Mrazek, interview. Barbara Crossettes, 
“Vietnam Appears to Hinder an Emigration Accord,” New York Times, August 22, 1987. “Orderly Departure Statistics as of October 
1986,” Midyear Consultation on Refugee Programs FY 1987, Hearing. The ODP backlog of 26,379 persons to United States included 
12,422 who previously received approval to immigrate to the United States. 
647 Barbara Crossettes, “Vietnam Appears to Hinder an Emigration Accord,” New York Times, August 22, 1987. 
648 Ibid. 
649 Paul Marinaccio, “Amerasian’s Case Makes Headway,” Newsday, November 30, 1986; Mrazek, interview; Barbara Crossettes, 
“Vietnam Appears to Hinder an Emigration Accord,” New York Times, August 22, 1987;“Orderly Departure Statistics as of October 
1986,” Midyear Consultation on Refugee Programs FY 1987, Hearing. 
  167 
condition that Minh forego the required ODP interview and medical examination. Frank 
Sieverts, the spokesman for the Bureau for Refugee Programs asserted that Minh had to 
go through both the interview and the exam to check his identification and assess his 
medical condition.
650
   
With no diplomatic relations or the ODP, Vietnam refused to let American 
interviewers and medical teams into the country to conduct such exams. Conversely, the 
United States refused to let Minh leave without them. Thus, Sieverts suggested, that 
instead of granting Minh an individual exception, the US Government could simply place 
Minh’s name among the three-thousand other Amerasians listed for departure.651 
Considering the condition of the ODP, this seemed a meaningless solution that 
failed to meet the request for medical “urgency.” Even for those Amerasians in Vietnam 
already approved for immigration, the backlog meant that often their departure date 
exceeded the one year expiration on their ODP medical exams, placing them into a static 
category, “Persons Approved but Not Medically Clear” in a suspended program.652 As 
the suspension dragged on, this category continued to grow and ever fewer Amerasians 
departed Vietnam for America. In 1985, before the suspension of the ODP, 1,498 
Amerasians departed Vietnam under the program but in 1986 that number dropped to 
512.
653
  
                                                 
650 Paul Marinaccio, “Vow of Help for Crippled Amerasian,” Newsday, December 13, 1986. 
651 Ibid. Official reports listed 3000 Amerasians on the backlog list. Even while the program was suspended, departures from Vietnam 
for people already approved continued at drastically reduced levels, decreasing from an average of 704 refugee departures/month to 
483/month. Appendix IV of Midyear Consultation on Refugee Programs FY 1987, Hearing. 
652 At its peak the ODP backlog listed 3,825 refugees classified as “Persons Approved Yet Not Medically Cleared” and 1,912 
“Approved But Will not Yet Be Telexed to Vietnam.” The former category covered those with expired medical exams, an increasing 
number because medical exams were impossible under the suspension. The latter category included those who had never received a 
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States declined from an average of 704/month to 483/month—levels comparable to early 1983. “The Orderly Departure Program: The 
Need for Reassessment,” Midyear Consultation on Refugee Programs FY 87, Hearing, 156. 
653  Amerasian departures to the United States peaked in 1985 as Vietnam responded favorably to the announcement by Secretary of 
State George Shultz in 1984 that the US was committed to receiving all of Vietnam’s Amerasians through the ODP within the next 
two years. However there was no formal agreement as a result of Schultz’ announcement, and it had no effect on the operation of the 
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Thus, despite its claims of humanitarian concern for all of the Amerasians, there 
was very little US government interest in cooperating with Vietnam over Minh. Even 
Mrazek’s attempts on Capitol Hill to obtain support for Minh’s case hit resistance from 
the State Department. After a personal plea to Secretary of State George Shultz to grant 
Minh an immigration exception for humanitarian reasons, Mrazek received a 
“perfunctory letter” from the State Department stating that “they wish they could help but 
they were not going to cooperate” on this issue.654 
By January 1987, the students of HHS began to understand the broader 
implications of their efforts to bring Minh to the United States. His case was an 
opportunity for the United States and Vietnam finally to reestablish diplomatic relations 
and perhaps reconcile some of the lingering effects of the war. The students themselves 
also had the opportunity to participate directly in the American political process—
meeting with Vietnamese officials, collaborating with their congressman and lobbying 
congressional members.  
Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service (LIRS) in Manhattan advised the 
students on the political strategy that would garner the best results. As one of the agencies 
contracted with the US government for refugee resettlement and concerned with the 
current status of the ODP, LIRS officials encouraged the students’ efforts, hoping they 
could help revitalize the program. Associate Director of LIRS, Marta Brenden believed 
                                                                                                                                                 
ODP. In 1983 and 1984, 638 and 937 Amerasians departed Vietnam for the United States respectively. Midyear Consultation on US 
Refugee Programs for Fiscal Year 1987, Hearing, 108; Midyear Consultation on US Refugee Programs for Fiscal Year 1986, 
Hearing, 108. “Report on the Amerasian Issue,” Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation, August 1989, folder 42, Box 1,Van Le 
Files, on Southeast Asian refugees. MS-SEA12. Special Collections and Archives. The UC Irvine Libraries, Irvine, California. 
January 13, 2013. 
654 Mrazek, interview; Irene Virag, “Lawmakers Ask Shultz to Help Amerasian,” Newsday, March 7, 1987. 
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Minh’s case brought a human element to the stalemate: “‘You are raising a real life 
situation for all these people to think about while they negotiate.’”655 
Mrazek and Quang also understood the possibilities of bi-lateral cooperation on 
Minh’s case. According to Mrazek, “‘Helping Le could demonstrate the mutual concern 
of our people over the cost of the war.’”656 Surely both Mrazek and Quang knew the 
benefits of reaching a successful solution on Minh only months after reports that officials 
from both countries had reached agreements to allow all of the Amerasians in Vietnam to 
come to America, had proven premature.
657
  
The culprit in the failed negotiations appeared to be a staunch disagreement over 
the term refugee. While Vietnam insisted that the majority of those benefiting from the 
ODP did not meet the qualifications of refugees, rejecting the insinuation that it was 
persecuting its citizens, the Reagan administration insisted it was, and refused to accept 
the Amerasians as anything else.
658
  
By promoting the persecution of the Amerasians and designating them refugees, 
America could maintain the Cold War narrative of the evils of communism and the 
assertion that such treatment was part of Vietnam’s post-war anti-American policy, while 
upholding its own humanitarian efforts to rescue the Amerasians.
659
 As evidence of this 
divide, in October 1986, less than a week after agreeing to bi-lateral cooperation on the 
                                                 
655 Midyear Consultation on Refugee Programs FY 1987, Hearing; Paul Marinaccio, “New Strategy for Helping Amerasian,” 
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Amerasian issue, President Reagan undermined it by declaring the Amerasians in 
Vietnam “refugees of special humanitarian concern to the United States.”660 
In the meantime, the persistence of Mrazek and the HHS students had finally 
begun to pay off with individual members of Congress. By March 1987, Mrazek had the 
support of the majority of the House to bring Minh to America for medical treatment. He 
noted a bipartisan effort and that Tiernan’s photograph was the best selling point. 
According to Mrazek, many members of Congress were sympathetic to Minh’s story and 
the discrimination he faced because he looked American. Minh’s face, he explained was 
“a bitter and painful reminder of the war.”661 In response, Mrazek sent a letter to 
Secretary of State Shultz including the signatures of 306 members of the House 
supporting a humanitarian exemption for Minh that would allow him to come to America 
without the interview and medical exam.
662
  
As a result of the growing political support, the State Department agreed to 
expedite the immigration process for Minh. By April, the Vietnam government located 
Minh who expressed his desire to leave Vietnam and granted his exit visa.
663
 By May, 
Mrazek, Congressman Thomas Ridge (R-PA)—a decorated Vietnam War veteran active 
in negotiations over American MIA/POWs—and Tiernan flew to Vietnam to meet Minh 
and bring him “home.” Minh was no longer simply a high school humanitarian project, 
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for America. He claimed Vietnamese security guards accosted him in front of the Caravelle hotel in Ho Chi Minh City. After spending 
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but a politically symbolic gesture between the two countries. Minh, Mrazek exclaimed, 
could be the “first step to removing some of the roadblocks.”664 
Becoming American 
Much of the media coverage leading up to the congressional support for bringing 
Minh to the United States utilized a humanitarian discourse which publicized Minh’s 
urgent need for medical care. However, once the State Department agreed to cooperate 
on Minh’s case, journalists employed an inclusionary rhetoric of kinship based on Minh’s 
American paternity. Huntington High School declared April 27
th
 “Le Van Minh Day,” a 
day to celebrate their successful efforts to bring Minh “home.” At the event, local 
folksinger Patricia Shih performed an original song about all the Amerasians left behind 
in Vietnam. Her lyrics arousing notions of national paternity, “‘Papa, you’re in my heart. 
Do you want to keep our lives apart?’”665  
In addition, Amerasian teenager Anh Dung Nguyen spoke to the students of his 
experience in Vietnam and America. Newsday reporter Virag poignantly explained that 
although Anh never met his American father, a soldier who left Saigon when Anh was an 
infant, Anh still held onto the dream of finding him and kept a framed photograph of him 
by his bed.
666
 Anh’s own testimonial was even more gripping as he expressed the 
common hope of many Amerasians during the period—that coming to America and 
becoming American would fill the hole left by their absent father and their 
marginalization in Vietnamese society.  
                                                 
664 Irena Virag, “Orphan Becomes a Symbol of Diplomacy,” Newsday, March 25, 1987. 
665 Irene Virag, “Le Van Minh’s Friends Celebrate,” Newsday, April 28, 1987. 
666 Irene Virag, “Le Van Minh’s Friends Celebrate,” Newsday, April 28, 1987. 
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In 1985 the US Catholic Conference reported that the need for Amerasian 
children to connect with their American fathers was emotional and “deeply ingrained” 
and for most, it was the primary motivation for migrating.
667
 Coming to America, Minh 
will feel “reborn,” Anh told the students at HHS. “Half my blood is American” and “I am 
one of the lucky ones.”668 
One month later, Mrazek arrived in Vietnam and Virag provided detailed reports 
of Minh’s trip “home to the land of his unknown father.”669 Virag’s reports consistently 
described the budding relationship between the congressman and Amerasian teenager in a 
framework of paternal responsibility, strengthening the notion of kinship through an 
inclusionary rhetoric of family. “‘I feel like a prospective father’” Mrazek stated the day 
before leaving for Vietnam, “‘I have the same sense of expectation and concern for the 
unknown as when I was awaiting the birth of my first child.’”670 
The bond between Mrazek and Minh developed quickly. Photos captured the tall 
congressman carrying Minh like a child, with Minh’s thin arms wrapped tightly around 
Mrazek’s neck. Virag relayed the sentimental moments between man and child to 
Newsday readers as those special moments that fathers share with their sons:  Mrazek 
putting drops of medicine in Minh’s eye before dabbing it with a tissue and sharing 
pictures of his children and wife or playing blackjack with Minh in his hospital room, 
while Minh told of his life on the streets, of hunger, danger and survival and his best 
friend Ti.
671
 Only the heartfelt reunion between Minh and Tiernan, whose photograph had 
                                                 
667 “In Our Fathers’ Land: Vietnamese Amerasians in the United States,” A Survey by the United States Catholic Conference 
Migration and Refugee Service, November 1985, folder 2, Box 20, Southeast Asia Resource Action Center records. MS-SEA004. 
Special Collections and Archives, The UC Irvine Libraries, Irvine, California. January 13, 2013. 
668 Irene Virag, “Le Van Minh’s Friends Celebrate,” Newsday, April 28, 1987. 
669 Irene Virag, “Mrazek Leaves Today on a Mission of Mercy,” Newsday, May 26, 1987. 
670 Irene Virag, “Mrazek Leaves Today on a Mission of Mercy,” Newsday, May 26, 1987. 
671 Irene Virag, “Goodbye…and Hello. Li Welcome Postponed,” Newsday, May 31, 1987. 
  173 
initiated the efforts for Minh, could compete with Mrazek’s moments. Tiernan “stroked 
Minh’s withered legs,” “tousled his hair” and comforted Minh by giving him a small 
brown teddy bear.
672
 
The compassion and care shown to Minh by both Mrazek and Tiernan helped ease 
his transition to life in America. Unable to leave Thailand after a medical exam revealed 
he had a contagious eye infection, Minh’s “Americanization” continued with his 
introduction to American culture. While in the isolation ward for refugees of a Bangkok 
hospital, Minh perused pictures of the White House and the Statue of Liberty, ate M&Ms, 
and listened to Simon and Garfunkel, Jimi Hendrix and The Cars on his new cassette 
player.
673
 These were, Virag described, “symbolic ways” in which Minh moved “a little 
closer to America.”674 
Many in America also moved closer to Minh. At HHS, the students anxiously 
awaited his arrival and many tried to imagine how Minh felt knowing he was coming to a 
new culture that he knew nothing about. Pictures of Minh wearing sneakers, listening to 
his cassette player and playing cards transformed the “crippled” boy from Tiernan’s 
photograph, living on the other side of the world, into a real person for the HHS teenagers 
who had known him only as a picture of a street kid and a beggar.  
Teachers at HHS took the opportunity to situate Minh’s case and the school’s 
efforts into the bigger context of diplomacy, determination, and human compassion. 
Students who had worked relentlessly to bring Minh to America now began to wonder 
more about him. They imagined the life he was leaving, thought “about the mother who 
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had ordered him into the streets when he was 10,” and were hopeful for the life he was 
going to have.
675
 The students also considered his paternity, curious about Minh’s 
American father, the man “of whom he knows nothing.”676  
Like the media coverage, the focus of the HHS students also shifted from Minh’s 
twisted spine to his American face. Sixteen-year old Dina Boccio pointed to the picture 
of Minh that had made him “famous,” a photo in which one cannot deny nor turn away 
from Minh’s physical challenge. But Boccio was no longer looking at Minh’s awkwardly 
bent legs that many insisted had incited the support for Minh. Perhaps finally free to 
voice the underlying motivator in the efforts to bring Minh to America, the clear 
connection of kinship and familiarity, Boccio exclaimed, “‘Look at that face, how could 
you not do anything? We had to do something.’”677 
By the time Mrazek carried Minh off the airplane into a crowd of television and 
newspaper reporters and HHS students at New York’s John F. Kennedy Airport on June 
4, 1987, the congressman and the Amerasian teenager had formed an indelible bond. “‘I 
didn’t go to Vietnam to find a son,’” Mrazek told Virag, “‘and yet I’ve fallen in love with 
this boy.’”678 Minh too seemed comfortable with the congressman, calling him “Daddy” 
and clinging to him as they stepped off the plane where media questions and camera 
flashes instantly engulfed them. The HHS students were also there. Crying, laughing and 
hugging each other, they welcomed Minh to America with huge banners, “Welcome 
Home Le” and “We Love You,” and presented him with a small American flag.679  
                                                 
675 Minh later recanted his claim that his mother had abandoned him to the streets. In 2000 he explained that he had spoken out of 
anger and in reality had ran away from home because his stepfather abused him. Michael Luo, “A Beggar No More,” Newsday, July 9, 
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Mrazek commended the students for their persistence and hard work in their 
efforts to bring Minh to America. He reminded the students that they had “truly changed 
the life of this young man” and that “Minh begins a new life in the U.S. today.” Secretary 
Quang also attended, taking the opportunity to remind Americans that Minh was only one 
of many Amerasians in Vietnam and to reinforce his hope that improved relations could 
emerge as a result of Minh’s case. The Amerasian children in Vietnam, Quang stated “are 
the children of the United States.”680 
Lessons Learned 
Ultimately, however Minh’s transition to America was not idyllic. Like many 
Amerasians before and after him, Minh struggled with issues of loss, assimilation, and 
identity. According to psychologists Robert McKelvey and John Webb, Amerasians 
frequently experienced loss from the abandonment of both their American fathers and 
their biological mothers. Paternal abandonment often resulted in poverty, ostracism, and 
shame for the Amerasians, ensuring a disadvantaged life of diminished educational and 
vocation opportunities in the countries of their birth.
681
 Additionally, the rejection by 
their Vietnamese mothers from fear, despair or disgrace, had long-term psychological 
consequences like depression and anxiety for Amerasians.
682
  
Further exacerbating the feelings of loss were the humiliation and rejection that 
accompanied their failed search to find their fathers once in America. Dartmouth 
                                                 
680 Ibid. 
681 Robert S. McKelvey and John A. Webb, “Long-Term Effects of Maternal Loss on Vietnamese Amerasians,” Journal of the 
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psychologist Kirk Felsman explained that by 1987, as the Amerasians matured, many 
began questioning their own identity, marriage and family, and finding their fathers 
became fundamental.
683
 There was no official mechanism to assist them with the search 
once they were in America despite the help of private organizations like the American 
Council for Nationalities Service in New York City and private individuals like Father 
Carroll.  
Moreover, American policies worked to protect the identity of the fathers at the 
expense of their children. The potential of demands for child support and fears that a half-
Vietnamese child could disrupt the lives of American men took precedent over the 
Amerasian children’s desire to find their fathers.684 In his efforts to locate potential 
fathers for the purpose of establishing evidentiary proof of paternity, Father Carroll 
interacted with many American men who he claims agreed to acknowledge paternity only 
if it could be kept secret from their American wives and children.
685
 In 1985, the United 
States Catholic Conference reported that only two-percent of Amerasians had reunited 
with their fathers upon arrival to the United States a number that would remain consistent 
through the end of the program in 1994.
686
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Failed father searches had big implications for issues of paternal abandonment 
and mental health. For many Amerasians, the inability to fulfill the fantasy of family 
reunification contributed to feelings of isolation that had defined their lives as bui doi in 
Vietnam and that now defined them as “outcasts” in America.687 Further enhancing their 
alienation was the absence of citizenship. It was only through the legitimation of the 
father and the resulting birthright citizenship that the Amerasians could fully grasp and be 
embraced by their “Americanness.” 
 As a result, in 1985 LIRS reminded its employees that although American policy 
legally defined Amerasians as the children of American citizen fathers, lacking any 
formal claim by the father, birthright citizenship was not automatic. Additionally, the 
State Department did not accept potentially inaccurate documents from Vietnam like 
birth certificates for the purpose of establishing citizenship.
688
  
Complicating the issue of citizenship and belonging in America was the 
inclusionary language of legislation found by 1986 in both the AIA and the ODP. Each 
policy acknowledged the Amerasians as children of U.S. citizens, inferring that the 
Amerasians had access to the same rights possessed by children of two citizen parents. 
But the practical application of the legislation denied such a connection and simply 
served to further confuse Amerasians and Americans as to whether or not they actually 
belonged in America.
689
 On one hand, they were the children of American fathers but on 
the other, they were non-citizens, most refugees.  
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LIRS also expressed concerns about the dangers of assimilation. Due to their 
“American” looks, LIRS explained, many Americans too quickly forced the Amerasians 
into American cultural and racial categories. They assumed that blond hair, afros, or 
freckles equated to an easy adaptation into American culture. There was an ethnocentric 
assumption by many Americans that Amerasians would most benefit by becoming 
“American” as fast as possible. “Protecting them,” LIRS officials argued, by imposing 
American culture and heritage while denying them their Vietnamese was troublesome. 
Such a practice LIRS warned, left the Amerasian “doubly rejected.” Assimilating into a 
new culture was just as difficult “for those who ‘look American’ as for those who do not” 
they explained, and the Amerasians “are as much Vietnamese as any other Vietnamese 
nations that we serve.”690 
Minh would experience all of these challenges. During his interview with 
immigration officials in Thailand, he expressed remorse over leaving his friends in 
Vietnam and refused to speak with the interviewer about his life, pushing away and 
turning his back.
691
  His Vietnamese interpreter, Xuan Bell, expressed concerns over 
Minh’s behavior and perhaps the quick transition to America itself: “Whatever family has 
him will have a hard time. He’s never lived in a family before.”692  
Mrazek however hoped that Minh could adjust reasonably. He and his family 
housed Minh for a few weeks before transitioning him to his permanent foster home in 
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Centerport, New York with Eugene and Nancy Kinney. Minh unhappily left the Mrazek’s 
home when it came time. Unfortunately, his transition coincided with the upsetting news 
that even in the United States, there was no medical solution for his legs. Minh would 
have to use crutches to walk for the rest of his life.
693
  
The next few months were a whirlwind of emotion for Minh and the Kinneys. 
Validating the warnings of LIRS regarding fast-tracking assimilation for the Amerasians, 
Minh had difficulty adjusting to his new life. Although he looked American, Minh did 
not speak the language or understand the culture. The community of friends and support 
that welcomed him to America a month earlier had dissipated quickly after his arrival. 
The students at HHS left for summer vacations. Zach, Sandler and Forte departed for 
college and Mrazek, the man Minh called “Daddy,” returned to Washington. His “rescue” 
had removed him from the only life and family he had ever known into an unfamiliar 
American society.  
The pressure for Minh’s quick assimilation translated into tension with his 
adoptive family. Minh’s adoptive mother, Nancy Kinney, explained “Minh stayed with us 
for 14 months. We had a lot of trouble raising him. He was very resistant to school and 
had no desire to get up in the morning. He wanted dinner at midnight because that’s when 
he’d eaten on the streets in Vietnam.’”694  
In August, Minh filed the paperwork to bring his mother and half-siblings to the 
United States through the ODP.
695
 By November, Newsday reported the 
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“Americanization of Le Van Minh is a slow process.” The article examined the cultural 
and language barriers Minh still faced, his affinity for sleeping on the floor, eating at odd 
times as he did on the street and the longing for his mother.
696
 The Kinneys blamed the 
challenges they faced with Minh on the quick transition and his “lack of orientation.” 
While pointing to his medical condition to justify the expeditious departure, Mrazek too, 
admitted that more time to prepare for his arrival in America would have made a 
difference: “I think taking him from his street environment and bringing him to America 
has resulted in an accelerated transformation from boy to man.”697 
By February 1988, Minh lived in Oakdale, New York, his third “foster” home 
since coming to America. He was the twelfth Vietnamese and Amerasian foster son for 
Mary and Edwin Holter. Their home provided Minh a sense of familiarity and normalcy. 
Minh lived with other boys who spoke his language, understood his culture, and looked 
like him. One year later, Minh moved again to live with his newly emigrated mother and 
half-siblings in Utica, New York before relocating to San Jose, California where his 
family settled among the growing Vietnamese community. Although Minh’s assimilation 
was not the success story first anticipated, his journey became the impetus for new 
legislation that would affect the lives of tens of thousands of Amerasians still living in 
Vietnam.
698
  
Are you My Daddy?  
Mrazek had hoped that the bilateral cooperation needed to bring Minh to the 
United States could bridge the diplomatic gap enough to restart the ODP. Upon his 
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arrival in Vietnam to pick up Minh, Mrazek had already scheduled a meeting with 
Vietnamese officials to investigate such possibilities. Once there, however, he knew 
another discussion was also necessary. As Mrazek walked around the city, he noticed the 
dozens of Amerasian kids who had started following him. These were children, he 
remembers, who “stood out so starkly from what is a racially pure society, particularly 
the black Amerasians and those with clearly Caucasian eyes. They were surrounding me 
and talking about taking them to the land of their fathers.”699  
Mrazek’s experience with the Amerasians coincided with foreign visitors to Ho 
Chi Minh City after the war, but Mrazek was in a position to do something. After 
speaking with the children through his interpreter and discovering that they could not 
attend school and suffered discrimination within society because they were half-
American, Mrazek realized that Minh was just the first step.
700
 He had to provide a way 
for those Amerasians who wanted to come to the United States.
701
  
Although the Amerasians worked within the ODP, Mrazek believed he had to 
address their condition independent of it. The Reagan administration continued to fall 
short in its efforts to renegotiate the ODP with Vietnam. Neither side proved willing to 
fully cooperate pending tensions over MIA/POW, Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia, 
and the ODP backlog. However, the Amerasians were the children of American fathers. 
As a result, Mrazek hoped Americans would be more sympathetic to their cause. This 
was important at a time when the American public had begun to tire of the issues 
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surrounding Vietnam and immigration, when policymakers had narrowed the focus of the 
ODP to family reunification, and when many Americans believed that America had paid 
its debt for the war.
702
  
Mrazek found Vietnamese officials, including Foreign Minister Thach, favorable 
to his proposal that the Amerasians be treated separately. The United States, he 
suggested, would accept all of the Amerasians who wanted to come to America and 
would not classify them as refugees. The re-classification was critical for Vietnamese 
officials who continued to insist that Amerasians did not fit into the definition of refugee 
since they received the same treatment as all other Vietnamese citizens. It was, Mrazek 
claimed, “a sore point” for the Vietnamese who watched their former “agreement” with 
American officials in October of the previous year implode after the Reagan 
administration refused to bend on the issue.
703
 
Mrazek felt satisfied that he could get something done in Congress to this effect 
and he left Vietnam with Minh vowing to pass legislation that met the needs of the 
Amerasians. In his farewell to the congressman and the Amerasian boy, Thach 
exclaimed, “This time, Congressman Mrazek brings with him one Amerasian child. Next 
time, he will bring thousands of Amerasian children.”704 
The Politics of Policy 
 
 Three days before his untimely death, Representative Stewart McKinney, the co-
author of the AIA, introduced in the House H.R 2265, Amerasian Immigration 
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Amendments of 1987. The bill sought to address the limitations of the AIA that had 
rendered it largely useless.
705
 Clearly bothered by the ineffectiveness of his initial 
legislative efforts, McKinney quoted Pearl S. Buck when he described the Amerasians in 
Southeast Asia as “piteous, miserable, and hopeless,”  and called on Congress to 
reexamine the U.S. commitment to assist those who “by virtue of their American 
parentage, deserve a chance for a better life in the United States.”706 The bill failed to 
advance out of the Judiciary Committee and McKinney never had the chance to support 
or participate in passing Mrazek’s Amerasian Homecoming Act.707 He died on May 7, 
1987 after a prolonged and private battle with AIDS.
708
 
Unaware of the ineffective AIA or the efforts surrounding its passage five years 
earlier, Mrazek began creating his own Amerasian legislation. As had his predecessor in 
1981, Mrazek quickly found himself stonewalled by Ron Mazzoli, the Chairman of the 
Immigration Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee and Alan Simpson, 
Chairman of the Immigration Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee.
709
 Neither Simpson nor Mazzoli had any interest in taking on the Reagan 
administration which remained staunchly opposed to separating the Amerasians from the 
other points of contention with Vietnam, undercutting U.S. negotiations. In their view, by 
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treating the Amerasians separately, Mrazek took an area of negotiation off the table and 
diminished the opportunity to accomplish bigger goals.
710
  
But that was not Mrazek’s concern. He knew he had a very small window of 
opportunity in which to make change as he deemed it critical to the possibilities for a 
successful life in America. By 1987, the Amerasians were getting older. The average 
Amerasian was then already seventeen-years old, illiterate, with very little education and 
few job skills.
711
 Mrazek knew that such challenges would make assimilation into 
American society difficult. In addition, the older the Amerasians became, the less 
sympathetic their plight was to the American people who would likely be more moved by 
the fate of abused and begging children than homeless and unemployed adults.
712
 Mrazek 
knew that while the MIA/POW and ODP issues were important, legislation could take 
years and the Amerasians simply did not have that time. 
 Despite staunch resistance to his efforts, Mrazek authored what became the 
Amerasian Homecoming Act, a bill he hoped would both address the needs of the 
Amerasians and be acceptable to the Reagan administration.
713
 After creating the basic 
structure of the act, Mrazek addressed one of the core issues of opposition to the bill, the 
documentation needed to determine who was and who was not an Amerasian.  
Unlike its predecessor which depended on evidentiary proof through documents, 
Mrazek’s bill assumed that such documents did not exist and that for the Amerasians, 
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their evidence was “their face and skin color.”714 Even with the best of intentions in 
opening up the bill for all Amerasians in Vietnam, such evidentiary requirements would 
force American officials to categorize Amerasian applicants based on personal 
assumptions of what an American looked like. However given the absence of 
documented paternity, few other options existed. 
According to the bill, American personnel would interview each Amerasian 
individually to identify evidence of American paternity. If no documentation existed, the 
interviewers would rely on physical characteristics. Specifically, if their skin was black or 
their eyes were Caucasian, this could count as physical evidence of American paternity. 
Unlike the arguments surrounding the AIA regarding children fathered by non-American 
personnel in Vietnam, Mrazek argued that because of the large American presence during 
the war, it was only logical to assume that a non-Vietnamese father was American rather 
than Australian or a member of one of the other countries who had sent a few troops into 
Vietnam during the war.
715
 This assumption necessitated an American response to 
children shunned, abandoned, and denied basic rights because of how they looked. They 
were, Mrazek claimed, “a product of our being there.”716  
Likely informed by the challenges and failures experienced with the AIA and with 
issues that Minh now faced in his resettlement, Mrazek also expanded the immigration 
restrictions of the bill to allow Amerasians to bring their immediate family members with 
                                                 
714 Midyear Consultation on Refugee Programs FY 1987, Hearing, S136. Although the AIA did allow the consideration of physical 
appearance in determining the paternity of an Amerasian, officials depended largely on documentation over looks. In October 1982, 
the U.S. Director of the ODP, Donald I. Colin initiated a “short priority list” of groups that American officials deemed priority for the 
ODP. On that list, Colin identified “documented Amerasian children,” effectively limiting access to the ODP to those Amerasians 
with documented evidentiary proof of paternity.  The Amerasian Immigration Act, Public Law 97-359, 97th Cong., 2d sess., (Oct. 22, 
1982); Mrazek, interview. 
715 Mrazek, interview. 
716 Ibid. 
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them.
717
 In addition, he designated the Amerasians as immigrants but provided them with 
refugee benefits that included a mandatory six-month stay in the Philippines Refugee 
Processing Center for cultural and language training.
718
  
 Mrazek also seriously considered granting the Amerasians birthright citizenship. 
However, he knew that any attempt to award blanket citizenship would have ensured its 
failure. American policymakers and the Reagan administration deliberately used 
inclusionary rhetoric in their policies, defining the Amerasians as children of American 
citizens. But while U.S. policy “clearly recognized that Amerasians have a legitimate 
claim to live in the United States,” the administration ignored any opportunity to legally 
recognize them as Americans through birth-right citizenship.
719
  
Citizenship would effectively have solved the problem of the Amerasians by 
opening new channels to immigration and promising them the rights and protections of 
the U.S. Constitution. Additionally, citizenship possibly would have given Americans 
more reason to reestablish diplomatic relations with Vietnam to protect its new citizens. 
But the Amerasians were a foreign policy problem that the Reagan administration had 
little interest in solving. It continued to ignore the cultural and racial basis for the 
discrimination the Amerasians faced in Vietnam, instead insisting that such treatment for 
                                                 
717 “Amerasian Families and American Fathers; Considerations for Responses to Tracing Requests,” InterAction Amerasian 
Resettlement Program, folder 2 Amerasian Information, Report 1985-1987, Box 20,  Southeast Asia Resource Action Center records. 
MS-SEA004. Special Collections and Archives, The UC Irvine Libraries, Irvine, California. January 13, 2013; Robin S. Levi, 
“Legacies of War: The United States Obligation toward Amerasians,” in Mixed Race America and the Law, ed. Kevin R. Johnson 
(New York: New York University Press, 2003) 412-422.On September 11, 1984, the Reagan administration announced the expansion 
of the ODP to accept all Amerasian children and their qualifying family members. The result was an increase in the monthly departure 
rate from 182/month (Amerasians) to 319/month (Amerasians and family members). However by 1987 Congressional efforts to 
reduce the numbers of refugees entering the country resulted in the push for approved Amerasians to resettle in the United States and 
use the naturalization process to sponsor family members. 
718 Although the AHA designated the Amerasians “immigrants,” the funding for the program came from the Migration and Refugee 
Assistance fund and their admission numbers counted under the overall annual refugee ceiling for the ODP. Hearings before the 
Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees and International Law, “Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 1990,” 101st Cong., 1st sess., 
September 12 and 13, 1989, 159; Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Bill, 1989, House 
Committee on Appropriations, 100th Cong., 2d sess., May 19, 1988, 85. 
719 “Amerasian Resettlement Planning Committee Report,” March 14-15, 1988 and April 18-19, 1988, folder 1 Amerasian 
Resettlement Reports, 1988-1989, Box 1, Van Le files on Southeast Asian refugees. MS-SEA12. Special Collections and Archives, 
The UC Irvine Libraries, Irvine, California. January 13, 2013. 
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the half-American children was part of Vietnam’s anti-American agenda. By presenting it 
in such a way, the Reagan administration reinforced the Cold War narrative that Vietnam 
was America’s enemy. In refusing to negotiate on the Amerasian issue, grouping it with 
all the other topics of concern, the administration maintained its hard line against 
communism, never giving an inch, even relating to children.
720
  
By 1987, Reagan targeted Vietnam’s continued occupation of Cambodia for his 
anti-communist stance in Southeast Asia. In a June 1987 letter to Reagan, Secretary of 
Defense Frank Carlucci reminded the president that normalizing relations with Vietnam 
depended upon an acceptable Cambodian settlement that provided for the withdrawal of 
Vietnamese troops.
721
 The administration rejected increasing pressure from Congress to 
resolve the smaller issues—MIA/POW and Amerasians—between the two countries as 
grounds for reconciliation citing its commitment to a free and independent Cambodia and 
the Cambodian noncommunist resistance. Finding common ground with Vietnam, the 
administration claimed, “would be viewed as a signal of weakening American resolve to 
stay the course” in Cambodia and could have an adverse effect on those “smaller” issues 
of humanitarian concern.
722
  
Accordingly, the administration was clear that it had no interest in diplomatic 
relations or in making the Amerasian issue soluble. Key policymakers Simpson and 
Mazzoli also had no interest in taking on their party over such an issue.
723
 These kinds of 
choices infer that the Amerasians constituted nothing more than political pawns in a 
                                                 
720 As discussed in Chapter Four, Reagan’s determination to maintain a hard line with communism per Cold War politics dictated his 
foreign policy decisions including a commitment to a Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia.  
721 Letter, Frank C. Carlucci to Ronald Reagan, June 15, 1987, ID #480701,  CO172, WHORM: Amerasian Children, Ronald Reagan 
Library. 
722 Letter, J. Edward Fox to Dante B. Faschell, nd, ID #575191, CO172, WHORM: Amerasian Children, Ronald Reagan Library. 
723 Mrazek, interview. 
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game of Cold War politics.  Their half-American bodies and their poor living conditions 
in Vietnam promoted the evils of Vietnamese Communism. Mrazek understood these 
political layers, explaining that excluding citizenship from the bill was, “a pragmatic 
decision” to ensure it would pass. 724  
 Convinced that his bill fulfilled the immediate needs of the Amerasians and that it 
could pass Congress, Mrazek, and his co-sponsor Thomas Ridge submitted it to 
Mazzoli’s House Committee on the Judiciary. There, it languished for weeks before 
Mazzoli told Mrazek that the bill would receive no hearings.
725
 In its rejection of the bill 
the Judiciary Committee reasserted its firm commitment to the plight of the Amerasians 
but claimed that the potential for abuse in the bill outweighed the humanitarian concern 
of the legislation.
 726
 Additionally, the committee claimed, the ODP and AIA already 
existed to deal with this issue.  
Mrazek had a backup plan, however. Thanks to a political stalemate between 
Congress and Reagan over ideological differences, Congress planned to pass a continuing 
resolution at the end of the year to keep the government running. After gaining the 
necessary political support from his subcommittee and the appropriations committee, 
Mrazek inserted his Amerasian bill into the continuing resolution.
727
 
                                                 
724 Ibid. 
725 Robert Mrazek and John McCain introduced The Amerasian Homecoming Act (H.R. 3171/S1601) to the House and Senate 
respectively from which the bill went to committee on August 6, 1987. The Act provided for the admission as immigrants to the 
United States of Vietnamese Amerasians for a two year period, beginning 90 days after enactment. The Department of Justice rejected 
HR 171 on the grounds that the AIA and the ODP were sufficient for the immigration of Amerasians from Vietnam. Cong Rec., 100th 
Cong., 1st sess., August 6, 1987; Mrazek, interview;  Letter, John R. Bolton to Peter W. Rodino, November 10, 1987, ID #58021, 
CO172  and Letter, J.Edward Fox  to Peter W. Rodino Jr., October 13, 1987,  ID #555040, CO172, WHORM: Amerasian Children, 
Ronald Reagan Library. 
726 Letter, John R. Bolton to Peter W. Rodino, November 10, 1987, ID #58021, CO172  WHORM: Amerasian Children, Ronald 
Reagan Librar8 
727 The Amerasian Homecoming Act was introduced in the House as HR 35668 on October 28, 1987 with Thomas Ridge as co-
sponsor. Mrazek’s use of the appropriation committee for the AHA challenged the limits of the congressional committee system. 
While the appropriations committee decided the allocation of funds, the authorizing committee—the House of Foreign Affairs 
Committee in this case— was responsible for creating policy. According to Mrazek, because he did not have the cooperation of the 
authorization committee on the AHA, he took it upon himself to create policy, writing the bill and adding it to the continuing 
resolution. 
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When the bill appeared in the House as part of the appropriations bill, Mrazek 
faced harsh criticism from a furious Mazzoli who assailed a bill created by one member 
of the House that never had hearings and diverged from the policy standards for United 
States relations with Vietnam.
728
 However, Mazzoli could not remove the bill without 
rejecting the entire continuing resolution. The House approved it and sent it to the Senate. 
 In the Senate, Mrazek had an ally in Senator John McCain (R-AZ). McCain, a 
Vietnam War veteran and former Prisoner of War, was remarkably sensitive to the plight 
of the Amerasians and he held great influence in the Senate regarding all things 
concerning Vietnam. It was McCain who had introduced the initial bill to the Senate a 
few months earlier.
729
 With the support of McCain and committee chair Dave Obey (D-
WI), whom Mrazek credits for his savvy yet tough negotiation skills, the Homecoming 
Act successfully passed through the Senate and landed on Reagan’s desk as part of a 
1,194 page omnibus bill. Unable to remove the Homecoming Act from the legislation, 
Reagan had no choice but to sign it into law.  
Hope 
 The students at HHS must have been proud of their efforts. Not only had they 
succeeded in bringing Minh to the United States, their actions had been the catalyst for 
bi-lateral cooperation between two Cold War foes. They had, in essence, bridged the gap 
that had existed between the United States and Vietnam for over a decade. Although 
there was some frustration upon Minh’s arrival, that the media overlooked their 
                                                 
728 There was intense Congressional debate in the House surrounding the Congressional Resolution (CR) and specific criticism of the 
opportunity it provided to automatically pass bills without debate or discussion in the House or Senate. To read the specific debates 
see: Cong, Rec., 100th Cong., 1st sess., 1987, Vol. 153, pg. H10911. 
729 On August 6, 1987 McCain introduced S1601 in the Senate, the counterpart to Mrazek’s HR 3171, The Amerasian Homecoming 
Act. This bill failed to move past committee. 
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contribution and hard work for the sake of political headlines that highlighted Mrazek, 
the students appreciated the chance to make a real difference.
730
  
One wonders however if the students thought about Minh from their dormitories 
and classrooms at Penn State (Zach and Forte) and Stanford (Sandler). Perhaps they were 
proud of their role in Minh’s life and in the Homecoming Act or maybe guilty after 
hearing reports of the challenges Minh faced. By all accounts, there was little if any 
contact between the students and Minh ever again. Minh did not attend HHS and after 
moving out of the Kinneys’ home, he effectively disappeared from the halls of the school 
and the Long Island community. At Tara Scalia’s graduation in 1988, Minh existed only 
in a photograph scattered amidst many others under the “Homecoming” section in the 
HHS Yearbook. In 2000, Marlo Sandler, living only minutes from Minh’s home in San 
Jose, California, told Newsday that on her honeymoon trip to Vietnam, she saw numerous 
homeless Amerasians and she “thought about Minh the entire time.”731  
Within a year of his arrival in America, the poster child for the Homecoming Act 
had melted into the shadows of American society. Unable to pass the citizenship test, 
Minh continued to live the life of a refugee struggling with the challenges posed by 
limited language, education and job skills.
732
 However Minh remained adamant that he 
was better off in America than in Vietnam. In America, Minh exclaimed, “you have 
hope.”733  While Mrazek witnessed the obstacles that Minh continued to face, he too 
“hoped” that the Homecoming Act, even without the granting of citizenship, would 
benefit the Amerasians in Vietnam by bringing them to America. 
                                                 
730 Gail Ellen Daily, “Students Meet Minh” Newsday, nd. 
731 Michael Luo, “A Beggar No More” Newsday, July 9, 2000. 
732 Ibid.  
733 Ibid. 
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Although Minh’s immigration did help to bridge the gap between the United 
States and Vietnam, his case further complicated the contradiction in US law that claimed 
the Amerasians as American children for the purposes of immigration but rejected claims 
of citizenship. Vietnam emphasized Minh’s American looks and American paternity in 
insisting America bring him home. However American leaders, although captivated by 
Minh’s “familiar” face, focused on his urgent need for American medical care. Neither 
the students at HHS nor American policymakers ever discussed finding Minh’s father, 
legitimating him, or awarding him citizenship. Minh was not an American child he was 
an injured child whose medical condition was more evidence of the dangers of 
communism and whose survival depended on his immigration to the United States. By 
treating Minh as an individual and exceptional case of medical and humanitarian need 
rather than one of the tens of thousands Amerasians still living in Vietnam, American 
policymakers could avoid acknowledging national paternal responsibility.  
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CHAPTER 6 
"LIKE A HOME WITHOUT A ROOF” 
The Amerasian Homecoming Act went into effect on March 21, 1988, as a 
bilateral agreement between the United States and Vietnam.
734
 It provided a two-year 
window to allow all of the Amerasians and their family members still living in Vietnam 
to immigrate to the United States.
735
 Using the pre-existing structure of the ODP to 
commence immigration procedures, the AHA replaced the UN officials responsible for 
interviewing and approving applicants with U.S. State Department employees. America 
now directly decided which applicants had American fathers and could immigrate to the 
United States.
736
  
Under the AHA, Amerasians born in Vietnam between January 1, 1962, and 
January 1, 1976, and their immediate relatives approved for immigration received 
immigrant status as well as refugee benefits.
737
 Such assistance provided them with six-
months of language and culture training as well as medical care and settlement assistance 
through the Philippines Refugee Processing Center (PRPC) and the Amerasian 
Resettlement Program (ARP).
738
 Both sought to help ease the transition into American 
society and begin the process of assimilation. 
                                                 
734 Enacted on December 22, 1987, the AHA went into effect on March 21, 1988. 
735 The estimated numbers of Amerasians still living in Vietnam varied in the tens of thousands. As a result, the AHA avoided 
imposing numerical limitations, accepting all Amerasians from Vietnam who wanted to immigrate to the United States. Approvals 
however counted under the refugee admissions ceiling of the Orderly Departure Program and the Migration and Refugee Assistance 
fund financed the program. In both cases, there were safeguards put in place in case the numbers of applicants exceeded the ceiling or 
the costs earmarked for the program. Hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary, President’s Refugee Admissions Proposal Fiscal 
Year 1988, 100th Cong., 1st sess., September 23, 1987, 107; “Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs 
Appropriations Bill, 1989. House, Appropriations Committee, 100th Cong., 2d sess., May 19, 1988, 85. 
736 Under the AHA, American INS officers conducted personal interviews in Ho Chi Minh City, rather than relying on UN 
interviewers. After the initial interview, approved applicants traveled to Bangkok where US officials made a final decision before 
going to the airport where applicants would be subject to a final identity check prior to boarding a plane to the PRPC. (CHECK) 
737 The addition of refugee benefits was meant to ease the transition to the United States for Amerasians and their families. PL 202-
100, The Amerasian Homecoming Act, HR 3568, 100th Cong., 1st sess; Phillip James Mabry, “We’re Bringing Them Home”: 
Resettling Vietnamese Amerasians in the United States,” PhD Diss., University of Pittsburg, 1996, 22-26. 
738 The resettlement program emerged from a cooperative agreement with the American Council for Voluntary International Action, 
composed of 116 national voluntary resettlement organizations, and the Office of Refugee Resettlement for the purpose of supporting 
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The Amerasians who qualified for the AHA had by 1988 spent critical years 
growing up in Vietnam. The youngest was ten-years old when the AHA went into effect 
and the oldest twenty-six. Some even had families of their own.
739
  By the time they 
applied for the AHA, the majority of Amerasians had lived long enough to recognize 
their physical differences in Vietnam’s relatively homogenous society, and to internalize 
their marginalized status as bui doi. For many, poor education, poverty and their 
association with the war compounded their ostracism.
740
 In 1989, the California 
Department of Social Services declared that the most important concern for Amerasians 
is the “self-identity crisis”—the result of having spent a lifetime ostracized, taunted and 
ridiculed because of their appearance.
741
 However, for many Amerasians, the AHA 
transformed their appearance from a symbol of shame to one of pride. The more 
American they looked, the quicker their approval to immigrate to America. 
The Process 
The application process for the AHA was a bilateral affair. The Vietnamese 
government informed the population about the program. Amerasian applicants submitted 
                                                                                                                                                 
local community efforts to “enhance the services provided to Amerasians and their families.” Upon arrival at the PRPC, files for each 
Amerasian were sent to the Refugee Data Center in the US which placed them with one of the national resettlement agencies, 
nonprofit organizations with cooperative agreements with the Department of State. Upon their departure from the PRPC the 
resettlement agency assisted with placing the Amerasian and family either near relatives already in the United States or in one of the 
fifty-five cluster sites approved by the Department of Health and Human Services. U.S. General Accounting Office: Program 
Evaluation and Methodology Division, Initial Observation and Findings of Amerasian Homecoming Act, Report to Hon. Robert J. 
Mrazek and Hon. Thomas J. Ridge, November 16, 1992; US General Accounting Office, Vietnamese Amerasian Resettlement: 
Education, Employment, and Family Outcomes in the United States,” Report to Congressional Requesters, March 1994.  
739 According to the 1994 GAO report, eighty-eight percent of Amerasians who entered the United States through the AHA did so with 
families, usually parents and siblings. Four percent immigrated with spouses. Only twelve percent came to America alone. US GAO, 
Vietnamese Amerasian Resettlement, 32-34. 
740 A 1985 study found that while most Amerasians reported having an average of six years of education upon arrival at the PRPC, 
poverty was the biggest barrier to education for them in Vietnam. Ranard and Gilzow, “The Amerasians.” By 1994, a US GAO study 
determined that the dysfunctional family structure and poor educational backgrounds that Amerasians brought with them to the United 
States impeded their progress. Generally, the odds for Amerasians of having a low level education was four times that of their full 
Vietnamese siblings and thirteen times that of other Vietnamese. Black Amerasians had particularly high rates (eleven and thirty-nine 
times respectively). Vietnamese Amerasian Resettlement, March 1994, 3. Vietnamese associated Amerasians with poverty and 
assumed them both poor and uneducated. Valverde, “Doing the Mixed Race Dance,” in Williams-Leon and Nakashima, 132-135. 
741 “Amerasians’ Special Needs Report,” Department of Social Services, State of California Health and Welfare Agency, August 1989, 
folder 8, Box 1, Amerasian Records,  Saint Anselm’s Cross-Cultural Community Center records. MS-SEA027. Special Collections 
and Archives, The UC Irvine Libraries, Irvine, California. January 13, 2013. 
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petitions for an interview with American officials through their local Vietnamese 
authorities who then approved or rejected each request, forwarding the list of approved 
petitions to the ODP office in Bangkok, Thailand. ODP employees rechecked the list 
before creating applicant files and scheduling interviews. Approved applicants and their 
families then traveled to Ho Chi Minh City where teams of American authorities 
conducted the interviews. Applicants who passed the interview received a medical 
examination before departing for the PRPC, and applicants who failed, returned home.
742
  
Some American officials, like Representative Robert Mrazek, worried that the 
process excluded Amerasians who lived outside of the normal channels of 
communication or, due to low levels of education, lacked access to information about the 
program.
743
 Additionally, many Amerasians claimed that local Vietnamese officials 
deterred them from applying or required them to pay bribes just to submit the initial 
petition.
744
 In a 1992 review of the program, US officials found that in many of the rural 
and mountainous regions, only fifty percent of Amerasians had left through the AHA and 
that “not every Amerasian has been informed of the program and that even of those who 
are aware of it, not all have been able to move into the processing stream.”745  
However, for the tens of thousands of Amerasians who did apply, their fate rested 
largely in the hands of the American interviewer. As anticipated by Mrazek, most 
Amerasians lacked the necessary documentation to prove American paternity by blood, 
and had only their physical appearance—skin color, eye shape and hair—as evidence. 
                                                 
742 In many cases the rejection of applicants resulted from an unconvincing American appearance. Rejection rates increased from 
twenty to eighty-percent over the lifespan of the program as attempts by Vietnamese imposters to replicate “American” features such 
as skin color, hair and eyes and the presentation of real Amerasians with “fake” Vietnamese families infested the program.  Initial 
Observation and Findings of Amerasian Homecoming Act, November 16, 1992. 
743 Initial Observation and Findings of Amerasian Homecoming Act, November 16, 1992. 
744 Ibid., McKelvey, The Dust of Life; Bass, Vietnamerica. 
745 Initial Observation and Findings of Amerasian Homecoming Act, November 16, 1992. 
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Five years after the contentious debate in Congress regarding the AIA over evidentiary 
proof and “American” blood in which Representatives Barney Frank and Patricia 
Schroeder criticized the Reagan administration for rejecting the notion that the American 
looks of the Amerasians, made them American, the AHA did just that. According to an 
official of the American consulate in Vietnam, the AHA interview started and ended with 
“the most superficial of evaluations: a look at the applicant’s face. Anyone thought to 
look like an American is immediately approved, regardless of whether he or she has any 
supporting evidence.”746 
Although well intentioned, as it had been in Frank and Schroeder’s argument, the 
reliance on physical appearance in the AHA unintentionally made race hypervisible on 
the bodies of the Amerasians. It forced American interviewers to rely on racial 
stereotypes that cast Asians and Americans into two distinct and opposing categories that 
conflated race and nation. Interviewers charged with determining whether an applicant 
looked “American” or Asian relied on subjective notions of whiteness and blackness to 
determine paternity. Interviewers imposed racialized assumptions of what the presumed 
“American” father looked like by inspecting the features of the Amerasians in search of 
“American blood.”747  In justifying the denial of an applicant, one American interviewer 
explained, “‘the child’s physical appearance does not support Caucasian parentage.’”748 
Often, the racial mixture of the Amerasian challenged the limits of whiteness and 
blackness as racial rationale for approving an applicant. Amerasians with Asian 
American, Latino, and Native American fathers—non-white and non-black—proved 
                                                 
746 Wall Street Journal, 28 Feb 2002. 
747 Mabry, “We’re Bringing Them Home,” 33. 
748 Memorandum, Colin Powell to President Ronald Reagan, April 19, 1988, ID #541476SS, IM 541476, WHORM: Subject File, 
Ronald Reagan Library. 
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difficult to identify. In considering the paternity of an Amerasian who claimed to have a 
Hawaiian father, one American official admitted the difficulty in defining an “American 
look.” In such cases, he explained, and for this applicant, his “future hangs on whether an 
olive-skinned kid with black hair and eyes is going to pass for being half-Hawaiian.”749 
There appears to have been little formal protocol regarding how an interviewer 
should make a determination of paternity in such cases.
750
 US State Department 
employees like Alice Krupnick sometimes found it impossible to fit the Amerasian 
mixture cleanly into a racial category and sought advice from colleagues. During the 
interview of one Amerasian boy whose obscure paternity confounded her, Krupnick 
marched the child into the offices of each of her colleagues seeking advice.
751
 One 
interviewer exclaimed, “‘I can’t put my finger on it, but there’s something different about 
his face,’” while another stated, “‘That kid is pure Vietnamese through and through. He’s 
just weird looking!’”752 
In many ways the racialization of Amerasians into American and Asian categories 
exposed America’s complicated relationship with mixed-race populations and the 
confusion over how to categorize them. On one hand the reliance on racially familiar 
attributes as evidence of paternity presented an inverted application of blood quantum, 
previously used to identify mixed-race persons in America for the purpose of exclusion. 
During the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, the non-white blood of persons of 
white-non-white mixtures relegated them to the racial status of their non-white parent, 
                                                 
749 Bass, Vietnamerica, 6; Jana K. Lipman, “The Face is the Road Map:’ Vietnamese Amerasians in U.S. Political and Popular 
Culture, 1980-1988,” Journal of Asian American Studies (February 2011), 58. 
750 Lipman, “The Face is the Road Map,” 58-60. 
751 Alison Krupnick, “The Benefit of the Doubt,” Harvard Review 28 (2005), 51. 
752 Yoon, “Reproducing Citizens,” 88. Although Yoon does not address the issue, the identification process appears reminiscent of 
American slave auctions in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. There is potential for further comparative work. 
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thus restricting their access to citizenship rights or the privileges of whiteness.
753
 
However, identifying “American blood” in the Amerasians was a tool of inclusion that 
conflated race and nation by elevating the Amerasians to the “racial” status of their 
American father and awarding them access to immigration rights. Amerasians who 
looked least like Asians and most like white or black Americans were, for the purposes of 
the AHA, Americans.
754
  
However for those Amerasians whose physical appearance was less distinctly 
black or white or whose fathers were non-black or non-white Americans, the hyper-
reliance on race was also a tool of exclusion. Without clear physical evidence of 
biological filiation with an American father, interviewers denied valid Amerasian 
applicants.
755
 In each instance, American interviewers relied on preconceived subjective 
notions of what an American looked like to make their decision. A seemingly impossible 
task in a “nation of immigrants” and considering the demographic composition of the 
American populace and one that forced interviewers to revert to colonialist 
interpretations of “us” American and “them” Asian.756 For Americans, one historian 
emphasized, “thinking about Orientals has always been thinking about what it means to 
be American.”757 This proved true for AHA interviewers. 
                                                 
753 In the 1896 Supreme Court Case of Plessy v. Ferguson, the Court used blood quantum to classify plaintiff Homer Plessy as 
“colored” because he was seven-eighths Caucasian ancestry and one-eighth African ancestry. Such classification was critical to the 
ruling of separate but equal in the case. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 541 (1896). Pascoe, What Comes Naturally; Lise 
Funderburg, Black, White, Other: Biracial Americans Talk about Race and Identity; Root, “Within, Between and Beyond Race” in 
Racially Mixed People in America. 
754 Diana Yoon argues that the rationales used to evaluate the Amerasians for the AHA functioned similarly to racial requirements for 
naturalization in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In both cases, race conditioned the access to rights and privileges. Yoon,  
“Reproducing Citizens,”89. 
755 Initial Observation and Findings of Amerasian Homecoming Act, November 16, 1992; Krupnick, “The Benefit of the Doubt.”  
756 Said, Orientalism; Yu, Thinking, Oriental, 7.  Yu argues that America’s infatuation with Asians as both a racial “problem” and a 
racial “solution”(referring to the model minority stereotype that emerged in the second half of the twentieth-century) is rooted in an 
inability to reconcile the two. For further discussion of American immigration policies towards Asian see Tichenor, Dividing Lines. 
For further explanation of the connection between race, racism, and racialization and war between America and Japan see Dower, War 
Without Mercy. 
757 Yu, Thinking, Orientals, 190. 
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From Dust to Gold 
During the first two years of the AHA, the approval rate for the program was a 
perfect one-hundred percent.
 758
 Interviewers like Krupnick worked to fulfill Mrazek’s 
expectations of inclusion for all Amerasians and their family members who wanted to 
leave Vietnam. Initially most interviewers seemed to reflect Krupnicks’ general 
philosophy that their purpose was to right a wrong that the U.S. government had 
committed by not previously taking responsibility for the Amerasians.
759
 But the success 
of the program brought unintended side effects that soured interviewers responsible for 
deciding who could come to America.
760
 
 By the time the AHA began in 1988, American media coverage and the 
inclusionary language of the legislation had convinced the American public that 
Amerasians were “American” children, promoting a sympathetic narrative of their 
hardships. Accompanying such stories were the photographs of Amerasians with distinct 
“Caucasian” and Afro-Asian features holding pictures of their American GI fathers.761 
However, the AHA also persuaded Amerasians that they were American children, 
introducing a new sense of pride and value to a population previously marginalized as 
“children of dust.”  
As a result some Amerasians gained a new found sense of pride in their 
Americanness. According to one Amerasian woman, after learning about the AHA, “I 
became more familiar with America when I learned that my father was American. I 
                                                 
758 Initial Observation and Findings of Amerasian Homecoming Act, November 16, 1992, 56. 
759 Krupnick, “The Benefit of the Doubt,” 46-58; Yoon, “Reproducing Citizens,” 86. 
760 Anis, “Psychosocial Adjustment of Vietnamese Amerasians,” 53. 
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  199 
thought it was a noble land and my fatherland.” Another Amerasian explained that the 
AHA, “gave me hope for a better future.”762  
The perception that America had finally accepted the Amerasians as “American” 
made them attractive to full-blooded Vietnamese who now viewed them as a ticket to 
America. Amerasians became popular targets for pretend friends, guardians, and family 
members.  Lacking financial resources to travel to Ho Chi Minh City for the interviews or 
pay the bribes to Vietnamese officials, many Amerasians accepted fake families and 
forced marriages.
763
 Tyler Chau Pritchard, an Amerasian who emigrated in 1991 
explained the shift:  “suddenly everyone in Vietnam loved us. It was like we were 
walking on clouds. We were their meal ticket, and people offered a lot of money to 
Amerasians willing to claim them as mothers and grandparents and siblings.’”764 Twenty-
year old Amerasian Trinh revealed that before the AHA, many Vietnamese treated 
Amerasians “‘like dogs in the street’” but after the AHA “‘we began living like rich 
people. People can pay as much as two thousand dollars, to buy an Amerasian.’”765 
Because Amerasians needed their paperwork processed and approved by 
Vietnamese authorities to qualify for an interview, corruption abounded. Amerasians 
often had to bribe Vietnamese officials to get their names on the interview list. One 
Vietnamese girl claimed: “we paid ten thousand dong per name to register and three 
hundred thousand dong to get a passport for the family. They ‘lost’ our names, and we 
                                                 
762 Amerasian online survey by author, April 1, 2011, https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/Amerasianresearch. 
763 Initial Observation and Findings of Amerasian Homecoming Act, November 16, 1992. According to Bass, the motivations for 
many included guilt, money, family obligations, blackmail and fear of crossing the ocean alone. Bass, Vietnamerica, 125. 
764 Lamb, "Children of the Vietnam War." 
765 Bass, Vietnamerica, 129. 
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had to pay more bribes. Then we had to pay more money to the translator at the interview 
site, the fat woman dripping with gold.”766 
Although the average annual per capita income in Vietnam during the period was 
only $230, a 1992 evaluation found that the cost for Amerasians to apply for the AHA, 
ranged from $50 to $5000 dollars, with an average cost of $350.
767
 In addition, because 
the typical American interviewer had undergone only one year of language training, 
largely insufficient in preparing them to interview applicants, they often relied on 
translators supplied by the Vietnamese government to communicate with applicants.
768
 
For hopeful candidates this meant yet another bribe to ensure that translators 
communicated correctly.
769
  
The façade of many fake families promising to care for and love their 
“Amerasian” children in exchange for a ticket to America confused Amerasians 
searching for acceptance and belonging. All too often, Amerasians found themselves 
abandoned once they departed Vietnam, after the relationship with their bogus families 
deteriorated.
770
 Twenty-four year old Amerasian, Phuong emphasized: “‘When we were 
in Vietnam, being interviewed, they [fake family] were very nice to me, sure. But now 
that we are here [PRPC], they don’t need me anymore. They treat me like dirt…they 
                                                 
766 Ibid., 128. 
767 Initial Observation and Findings of Amerasian Homecoming Act, November 16, 1992. 
768 Ibid; Krupnick, ‘The Benefit of the Doubt.” 
769  In the 1992 review of the AHA, US officials reported that some Amerasians complained that Vietnamese interpreters manipulated 
the interview outcome. If paid a proper bribe, interpreters coached applicants on how to answer the interview questions and translated 
their responses favorably. As rejection rates increased with the program by 1990, valid Amerasians reportedly paid for such services 
to increase their chances of acceptance. Initial Observation and Findings of Amerasian Homecoming Act, November 16, 1992, 8; 
Mabry, “We’re Bringing Them Home,” 34. 
770 Debonis, Children of the Enemy,12. For further discussion of fraud within the Amerasian Homecoming Act see Bemak and Chung, 
“Psychosocial Adjustment” and Bass, Vietnamerica. Both works further expose that at the PRPC and in America, fake families, 
termed “buyers” by Bemak and Chung, often abandoned the Amerasians leaving them to fend for themselves. 
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insult me, berate me, the daughters even have attacked me. They loved the Amerasian 
when they need to leave Vietnam, but now they despise us.’”771 
Amerasians feared the discovery of phony families. If exposed during the 
interview process, fraud disqualified Amerasians from participating in the program.
772
 If 
unveiled in the PRPC, Amerasians risked permanent residency in the PRPC camps.
773
 If 
uncovered in the United States, Amerasians found themselves ineligible for their refugee 
benefits and status. Furthermore, the immigration of fake families disqualified 
Amerasians from bringing their real families to the United States.
774
 One person 
highlighted the consequences for one Amerasian who reported his fake mother to the 
authorities: 
Minh will become a secondary migrant cut loose from refugee center 
benefits, housing allowances, schooling, and welfare. He will become a 
criminal liable to expulsion from the United States, and he will be 
disqualified from sponsoring for immigration any of his real family 
members. His fake mother will get the apartment, food stamps, cash 
assistance, Medicare, ESL, and sympathy for having raised a ‘no good’ 
Amerasian.
775
 
 
Early on, the issue of sham families and Amerasians complicated the 
humanitarianism behind the AHA. As the program progressed, the interview of the 
applicant and accompanying family proved critical in exposing fraud. Interviewers 
subjected Amerasians and their family members to a series of simple questions, 
sometimes separating family members to test for accuracy. If the stories corresponded, 
                                                 
771 Debonis, Children of the Enemy, 12. 
772 Vietnamese Amerasian Resettlement, March 1994, 3. 
773 “Administrative hold,”—the delaying or cancelling of departure for the United States— was the ultimate sanction in the PRPC for 
those who violated camp rules, failed to complete the work requirements, were suspected of criminal behavior, or who had certain 
medical conditions including pregnancy and mental illness. Additionally the Philippine military units that provided camp security at 
the PRPC operated the “monkey house,” jails in which they could hold refugees without charges or hearings indefinitely. This too, 
was used to punish those refugees accused or suspected of crimes, political subversion or breaking camp rules. James Tollefson, Alien 
Winds: The Reeducation of America’s Indochinese Refugees (New York, Praeger, 1989), 130-133. 
774 Initial Observation and Findings of Amerasian Homecoming Act, November 16, 1992. 
775 Bass, Vietnamerica, 126.  
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interviewers like Krupnick looked for subjective signs of family life—physical 
resemblances and genuine familial affection.
776
 Even in cases where an interviewer 
suspected fraud, according to Krupnick, the Amerasians were often reluctant to reveal the 
crime, likely fearing it would hinder their own chances of approval to America.
777
 
The Interviewers 
With so much subjectivity, the backgrounds and perceptions of the interviewers 
were critical. According to a 1990 Government review of the program, the training and 
experience of American interviewers included knowledge of refugee processing 
procedures, an understanding of the conditions in Vietnam and Southeast Asia, and an 
average of over eighteen years of service with the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS).
778
  
In reality, however, interviewers ranged from Foreign Service officers who 
worked and lived in Vietnam and had Vietnamese spouses to those with no previous 
foreign experience whose backgrounds were in the INS border patrol.
779
 Additionally, 
while most interviewers received a year of Vietnamese language training, US officials 
admitted that it was not enough to enable them to discern different accents, dialects and 
customs of the Vietnamese people which forced them to depend on interpreters supplied 
by the Vietnamese government to interview applicants.
780
 Interviewers also understood 
the dangers inherent in their inability to communicate directly to applicants and knew that 
                                                 
776 Krupnick, “The Benefit of the Doubt,” 52. 
777 Ibid. During her time as an interviewer, Krupnick  claims that only once in four years, did an Amerasian confess that the foster 
family accompanying him to the interview, was fake.  
778 Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law, The Orderly Departure Program From Vietnam, 101st Cong., 2d 
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interpreters could manipulate the outcome in exchange for a fee.
781
 However there was 
not much they could do to alleviate the situation. Instead, interviewers tended to place 
greater emphasis on the part of the interview they could control—whether or not the 
applicant “looked” American.782  
During the initial implementation of the AHA, twenty-seven year old Krupnik, 
“fresh” from her year of intensive Vietnamese language training, joined other 
interviewers who also embraced the mission of the program to allow any Amerasians 
who willingly wanted to come to the United States.
783
 On her interview team were Bill, a 
former USAID employee in Vietnam, and Bob, a Vietnam veteran. Both men had a 
personal investment in the AHA, having married Vietnamese women and fathered 
Amerasian children.
784
 Krupnik noted the concern that Bill and Bob expressed for the 
Amerasians they interviewed and the care they showed the Amerasians on the streets who 
thrust scraps of paper at them asking for help finding their fathers and going to 
America.
785
 
Other members of the team included INS officers who Krupnick explained did not 
have any previous connection to Vietnam and did not speak the language.
786
 Unlike Bill 
and Bob, these interviewers ignored the Amerasians on the streets, brushing away their 
outreached hands and the scraps of paper. “My initial impression, Krupnik explains, “is 
that they are xenophobic good ole boys, replete with cowboy boots and suitcases full of 
                                                 
781 Ibid. 8. 
782 Ibid. Vietnamese officials reported that the rejection rates of ODP interviewers varied from sixty to ninety-percent. US officials 
believed that one factor in the inconsistency was the reliance on Vietnamese interpreters.  
783 Krupnik, “The Benefit of the Doubt,” 46. 
784 Ibid., 47. 
785 Ibid. 
786 Ibid. 
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American snack food.”787 Still, during the first two years of the program, most of the 
interviewers optimistically set about their task. Focusing on the humanitarian opportunity 
of the AHA to alleviate the tragic condition of the Amerasians, interviewers approved 
every applicant in the initial period.
788
 
Having underestimated the numbers of Amerasians still remaining in Vietnam, 
however, policymakers extended the program indefinitely before it expired in March 
1990.
789
 During this period, the initial optimism of the interviewers along with the 
excitement of the American public waned. Interviewers became increasingly intolerant of 
the growing amounts of fraud and corruption and many experienced burn out. For some, 
their intolerance exposed the anger and hurt leftover from the war. For others, their 
frustrations exposed underlying perceptions that the Amerasians were inferior and the 
offspring of prostitutes.
790
 Even Krupnik admitted that after two years, “little by little I 
stop being quite as naïve, quite as curious, quite as engaged. I stop being quite as 
compassionate, quite as unbiased. I am tired. Tired of the caseload; tired of the fraud, 
tired of the policy changes.”791 
                                                 
787 Ibid. 
788 During the first two years of the program, the approval rates for Amerasian applicants to the ODP were 100% and matched the high 
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show a credible basis for that fear. Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees and International Law, The Orderly Departure Program 
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In the second phase of the program, the approval rate plummeted to eighty percent 
in 1991 and twenty percent in 1992.
 792
 The numbers reflect the inconsistency that existed 
among the interviewers. While one interviewer accepted sixty-five percent of the cases, 
another accepted only thirty-five percent.”793 Over time, more interviewers shifted from 
the initial philosophy that even in questionable cases the Amerasian received the benefit 
of the doubt, to a more conservative approach that, “’I assume fraud in every case I 
see.’”794   
Consequently, the once liberal interpretations of their application of the concept 
“looks American,” now diligently tried to fit the faces of Amerasians into a more 
conventional version of what an “American” looked like. Understandably, many 
narrowed the kinds of physical characteristics that determined whether an applicant 
looked “white enough” or “black enough” to justify a claim of American paternity.795 
Specifically, interviewers became wary of “distinguishing features that could be 
mimicked by a non-Amerasian Vietnamese.”796 Interviewers, already dependent upon 
certain racial characteristics to approve applicants, now found those features in question. 
Skin color and hair texture were no longer clear indicators of American paternity as 
interviewers wondered if applicants who “looked” American had lightened or darkened 
their skin, dyed their hair color, manufactured afros or surgically widened their eyes.
797
 
                                                 
792 Initial Observation and Findings of Amerasian Homecoming Act, November 16, 1992, 56. 
793 Mabry, “We’re Bringing Them Home,” 34-35. 
794 Bass, Vietnamerica, 55. 
795 For further discussion on racial categorization during the ODP interviews see Yoon,“Reproducing Citizens,”89; DeMonaco, 
“Disorderly Departure,” and Mabry, “We’re Bringing Them Home,” 33. 
796 Initial Observation and Findings of Amerasian Homecoming Act, November 16, 1992, 7. 
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With all of the traditional markers of Americanness compromised, one exasperated 
interviewer exclaimed, “‘usually we rely on freckles for proof.’”798  
With such complications now surrounding subjective assumptions of race, how 
interviewers perceived and understood the Amerasian issue became paramount to 
decision-making. Unfortunately for the Amerasians, and reflected in the plummeting 
acceptance rates, by 1991 an overwhelming sense of cynicism replaced the optimism that 
had defined the first two years. Even interviewers who had Vietnamese spouses or 
Amerasian children began to view the applicants differently. For example, the ODP 
colleagues of American interviewer Robert McMahan, a father of two Amerasian 
children, surprisingly described him as “‘heartless’” in his dealings with Amerasian 
applicants. McMahan later admitted although his own children were Amerasians, as an 
interviewer, “‘I used to avoid contact with Amerasians’” stating “‘I thought their mothers 
were a bunch of whores.’”799  
Other interviewers expressed their discontent with the program in general, 
reviving concerns of an immigrant “invasion.” One female interviewer aptly nicknamed 
Nyetnik by the AHA applicants for her boorish manners felt very strongly that the AHA 
was a mistake by the United States. Nyetnik revived many of the anxieties surrounding 
Cuban leader Fidel Castro’s decision to send Cuban criminals to America in the Mariel 
Boatlift and the lingering concerns about the social and economic toll of immigration on 
America. She claimed that through the AHA, Vietnam “‘scrapes up its social riffraff, its 
schizophrenics, and criminals, and sends them to America. We’re watering down our 
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799 Bass, Vietnamerica, 26. 
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gene pool with Amerasian mental cases. We’re flooding the social welfare system with 
fake families.’”800  
American interviewers during this period also revealed racialized stereotypes that 
may have influenced their subjectivity. Some believed Amerasian children had criminal 
and negative behavior predilections. McMahan described the Amerasians as “part of an 
unruly subset of society, ‘willful,’ ‘stubborn,’ ‘unfocused,’ ‘they have no discipline.’”801 
Others, like Bill McCabe, director of the Buck Foundation in the Philippines and another 
father of Amerasians, revived the common wartime stereotype of the “sneaky” Asian. 
McCabe described his own children as having “‘manipulative, complex, divided 
personalities. They can look me right in the eye and lie.’”802 
As pressure mounted regarding the fraud and corruption, interviewers 
increasingly collaborated on their cases, often consulting with each other over the 
physical appearance of an applicant. The general rule amongst interviewers was that it 
took three no’s to deny an applicant and one yes for acceptance.803 In discussing the 
appearance of one applicant with a colleague, Krupnick describes, “together we discuss 
the boy’s characteristics in front of him and the family being interviewed. ‘The eyes look 
round and seem to be a shade of brown.’”804 Although the process itself proved 
humiliating for the Amerasians, without documentation, their physical features remained 
                                                 
800 Ibid., 54.  The word Nyetnik means “naysayer” in Russian. Bass reports that this particular interviewer reminded the Amerasians of 
the boorish manner of the Russians they had encountered. Such views may have been a response by recent changes to US refugee 
policy in 1988—liberalization of emigration from the Soviet Union, resumption of the Mariel Migration Agreement with Cuba and the 
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801 Bass Vietnamerica, 27. 
802 Ibid., According to Robert Lee Asians in America have historically been cast as economic, social and sexual threats. Assumptions 
of “deviance” remain central to the image of the Asian as pollutant, coolie, yellow peril, model minority and gook. Such stereotypes 
portrayed Asians as alien threats to the American nation and family and contribute to the constantly changing definition of who the 
“real Americans” are in terms of class, gender, race, and sexuality. Thus, the “sneaky” Asian reinforced fears that Asians in America 
in the post-Vietnam War era, continued to threaten American unity and remained the “enemy” as scapegoats for America’s economic 
decline and the psychic trauma of the war. Lee, Orientals, 8-9, 190. 
803 Wall Street Journal, 28 February 2002. 
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their only chance for approval.
805
 However, as deception became more common, the 
interviewers struggled to pinpoint American paternity on looks that they now suspected 
were fraudulent. The declining approval rates by 1991 reflected the increasing hesitation 
and doubt of the interviewers. 
PRPC 
 Once approved for the AHA, Amerasians and their families departed Vietnam for 
the Philippines Refugee Processing Center on the Bataan peninsula where they joined 
other Vietnamese refugees for six-months of language and culture training before 
resettlement in the United States.
806
 The camp consisted of ten “neighborhoods” which 
each housed about 1,700 refugees.
807
 American social service and resettlement 
organizations like the Indochina Resource Action Center (IRAC), Lutheran Immigration 
and Refugee Services (LIRS) and the International Catholic Migration Commission 
(ICMC) initially supported the mandatory six-month requirement, viewing it as “a good 
taxpayer investment” that helped Amerasians efficiently assimilate into a “productive 
role in American society.”808  
 The PRPC sought to prepare all Southeast Asian refugees for membership in the 
American community and to initiate the process of “becoming” American through 
                                                 
805 Yoon, “Reproducing Citizens,” 88. 
806 Although the AHA designated the Amerasians “immigrants” from Vietnam, they remained under the auspices of annual refugee 
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assimilation and by “equipping them to be self-reliant.”809 The US State Department 
believed that a three-prong approach to basic literacy and cultural skills--English as a 
Second Language instruction, Cultural Orientation, and Work Orientation—would allow 
refugees to function effectively in American society. Classes emphasized life skills that 
focused on the adoption of proper social and economic behaviors, and taught refugees 
what they must do in America rather than what they must know.
810
 Lessons focused on 
teaching refugees how to function in society; emphasizing specific and practical tasks 
like balancing a checkbook, filling out job applications, how to flush toilets, where to 
apply for welfare, and how to light a gas stove.
811
 Language lessons incorporated 
seventeen different competency areas ranging from banking and clarification to 
directions, time and, shopping.
812
  
To alleviate concerns that the refugees might become economic burdens on 
American taxpayers through unemployment or dependency on welfare, the mission of the 
assimilation process at the PRPC was economic self-sufficiency.
813
 Thus, the PRPC 
curriculum taught refugees that “good” Americans worked hard and paid their own bills. 
Classes, curriculum, and staff members discouraged welfare dependency by constantly 
reminding residents that “‘most Americans think that people who stay on welfare are 
lazy,’” and that “‘upward mobility is very possible for people who work hard.’”814  
                                                 
809 The PRPC opened in 1980 initially housing Southeast Asian refugees immigrating to various first asylum countries. However by 
1989, the PRPC was used almost exclusively by the United States. Yoon, “Reproducing Citizens,” 106-112. Tollefson, Alien Winds, 
xvii. 
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By the time refugees departed the PRPC for the United States, they understood 
the message: good immigrants will start at the bottom and accept their subservient 
position and minimum wage job.  However, through hard work and perseverance, they 
would prosper.
815
 Upon leaving the PRPC, residents received a Statement of 
Understanding that reiterated the objectives of the training program:  
Shortly you will be arriving in the United States as a refugee. You will be 
sponsored and assisted by one of the Voluntary Resettlement Agencies. 
The goal of sponsorship is to bring you to economic self-sufficiency as 
quickly as possible usually through employment. The purpose is to help 
yourself.
816
 
 
By 1989, criticisms of the PRPC began to emerge with reports of the dangerous 
and crowded conditions.
817
 In his 1989 book Alien Winds, English professor James 
Tollefson who spent sixteen months in refugee camps in Southeast Asia, including 
working for the ICMC’s teacher education unit at the PRPC, criticized the training 
programs for transforming refugees into American subjects rather than citizens. Tollefson 
compared the PRPC assimilation process with the early twentieth-century 
Americanization movement that sought the rapid assimilation of certain kinds of 
immigrants by requiring them to completely replace their traditional cultures and 
behaviors with proper American ones.
818
 
It paralleled the efforts of politicians like Senator Alan Simpson and Colorado 
Governor Richard Lamm who promoted assimilation as a tool of exclusion for 
                                                 
815 Scholar Mary McGroarty studied the ESL textbooks for immigrants during the 20th century and compared the PRPC curriculum via 
textbooks with the preceding Americanization programs. Tollefson, Alien Winds, 58. 
816 Mabry, “We’re Bringing Them Home,” 49. 
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Them Home,” 40. 
818 The Americanization movement emerged from the 1911 Dillingham Commission Report that recommended restrictive immigration 
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immigrants arriving in the United States.  Both revived the model of the Americanization 
movement, fearing the growing “threat” immigrants posed to America.819 Lamm claimed 
the country, “‘can accept additional immigrants, but we must be sure they become 
American.”820  Assimilation, Simpson argued, was “‘fundamental to American public 
values and institutions’” and those who do not adapt may “‘create in America some of the 
same social political and economic problems which existed in the country which they 
have chosen to depart.’”821 
According to Tollefson, the PRPC failed to promote civic or political 
responsibility, thus failing to prepare refugees to become contributing members of 
American society and potentially American citizens.
822
 Rather, the camps promoted the 
message of economic responsibility—self-sufficiency and the myth of upward mobility—
teaching refugees only how to participate in the American economy as workers and 
consumers.   
                                                 
819 The threat of the “unassimilable” immigrant was the focus of much nativist discourse and immigration policy during the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries. Matthew Frye Jacobsen posits that the 1790 Naturalization Law which limited citizenship to “free white 
persons” established the precedent of exclusion against different groups of immigrants including “white” Europeans. The ability or 
inability of a group to assimilate became justification for exclusion. Leaders combined the term “fitness for self-government” with 
assumptions of racial inferiority to determine whether or not a specific group could immigrate. Matthew Frye Jacobson, Whiteness of 
a Different Color: European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999). Gary Gerstle argues 
President Teddy Roosevelt viewed immigration and race mixing as a benefit to the nation as long as it progressed the American race 
as both white and European. Roosevelt framed his views in assumptions of assimilable and un-assimilable immigrants. “True 
Americanism” was the ability of immigrants to fully embrace, assimilate and become American. The conflict between an expansive 
American civil nationalist creed that promotes equality irrespective of race, ethnicity, and nationality and the support and promotion of 
racial inequality is evident in the disciplining of those who refused to assimilate or whose presence “threatened” the welfare of the 
nation. Attacks and nativist sentiments against “non-assimilating” immigrants emerge specifically during times of perceived national 
crisis. Gary Gerstle, American Crucible: Race and Nation in the Twentieth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). 
Henry Yu examines the effects of assimilation theory and Robert Park’s “marginal man” theory on Asians in America. Yu argues that 
even after attempts to assimilate appropriately, the geographic distance and cultural difference of Asians frames them as “permanent 
outsiders” in America. Yu, Thinking Orientals. For further discussion see Tichenor, Dividing Lines; Roger Daniels, Coming to 
America: A History of Immigration and Ethnicity in American Life (New York: Harper Perennial, 1991); Frederick E. Hoxie, A Final 
Promise: The Campaign to Assimilate the Indians, 1880-1920 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2001). 
820 Hing, Making and Remaking Asian America Through Immigration Policy, 8. 
821 Ibid., 7. 
822 Tollefson argues that rather than teaching civic responsibility—traditional citizenship--as a goal of assimilation that prepared 
newcomers to participate politically as fully-functioning American citizens, the PRPC taught functional citizenship in which 
newcomers were taught how to participate in the American economy as workers and consumers. Tollefson, Alien Winds, 57. 
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Refugees learned that the keys to success in America were: willingness to learn, 
ability to follow orders, and dependability.
823
 English language curriculum emphasized 
the language of subservience, and according to Tollefson, “they are taught how to ask for 
permission, but not how to give orders; how to apologize, but not how to disagree, how to 
comply, but not how to complain.”824 They are exposed only to low-income jobs in 
factories and on assembly lines, and, “periodically, representatives of McDonald’s and 
Mister Donut set up simulated fast food counters to teach them how to work behind a 
cash register.”825 Tollefson accused the PRPC of only equipping refugees to work 
minimum-wage jobs, ensuring they did not have the skills or tools to compete with 
working-class or middle-class Americans or have access to upward mobility.
826
  
Although Tollefson’s critiques did not focus specifically on the Amerasians who 
composed thirty to forty-percent of the population in the camp by 1989, many other 
evaluations of the PRPC did. A 1988 review prepared for AHA co-sponsor Thomas 
Ridge and specific to the Amerasian experience contradicted Tollefson’s critiques, 
reporting that the education provided at the PRPC on democracy, capitalism, leadership 
and citizenship benefitted Amerasians.
827
 According to the report, the PRPC made “their 
                                                 
823 Yoon,”Reproducing Citizens,” 116 
824 Tollefson, Alien Winds, 75.  
825 Keith B. Richburg, “Philippines Camp Help Prepare Asian Refugees for Life in US, The Washington Post, March 26, 1988. 
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Tollefson’s ‘Alien Winds: The Reeducation of America’s Indochinese Refugees’ and Elsa Auerbach’s Review. Two Readers React” 
Teachers of English to Speakers of Other Languages, Inc., 24, no. 3 (Autumn, 1990): 529-541, accessed March 23, 2015, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3587246; Kirk J. Felsman, “Alien Winds: The Reeducation of America’s Indochinese Refugees,” Journal 
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827 “Implementing the Amerasian Homecoming Act,” October 12, 1989, folder 2, Box 1, Amerasian Resettlement Reports, 1989-1993, 
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[Amerasians] assimilation into a productive role in American society,” quicker and 
easier.
828
  
Despite all the efforts at education and training, camp life was difficult for many 
Amerasians. Their favored status as “children of gold” disappeared upon entering the 
PRPC where their American ties no longer protected them from abuse or 
marginalization.
829
 Amerasians in the camp experienced mistreatment from their 
Vietnamese peers and fake families that no longer needed to maintain the façade of 
loving kinship now that they had their ticket to America.  
Additionally, many Amerasians faced confusion over their “identity.” Deemed 
American children by the AHA, and admitted to the United States as immigrants, the 
requirement that the Amerasians had to attend the PRPC as refugees, confused many.
830
 
Once again victims of a contradictory American policy of inclusion—immigrant children 
of American citizens—and exclusion—refugees that had to become American—many 
Amerasians experienced an identity divergence and the distress associated with continued 
rejection.
831
 There was no special curriculum, treatment, or acknowledgement of the 
Amerasians as children of American fathers. They faced the same experience as all other 
camp refugees and any discussions of paternity occurred in the offices of camp 
counselors.
832
 In fact, Amerasians were the primary clients of the counseling units at the 
                                                 
828 Ibid. 
829 Philip Mabry suggests that PRPC camp and resettlement workers initially often exhibited a heightened sense of compassion 
towards the Amerasians in the camp, shocked by their “western” looks. However such reactions did not compromise the ways in 
which they treated the Amerasians, especially after reconciling their looks with their behaviors. As one camp worker recounted the 
confusion, the Amerasians embody “‘Vietnamese mannerisms in American bodies.’” Mabry, “We’re Bringing Them Home,” 232-
235.  
830 Yoon, “Reproducing Citizens,” 106. 
831 Bemak and Chung, “Vietnamese Amerasians: Psychosocial Adjustment and Psychotherapy,” 79-88. 
832 Yoon, “Reproducting Citizens,” 120-121. It was common for American resettlement organizations to collect mental health data on 
the Amerasian residents at the PRPC in efforts to better serve them once they arrived in the United States. Overtime, there was 
increased focus on the Amerasian “problem cases” and an emphasis on psychosocial assessments as resettlement workers sought to 
address the potential for hostility, violence, and depression from Amerasian newcomers. Amerasian Resetlement dissertation, 43-46. 
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PRPC.
833
 Stories of suicides and deep-rooted depression became commonplace among 
the Amerasians. According to Fred Bemak, a mental health expert enlisted by the 
National Institute for Mental Health to determine what had gone wrong, "we'd never seen 
anything like this with any refugee group."
834
 
Counselors and other PRPC and resettlement workers did not associate the 
struggles of the Amerasians with fatherlessness as much as they blamed it on their 
mixtures and the treatment they had faced in Vietnam. In an effort to determine how best 
to assist the Amerasians in the resettlement process, the Amerasian Resettlement Program 
provided its assessment of the identity issues facing Amerasians: “the issue of Amerasian 
self-identity is perhaps at the core of their problems, having both Vietnamese and 
American blood.”835  
PRPC authorities suggested that in addition to the problems inherent in the 
Amerasian blood mixture, the poverty, discrimination, and persecution that Amerasians 
faced in Vietnam meant they would be more inclined to join gangs and abuse drugs than 
other refugee populations.
836
 Eventually, PRPC authorities and resettlement workers 
assumed all Amerasians were victims of trauma, abuse, and psychic wounds that resulted 
in mental health disorders, developmental delays, inadequate socialization, low self-
esteem, problematic sexual behavior, violence, and confused personal identity.
837
 Camp 
                                                 
833 Yoon, “Reproducing Citizens,” 121. 
834 In a 1991-1992 study, Bemak found that fourteen-percent of Amerasians who resettled in the United States attempted suicide. 
Lamb, "Children of the Vietnam War.” 
835 Mabry, “We’re Bringing them Home,” 242. 
836 Consequently, some Amerasians in the PRPC did join gangs, engaged in crime, faced arrest, and exhibited mental health 
challenges, all acts that sometimes delayed or suspended their departure to the United States. DeBonis, 6; Bemak and Chung, 
“Vietnamese Amerasians: Psychosocial Adjustment and Psychotherapy.” 
837 Yoon, 120; In 1990 reports y the Indochinese Community Center in Washington, DC identified  newly arriving Amerasians from 
Vietnam as the highest risk group for AIDS. The reported determined that this group was most likely to participate in unsafe sex, 
unlikely to receive medical care or education because of the language barrier and poverty. Amerasian women were sexually active 
earlier than other Vietnamese and high rates of teen pregnancy, low self-esteem that the reported stated motivated sex for acceptance 
and love and led to lives of prostitution and drugs. Amerasian men were also identified as most likely to visit prostitutes and to 
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administrators, teachers, and social workers often profiled Amerasians as “maladjusted 
young adults” with “special needs” who “posed challenges for teachers, camp 
administrators, and social workers.”838 
Concerned about the contradictory treatment of the Amerasians and the reports of 
violence, abuse, and mental health issues in the camp, the Vietnam Veterans of America 
Foundation (VVAF) undertook its own investigation in 1989. The critical question for the 
VVAF centered on whether or not Amerasians, as children of American fathers, should 
have to transition through the PRPC.
839
 According to the VVAF, the problem with having 
Amerasians at the PRPC was they were not refugees. Vietnam did not accept that label 
and the AHA designated them as immigrants. To the VVAF, the United States had a 
national responsibility to them “that outweighs the standing commitment that America 
has toward the world’s refugees. The Amerasians are truly our own.”840  
As American children, the VVAF argued, the PRPC did more harm than good. It 
unnecessarily forced the Amerasians to “postpone their long overdue arrival in the U.S.,” 
requiring them to live in “atrocious conditions, where there is insufficient food and water, 
where they are crowded into billets constructed with asbestos, with people unrelated or 
known to them, and where their daily lives are regulated by coercion and fears.”841 The 
biggest tragedy, they asserted, was that Amerasians who processed through the camp and 
immigrated to the United States maintained the same disadvantaged status they held in 
                                                                                                                                                 
update Attachment B, folder 26 Center for Southeast Asian Refugee Resettlement, Organization Materials, Box 20, Southeast Asia 
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838 Yoon, “Reproducing Citizens,” 120. 
839 “Report on the Amerasian Issue,” Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation, August 1989, VVAF Washington, DC., folder 42, 
Report on the Amerasian Issue, 1989, Box 1, Van Le files on Southeast Asian refugees. MS-SEA12. Special Collections and 
Archives, The UC Irvine Libraries, Irvine, California. January 13, 2013.  
840 Ibid. 
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Vietnam.
842
 Thus, rather than transforming the Amerasians into Americans as the PRPC 
proposed, the experience degraded them and reduced them from the children of 
Americans into refugees. 
Such assertions, by the most politically powerful Vietnam veterans organization 
in the country, was both powerful and compelling. The recognition by the VVAF of 
American paternity and national responsibility exposed the problematic contradiction in 
US policy regarding the official status of the Amerasians as immigrants or refugees. As 
Amerasians departed the PRPC for their new lives in America, the concerns of Tollefson 
and the VVAF proved painfully true.  
American Dust 
By 1991, there were many unintended consequences that undermined the good 
intentions of Mrazek and his supporters. Issues of fraud and corruption and problems 
within the PRPC cast a negative light over a program that tried to address American 
failures. Additionally, those Amerasians who arrived in America often found a much 
different reality than imagined. After years of marginalization and ridicule in Vietnam, 
many Amerasians expected acceptance, a notion reinforced by the inclusionary language 
of the AHA.
843
 However in reality, most Amerasians discover neither.  A major problem 
remained.  A 1989 study by the Office of Refugee Resettlement found that only thirty-
two percent of Amerasians entering the United States had any information about their 
                                                 
842 The VVAF incorporated Tollefson’s critique into their assessment arguing that the PRPC did not prepare Amerasians for the 
opportunities in America but rather only reinforced their position of powerlessness in society, preparing them to be subjects rather 
than citizens and resettling them in America’s urban ghettos.  “Report on the Amerasian Issue,” Vietnam Veterans of America 
Foundation, August 1989, VVAF Washington, DC., folder 42, Report on the Amerasian Issue, 1989, Box 1, Van Le files on Southeast 
Asian refugees. MS-SEA12. Special Collections and Archives, The UC Irvine Libraries, Irvine, California. January 13, 2013. 
843 Amerasians’ Special Needs Report, August 1989, Department. of Social Services, State of California Health and Welfare Agency, 
folder 8 Saint Anselm’s Amerasian Records, Box 1,  Saint Anselm’s Cross-Cultural Community Center records. MS-SEA027. Special 
Collections and Archives, The UC Irvine Libraries, Irvine, California. January 13, 2013; Bemak and Chung, “Vietnamese Amerasians: 
Psychosocial Adjustment and Psychotherapy,” 79-88; Robin S. Levi, “Legacies of War: The United States’ Obligation toward 
Amerasians,” in Johnson, 421. 
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American fathers and ninety-eight percent of attempts to locate fathers were 
unproductive.
844
  
Additionally, as foreigners in American society and culture, the anticipated 
acceptance eluded the Amerasians.
845
 While many Americans mistook Amerasians for 
native born Americans, once their language difficulties or cultural differences surfaced, 
Amerasians encountered marginalization and exclusion. In 1988, the California 
Department of Social Services warned Americans against assumptions of racial 
familiarity.
846
 It was important, officials explained, “to remember that the appearance of 
the Amerasians will fool many people into believing that they are native Americans 
which can cause conflict and confusion.”847  
Many recognized the problems.  U.S. State Department employee Kyle Horst 
explained, “Just because Amerasians have blond hair or afros, we expect them to act like 
Americans. But it’s a myth that these are ‘our’ kids. They are Vietnamese. We’re not 
bringing them home. We’re taking them to a foreign country.”848 A 1989 report by the 
State Department reiterated Horst’s claim stating, the Amerasians “are not ‘our kids’ and 
                                                 
844 Studies found that the number of Amerasians who wanted to reunite with their American fathers ranged from 25 to 54% and that 
only a small percentage of those actually searched for their father. Bemak and Chung, “Vietnamese Amerasians. A number of private 
organizations offered assistance in the reunification/tracing of potential fathers including: the Veterans Administration Regional 
Service Centers.  “Vietnamese Amerasians: Practical Implications of Current Research, Office of Refugee Resettlement, 1989” 
Amerasian Families and American Fathers; Considerations for Responses to Tracing Requests, developed by InterAction Amerasian 
Resettlement Program, folder 2, Box 20, Amerasians Information, Reports, 1985-1987, Southeast Asia Resource Action Center 
records. MS-SEA004. Special Collections and Archives, The UC Irvine Libraries, Irvine, California. January 13, 2013;  Request for 
completion of survey  to evaluate outcomes of AHA, Director, St. Anselm’s Immigrant & Refugee Community Center,, March 8, 
1993, Folder 44 Saint Anselm’s Amerasian Records, Box 1, Saint Anselm’s Cross-Cultural Community Center records. MS-SEA027. 
Special Collections and Archives, The UC Irvine Libraries, Irvine, California. January 13, 2013. 
845 Amerasians’ Special Needs Report, August 1989, Department. of Social Services, State of California Health and Welfare Agency, 
folder 8 Saint Anselm’s Amerasian Records, Box 1,  Saint Anselm’s Cross-Cultural Community Center records. MS-SEA027. Special 
Collections and Archives, The UC Irvine Libraries, Irvine, California. January 13, 2013. 
846 By 1988, forty-six percent of all refugees arriving in the United States settled in California, including more than five-thousand 
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they aren’t ‘coming home’—they are Vietnamese young adults coming to a new and 
unfamiliar land for which their American genes offer no special preparation.”849 Even 
Amerasians themselves felt the divide, “‘When I was in Vietnam’” one Amerasian 
described, “‘I felt more American because of how I looked. But when I came here 
[America], I felt more Vietnamese. My language, the food I eat, the way I think, the way 
I do—it’s Vietnamese.’”850 
Black Amerasians specifically faced difficulty in overcoming the assumption by 
Americans that skin color equated to a shared racial kinship with African Americans. 
Missing was the common heritage, culture, and history. Some black Amerasians sought 
to create that bond by educating themselves on black culture and history. Likewise 
certain American resettlement services made genuine efforts to familiarize black 
Amerasians with “their” black heritage through the incorporation of black history into the 
curriculum.
851
 In some cases American workers educated black Amerasians on hair care 
and personal grooming in hopes of easing the transition into their impending racial 
identity.
 852 
 However, the efforts had limited success. 
For example, in Phoenix, many black Amerasians joined black street gangs in 
their efforts to find racial acceptance.
853
 Others, like black Amerasian Kien, admitted 
that, once in America, he tried to become African American by imitating black people, “I 
                                                 
849 Ranard and Gilzow, “The Amerasians,” 6. 
850 Ibid. 
851 New York Times, November 16, 1992. 
852 Mabry, “We’re Bringing Them Home,” 246. Mabry argues that although race and racial discrimination did exist in Vietnam and 
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talk how they talk, I’m a good imitator.”854 Largely however, the attempts to fit them into 
American racial categories failed.  
Furthermore, within Vietnamese-American communities—the only place that 
provided some kind of cultural familiarity, Amerasians encountered the same prejudice 
that they had faced in Vietnam.
855
 Even in America their physical appearance prevented 
them blending into the Vietnamese-American community which continued to label them 
poor, uneducated, and illegitimate children of prostitutes.
856
  A 1993 survey by the 
General Accounting Office found that ninety-five percent of Amerasians who immigrated 
to the United States under the AHA, experienced discrimination in the Vietnamese-
American community as opposed to twenty-percent from American communities.
857
 
In particular, black Amerasians faced harsher responses. The same survey found 
one-hundred percent of black Amerasians experienced discrimination from the 
Vietnamese American community.
858
 Many Vietnamese-Americans associated African 
Americans with racial stereotypes of crime and homelessness.
859
Although black 
Amerasian Lee Dong admitted that being around black people in America made him feel 
like he had a father he also believed that full-blooded Vietnamese did not like him 
because he was black, stating, “they look at me like I’m ugly.”860 In the words of one 
                                                 
854 Ibid. 
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black Amerasian, “I heard in Vietnam that black people [in America] were slaves, I 
didn’t want to be a slave.”861 
Thus, the AHA complicated the issue of race and racial acceptance in America for 
all Amerasians. The reliance on racial rationale by American interviewers to determine 
which applicants “looked” American formally designated approved Amerasians the 
children of American fathers. Their “race” proved their biological filiation and the 
inclusionary rhetoric of the AHA embraced them, welcoming the Amerasians “home” to 
the land of their fathers. Selected Amerasians wore their new American identity with 
pride. It had transformed them from “children of dust” to “children of gold” among their 
Vietnamese peers. Yet, their identity did not translate to the PRPC, where Amerasians 
became refugees, or to the United States where they resettled alongside other refugees 
and where they remained foreigners in a strange land.  
Compassion Fatigue 
By the end of the Reagan era, much of the interest in the Amerasians dissipated a 
shift that psychologist Robert McKelvey attributed to “compassion fatigue.”862  
Americans turned their attention from immigration to the end of the Cold War, 
normalizing relations with Vietnam, and reconciling their feelings about the Vietnam 
War.
863
 The end of the Cold War removed any national interest in providing a safe haven 
for Vietnam’s refugees and immigrants from the evils of communism. Furthermore, the 
demoralization of AHA interviewers and their increasing intolerance for the Amerasian 
                                                 
861 New York Times, November 16, 1992. For more on black Amerasians racial assimilation and identity see Williams, Teresa Kay and 
Michael C. Thornton, “Social Construction of Ethnicity Versus Personal Experience: The Case of Afro-Amerasians.” 
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plight, spread to the United States where resettlement services lacked resources to deal 
with fake families and abandoned Amerasians. In 1995, Joseph Love, a volunteer at St. 
Anselm’s Cross-Cultural Community Center in Garden Grove, California, one of the 
resettlement sites for Amerasians, estimated that 30,000 fake Amerasians and fraudulent 
families lived in the United States, leading to disenchantment with the process.
864
 
Such criticisms disappointed Mrazek who began wondering about the merits of 
the AHA. In addition to the public exposés, Mrazek received annual reports about the 
program, revealing the proliferation of fraud, corruption, and fake families. Reports of 
many Amerasians getting into trouble also surfaced.  Most Amerasians in the United 
States struggled to assimilate. Many faced unsurmountable challenges because they were 
illiterate and older, making the integration into American schools, jobs, and society 
difficult.
865
 More troubling for Mrazek were the reports that only two percent of 
Amerasians had “found” their fathers. There was, Mrazek claims, “a lack of 
responsibility” in that number from men who he guessed, “had gone on with their lives, it 
was disappointing.”866 
By 1994, the flow of Amerasians through the AHA drastically subsided and the 
PRPC shut down.
867
 The program peaked in 1992 when 18,500 Amerasians and their 
families entered the United States.  However that number dropped significantly to 3,500 
in 1994.
868
 Still, over time, the AHA had facilitated the immigration of sixty-nine 
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thousand Amerasians and their accompanying family members to the United States and 
over the next three years an additional nineteen hundred would immigrate before the 
program fizzled out.
869
 There are no reliable statistics on the number of Amerasians that 
eventually became naturalized citizens since Amerasians appear to fall under the annual 
numbers for Vietnamese nationals—an accounting oversight that depicts the complexities 
posed by all mixed-race populations in America.
870
  
However, despite the difficulty of the process, some Amerasians never attained 
US citizenship because they mistakenly believed that approval for the AHA had 
automatically conferred citizenship or because they believed it impossible to pass the 
citizenship test considering their lack of education and language.  
Thus, most Amerasians remain unaware of their citizenship status unless legal 
issues arise. In 1996, the Immigration and Naturalization Service initiated deportation 
procedures against Amerasian Dung Van Chau convicted of two crimes in the United 
States and subject to deportation to Vietnam because he lacked citizenship.
871
 Chau 
appealed the deportation to the Ninth Circuit US Court of Appeals on the grounds that he 
had immigrated to the United States in 1984 under the AIA and had U.S. citizenship.
872
 
The provisions of the AIA, Chau insisted, conferred citizenship by classifying its 
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872 Chau v. INS, 247 F.3d 1026,1027 (9th Cir. 2001).  
  223 
beneficiaries as children of US citizens.
873
 The court demanded proof of paternity. Chau, 
a permanent resident of the United States since 1987 introduced evidence—the testimony 
of his mother Mai Chau— that his father was an African American soldier stationed in 
Vietnam. However, he did not know his father’s identity.874  
The Court argued that because the AIA did not intend to grant citizenship, and 
Chau was born in Vietnam, there was a “presumption of alienage.”875 The court 
transferred the case back to the US District Court of Arizona which argued that Chau 
could not establish citizenship because he did not know the exact identity of his father.
876
 
In 2006 the Department of Homeland Security ruled that Chau had not proven that his 
father was a US citizen—“no evidence exists that a man who appears to be a US 
serviceman must necessarily be one,” and “service in the United States armed forces does 
not confer citizenship on a serviceman.”877 Therefore, Chau was not an American citizen 
but an alien, and subject to deportation back to Vietnam.
878
  
Like a Home Without A Roof  
Chau’s case highlights the fundamentally exclusionary nature of US Amerasian 
policy. In their efforts to accept some responsibility policymakers failed to address the 
issue of individual or military obligation or to reconcile the Amerasian mixture with US 
law. The AIA and the AHA sent conflicting messages to the Amerasians in Vietnam. 
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Both acts utilized an inclusionary rhetoric that defined the Amerasians as the children of 
American fathers but denied in practice formal membership by failing to award 
citizenship. The exclusion reflects important gaps in US laws and in the continued 
struggle that Americans have with issues of race and nation.  
Unwilling to expose the love relationships and sexual indiscretions of individual 
American fathers who policymakers agreed might be psychologically damaged by having 
a half-Asian child show up on their doorstep, the AIA and the AHA reinforced and 
repeated a well-known practice in America of “othering” the Amerasians, protecting the 
American “us” from the foreign “them.” Both acts in the contradictory discourse and 
policy reflected an inability by policymakers to incorporate mixtures of race and nation 
and inability to consider that perhaps “us” is “them.” 
The problem remains.  There is a saying in Vietnam that “children without a 
father are like a home without a roof.”879 Almost thirty years removed from the AHA, the 
Amerasians continue to suffer the consequences of fatherlessness and the absence of 
citizenship. In 2003 California Democratic Congresswoman Zoe Lofgren who 
represented San Jose where a large Amerasian population resided by 2003, proposed H.R 
3360, the Amerasian Naturalization Act which would have conferred the Amerasians 
from Vietnam automatic U.S. citizenship as the sons and daughters of US citizens.
880
 In 
2007 and 2012 Lofgren introduced H.R. 5156, the Amerasian Paternity Recognition Act 
which would provide automatic US citizenship to Amerasians born during the Vietnam 
and Korean Wars.
881
  
                                                 
879 Lamb, "Children of the Vietnam War.” 
880 In 2003 Lofgren introduced HR 3360, in 2005 she announced the same bill, now HR 2684, The Amerasian Naturalization Act. 
881 Lofgren initially proposed The Amerasian Paternity Recognition Act in 2007 as H.R. 4007 and again in 2012. The Amerasian 
Paternity Recognition Act, April 27, 2012, Zoe Lofgren, HR 5156, 112th Cong., 2d sess. 
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Each bill proposed to confer birth-right citizenship to Amerasians who had legally 
entered the United States through the AHA, the AIA, or the ODP as well as those 
remaining in Vietnam if they wanted to immigrate. Lofgren promoted her bills with a 
familiar discourse pointing to the poor conditions the Amerasians faced in Vietnam, 
“these individuals lived through devastation during the Vietnam War and have been 
mistreated by the Vietnamese government because of their mixed race;” and the 
undeniable US paternal responsibility, “There is no doubt that they are the sons and 
daughters of American fathers. That determination was made when the US government 
invited these individuals to come to the United States to live.”882 Lofgren also pointed to 
the necessity of closure, “It is time to finally close a chapter in our history that has too 
long denied Amerasians the opportunity to be recognized as the American citizens they 
are.”883 Sharing the fate of the initial attempts of her long-gone predecessor Stewart 
McKinney, in each case Lofgren’s bills failed to make it out of committee.884 
Consequences of War 
The ongoing struggle remained for many despite the best efforts of their allies.  
Shortly after his celebrity as the poster child of the AHA faded, most Americans forgot 
Le Van Minh. By 1989, people dismissed him as a “troubled” child whose inability to 
assimilate to the structures of America’s schools and families became an all too familiar 
stereotype of Amerasians. It is possible that over time Minh recognized the irony of his 
                                                 
882 “Lofgren Introduces Citizenship Bill for Children Born in Vietnam to American Servicemen and Vietnam” Press Release, Oct 22, 
2003. http://lofgren.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=365962 (accessed January 1, 2015). 
883 “Lofgren Introduces Citizenship Bill for Children Born in Vietnam to American Servicemen and Vietnam” Press Release, Oct 22, 
2003. http://lofgren.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=365962 (accessed January 1, 2015). 
884 In 2012 HR 5156 failed to advance past the Judiciary Committee on Immigration and Border Security. 
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situation, “rescued” by a country without even asking, yet denied birth-right 
citizenship.
885
  
Now, at the age of 44, Minh lives in a two-bedroom house in San Jose, California 
with his Vietnamese wife and two children.
886
 With very little education and forced to 
use crutches and a wheelchair to get around his home, a result of the polio that ravaged 
his body as a child, Minh makes a living distributing newspapers from the window of his 
car. In 2000, Minh admitted that he had failed his attempts to pass the US citizenship test 
since his immigration.
887
 In 2009, the Amerasian Fellowship Association held its regional 
banquet in San Jose, California to celebrate the achievements of the Amerasian 
immigrant community. Absent from the affair was Minh, who lived fifteen minutes away.  
In fact, event organizers admitted they never heard his story.
888
 Still, when asked about 
his past life and whether or not he felt he had been given a fair shake, Minh explained he 
doesn’t think much about his former life in Vietnam and responded “‘Fair? Oh, 
absolutely, yes. I’m not angry at anyone.’”889 
                                                 
885 Exact numbers of the Amerasian population in the United States at any given time vary greatly depending on the source. This is 
likely a result of error allowed for fraudulent reporting. 
886 Michael Luo, “A Beggar No More,” Newsday, July 9, 2000. 
887 Ibid. 
888 David Lamb, "Children of the Vietnam War." 
889 Ibid. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
 ‘Into this tiny knot, though tied two worlds”- Pearl S. Buck890 
 
In the post-Vietnam War era, the efforts made by policymakers, humanitarian 
organizations and individual advocates on behalf of the Amerasians of Vietnam were 
complicated and conflicted. The inclusionary discourse of both the AIA and the AHA 
offered the Amerasians an acknowledgement of a biological kinship, a paternal filiation, 
and a home to belong. However, it did so under the geopolitical context of the Cold War 
and the humanitarian framework of a war the United States did not win. Policymakers 
failed to extend that discourse into acts of inclusion and award citizenship to children 
now deemed “sons and daughters of American citizens.” Such neglect exposed the 
inability of policymakers to overcome a history in the United States of assumptions of 
racial inferiority and exclusion against people of Asian descent. In Vietnam such notions 
lay in the initial colonial encounters, ideology, and discourse that arguably framed US 
foreign relations. Policymakers, unable to reconcile the American features and faces of 
the Amerasians with their Asian foreignness, took a contradictory stance—recognizing 
American children, but legislating them as Asian and therefore foreign. 
The plight of the Amerasians highlights the problematic existence of mixed-race 
persons in America. In the post-civil rights era many assumed that fears of miscegenation 
and a reliance on blood quantum existed only in the crevices of a racist American past. 
Yet the physical appearance of the Amerasians reminded policymakers that the “racial 
                                                 
890 As quoted in Pear S. Buck, East Wind: West Wind (John Day Co., 1930). 
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moment” persisted.891 In the tradition of the Asian experience in America, race remained 
a marker of difference that also determined nationality. Since the first Asians entered 
America in the mid-nineteenth century, US laws consistently viewed Asians in the 
framework of Orientalism and the East-West binary. Race and nation signified racial 
difference and geographic distance. If Americans were racially familiar and America was 
“us,” than Asians were racially foreign and Asia was “them.”892 
The Amerasian mixture however complicated the conflation of race and nation by 
blurring the lines of distinction. They were simultaneously racially foreign and familiar 
and geographically distant(mother) and near(father).Although it was clear per US law 
that legally, the Amerasians were not American citizens, the physical appearance of most 
Amerasians called the law into question. Opponents adopted a discourse of legal 
exclusion claiming that without evidence of paternity, Amerasians were the children of 
Asian mothers. Advocates embraced an inclusionary discourse and effectively “fit” the 
appearance of many Amerasians into the American racial taxonomy as proof of paternity.   
In both cases, policymakers failed to account for the actual mixtures and extend 
their discourse beyond the clear-cut delineations of race and nation. The Amerasians 
were not independently Asian or American, they were both. Such an acknowledgement is 
critical considering that America is a nation of immigrants in which an Asian American 
could serve in Vietnam and father an Amerasian child. However policymakers proved 
incapable of integrating the Amerasian mixture into US law. Unable to reconcile such a 
mixture of race and nation policymakers initiated a contradictory approach that 
                                                 
891 Spickard describes the racial moment as “the critical juncture in relationships between people when they come to see each other, 
and are seen by outsiders, as fundamentally, essentially immutably different from one another.”891 Spickard, “Race and Nation, 
Identity and Power,” 8. 
892 The East and West were cultural polarities defined by geographic distance and racial difference. Said, Orientalism.  
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simultaneously employed an inclusionary discourse that deemed the Amerasians worthy 
of American attention, guidance and humanitarian aid, and implemented exclusionary 
policies that designated them unfit for the responsibilities of American citizenship. 
Although per US law the Amerasians were not citizens. The fact that 
policymakers sought to break from the tradition of ignoring the illegitimate children of 
American fathers born abroad is telling and speaks specifically to the impact of the 
Vietnam War. The Amerasians presented an opportunity for Americans consumed by the 
guilt and the enormous sense of loss from the war for redemption and to rewrite the war 
narrative from military defeat to humanitarian victory. Their faces were evidence of 
America’s presence in Vietnam, the injustice of American intervention and perhaps the 
immorality of its soldiers. As America had invaded, destroyed and abandoned its South 
Vietnam ally, so too had America inflicted the same damage on its people. Like South 
Vietnam, America had also abandoned its children.   
 Still, accepting paternal responsibility proved challenging in the Cold War era. In 
the aftermath of the American defeat in Vietnam, President Reagan sought to rectify 
America’s military and humanitarian image. First by rewriting the war as a “noble cause” 
and redefining Vietnam veterans as American patriots and heroes and second, by stoking 
the flames of the Cold War narrative that posed the  “good” United States against the 
“bad” communist nations of the world—the Soviet Union and Vietnam. Evidence of 
American virtue was the quest to retrieve its missing American soldiers and prisoners and 
its efforts to “save” the Amerasian children. Within this context, the Amerasians became 
valuable tools of Cold War propaganda and the administration’s anti-communist agenda.  
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Thus, the Reagan administration had little interest in actually addressing the 
Amerasian issue during the height of the Cold War. Additionally, no policymakers called 
for individual fathers to take responsibility for their children and none besides Pat 
Schroeder proposed to address the actual root of the problem. Between the passage of the 
AIA in 1982 and the AHA in 1987, the Amerasians joined the MIA/POWs and 
reeducation camp prisoners as evidence of communist cruelty and as effective bargaining 
chips in the never-ending negotiations for diplomatic relations.  Had it not been for the 
photograph of Le Van Minh and the efforts of the students at Huntington High School 
and Congressman Robert Mrazek to bring Minh to the United States and pass the 
Amerasian Homecoming Act, any semblance of national responsibility for the 
Amerasians may have been lost with the suspension of the ODP the previous year. 
The evolution of the Amerasian issue among American policymakers is critical to 
issues of race, nation, and war. While the sex-based distinction embedded in US 
immigration and citizenship law protects America from the responsibilities of caring for 
fatherless, foreign-born children, the guilt associated with the Vietnam War demanded it. 
Americans could not ignore the familiar faces of the Amerasians but could not fully 
embrace them either. Over time America distanced itself from the Vietnam War and from 
the Amerasians who became just another refugee population with refugee problems.
893
 
As the population aged, the arguments by Amerasian advocates for citizenship faded as 
did any chance for national paternal responsibility or legal recognition of acceptance and 
belonging. The efforts of Congressional leaders like Pat Schroeder, Barney Frank, 
Stewart McKinney, Jeremiah Denton and Robert Mrazek succeeded in bringing attention 
                                                 
893 Vietnamese Amerasian Resettlement, March 1994. 
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to the Amerasian issue, the sex-based distinction in US law, and in providing a path for 
immigration for tens of thousands of Amerasians. However, their efforts failed to create 
real change. 
Thus notions of race and nation continue to shape the incessant reliance on the 
sex-based discrimination in US immigration and citizenship laws that permits individual 
American men to impregnate foreign women without any concern of paternal 
accountability or parental responsibility. When considered in the context of the large US 
military presence abroad, these laws, along with the unwillingness of policymakers to 
address such behavior and perhaps risk exposing the US military and US servicemen to 
public criticism, justify the irresponsible sexual choices of tens of thousands of American 
men who continue to create illegitimate children globally.  
Amerasians in a Transnational World 
The Amerasian issue is important and relevant. Although fraught with numerous 
other issues, the Amerasian case in Vietnam very much illustrates the problematic 
relationship between citizenship and membership, what the reproduction of American 
citizenship looks like, and the gendered legal assumptions of filiation and parental 
responsibility embedded in US citizenship law. The problematic application of racialized 
policies that have historically served to exclude “mixed” populations from membership 
become more complicated when the mixing was not just of race but of national borders. 
The decision of policymakers to exclude citizenship from the AIA and AHA was 
legal, and arguably reflected the legacy in America of exclusionary policies against 
people of Asian descent. Thus the recognition of belonging embedded in the inclusionary 
discourse surrounding the legislation reveals a deeper consideration. While the 
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Amerasians never received jus sanguini citizenship, the discourse of inclusion 
surrounding the AIA and the AHA revealed an underlying intention to recognize that 
they did indeed belong in and to America, but only within certain limits.  
Such assertions of conditional membership and citizenship have modern-day 
applications at a time when debates over immigration and race are fraught with tension 
and with the increasingly interracial, transnational, and border-crossing nature of the 
modern world. The War on Terror, America’s new “Vietnam,” has produced millions of 
refugees from the Middle East, an estimated four million from Syria alone.
894
 Concerns 
that terrorists exist among those fleeing the war-torn regions and that the US government 
“‘cannot allow the refugee process to become a backdoor for jihadists,’” have incited a 
backlash against some Muslim communities and caused many to question what it means 
to be an American and what an American looks like.
895
  Additionally, the estimated 
80,000 unaccompanied child migrants from Central America and Mexico, and the 1.4 
million DREAMers—children brought to the United States illegally by their parents—
continue to force Americans to reconsider how America defines and awards 
citizenship.
896
 The implications in both cases reveal the ideological struggle and constant 
negotiation of an American national identity. 
Most importantly, however, the Amerasian issue matters because it affected and 
continues to affect the lives of real people like Le Van Minh. The bottom-up effects of 
                                                 
894 Justin Fishel and Mike Levine, “US Officials Admit Concern Over Syrian Refugee Effort,” ABC News, February 12, 2015, 
accessed March 24, 2015, http://abcnews.go.com/International/officials-fear-syrian-refugees-pose-threat-us/story?id=28930114. 
895  Ibid., Chairman of the Homeland Security Committee Mike McCaul (R-TX) stated that it was a mistake for the US to allow 
refugees from Syria to enter the United States.  
896 Elizabeth Kennedy, “No Childhood Here: Whey Central American Children Are Fleeing Their Homes,” Perspectives, (July 2014); 
A 20..report found that the majority of DREAMers are Mexican although significant numbers are non-Mexican and come from all 
over the world. Most are fifiteen-years or older and therefore qualify for the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) 
Initiative which provides a two-year reprieve from deportation. “Who and Where the Dreamers Are,” American Immigration Council, 
August 8, 2012, accessed March 24, 2015, http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/who-and-where-dreamers-are. 
  233 
policies imposed from above are powerful and real. Our increasingly transnational world 
has facilitated new freedom and movement both physical and ideological, breaking down 
preexisting geographic borders and conceptual boundaries that have served to 
differentiate and categorize groups of people. In the process, policymakers will continue 
to question membership and belonging, reconsidering and reconstituting the role of race 
and gender in determining who is and who is not an American.  
Broader Implications of Intent 
Penero Miller was born out of wedlock in the Philippines in 1970. Miller was the 
daughter of a Filipina mother, Luz Penero, and an American father, Charlie Miller, a 
twenty-three year old US servicemen stationed in the Philippines. Miller’s relationship 
with Penero resulted in the birth of their child.
897
 Charlie did not marry the pregnant Luz, 
was not present at Lorelyn’s birth, nor did he ever return to claim or care for his child. 
Rather, as was typical of many American servicemen, “when his affair and his tour of 
duty ended,” Charlie “returned to America, leaving Lorelyn to be raised in the 
Philippines by her mother,” fatherless and illegitimate.898  
Twenty-one years later, Lorelyn Miller applied for US citizenship, claiming that 
because her father was an American citizen, she was too. However, because Charlie and 
Luz had not married and he had never claimed his daughter, therefore legitimating 
paternity, Lorelyn had no evidentiary proof that her father was indeed an American so the 
State Department rejected her claim. Not easily discouraged, Lorelyn found Charlie in 
Texas and convinced him to legally acknowledge her as his child. Charlie did and a 
                                                 
897 Jeffrey Rosen, “America in Thick and Thin,” New Republic, January 5, 1998, accessed February 1, 2015, 
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/america-thick-and-thin. 
898 Ibid. 
  234 
Texas court quickly approved his petition for paternity officially recognizing him as 
Lorelyn’s father.  
Now with evidentiary proof of paternity, Lorelyn again applied for citizenship. 
Once more, the State Department rejected her claim, this time on the grounds that she did 
not meet the requirement of majority established by the 1952 Immigration and 
Nationality Act. According to the law, legitimation of paternity for children born abroad 
out of wedlock to American fathers had to occur before the child’s eighteenth birthday.899  
Accordingly, at twenty-one years old, Lorelyn was simply too old and her claims of 
paternity invalid.  Therefore, she was not a US citizen.  
Still Lorelyn persisted, challenging the decision in front of the US Supreme Court 
in the 1998 case of Miller v. Albright in which the highest court in the land also ruled 
against her claim.
900
 The ruling was one of many citizen transmission cases brought 
before the Supreme Court since the 1977 case of Fiallo v. Bell that challenged the 
apparent sex-based discrimination embedded in US jus-sanguini citizenship law that 
awarded citizenship to illegitimate children born abroad to American mothers, but denied 
it to those of American fathers.
901
 In each case, the court maintained that “‘the different 
treatment of mothers and fathers of out-of-wedlock children was justified since the two 
parents are not ‘similarly situated.’”902  
In its opinion, the Court insinuated that the act of birth itself determined the 
biological difference between mothers and fathers for the purpose of transmitting 
                                                 
899 The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Public Law 414, 66 Stat. 163, (enacted June 27, 1952). 
900 The question for the court was whether 9 U.S.C. Section 1409—establishing upon birth the US citizenship of illegitimate foreign-
born children whose mothers only are citizens but failing to do the same if only their fathers are US citizens—violated the Fifth 
Amendment’s equal protection guarantees. The Court ruled that it did not. "MILLER v. ALBRIGHT," The Oyez Project at IIT 
Chicago-Kent College of Law, accessed March 10, 2015,http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_1060. 
901 Additional Supreme Court cases include Fiallo v. Bell (1977), Nguyen v. INS (2000), and Flores-Villar v. United States (2010). 
902 ProCon.org. "Miller v. Albright, Secretary of State," ProCon.org. Last modified on December 30, 2009, accessed February 12, 
2015, http://aclu.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=002338. 
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citizenship.
903
 While unwed mothers had the benefit of birth as evidence of biological and 
therefore legal filiation with their children, unwed fathers never would. Thus, the court 
assumed an absence, outside of marriage, of biological or legal filiation between fathers 
and children.
 904
   
Critical to such an assumption remained expectations of questionable claims of 
paternity by mothers and the insinuation of promiscuity—“‘she may not know’ who is 
the father of her child,’” and “‘two or more men may claim paternity of the same 
child’”— and the inability of fathers to understand the consequences of their sexual acts, 
to count, or even remember with whom they had slept.
905
 According to the Court, in the 
“normal interval of nine months between conception and birth,” the fact that the 
“unmarried father may not even know his child exists, and the child may not know the 
father’s identity,” justified the sex-based distinction.906 Thus within the reasoning of the 
court, fathers only came to the realization of conception, gestation, childbirth and 
memory and mothers only aspired to tell the truth regarding paternity, through the 
institution of marriage.   
However the Courts’ ruling in the Miller case to uphold the gendered sex-based 
distinction within US law regarding the transmission of citizenship becomes more 
problematic when placed in the context of Miller’s conception. Lorelyn was an 
Amerasian. The relationship between her parents occurred because the US military 
                                                 
903 Antognini “From Citizenship to Custody,” 432. 
904 Since father’s will never have the benefit of birth, US law allows unwed fathers to legitimate their child and claim paternity by 
satisfying four requirements to confer birth-right citizenship: 1) blood relationship, 2) the father was a citizen at the time of birth, 3) a 
written agreement to provide financial support until the age of majority (18), 4) until the age of 18, the person is A) legitimized under 
the law of his/her residence or domicile and the father B) father gives written acknowledgment of paternity under oath, C) paternity 
established by competent court. ProCon.org. "Miller v. Albright, Secretary of State," ProCon.org. Last modified on December 30, 
2009, accessed February 12, 2015, http://aclu.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=002338. 
905 Fiallo Appellees Brief, supra 49, 24. 
906 The Supreme Court’s Decision was 6-3, Justices Rehnquist, Steven, O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas ruling of Albright and 
Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer against. "MILLER v. ALBRIGHT," The Oyez Project at IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 
accessed March 10, 2015,http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_1060. 
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stationed Charlie in the Philippines as part of his military obligation. Their relationship 
mirrored those of thousands of Asian women and US servicemen that had occurred for a 
century in Southeast Asia. 
Lorelyn’s plea for paternal legitimacy and US citizenship was no different from 
those Amerasians who preceded her, including those from Vietnam, and neither was the 
failure of the US government to grant her citizenship. To do so would have required the 
Court to overturn the sex-based distinction in jus-sanguini citizenship and immigration 
law and to officially recognize the biological and legal filiation between illegitimate 
children and their fathers. Such an act would dramatically affect foreign US military 
actions. US servicemen would be accountable for the consequences of their sexual acts, 
the United States forced to admit legal responsibility for a population of illegitimate 
children that it helped create, and policymakers would have less control over the 
reproduction of citizens and therefore the membership of the nation.  
The ruling in Lorelyn’s case was even more problematic when placed within the 
context of America’s long military presence in the Philippines and current US foreign 
affairs.
907
 Between 1898 and 1991, thousands of American men and American dollars 
had inhabited the islands in the two largest American military installations outside of the 
United States, Subic Bay Naval Base near Olongapo City and Clark Air Force Base in 
Angeles City.
908
 During the Vietnam War, US forces launched B-52 bombing flights 
                                                 
907 After the US victory over Spain in 1898, Spain ceded its colonies to the United States in the Treaty of Paris. The US established 
twenty-three military base sites, Joseph M. Ahern, “Out of Sight, Out of Mind: United States Immigration Law and Policy as Applied 
to Filipino-Amerasians,” Pacific Rim Law & Policy Association, 1992, 106. 
908 The 1947 Military Base Agreement gave the United States a ninety-nine year contract for military bases at two of those original 
sites on the island of Luzon, Subic Bay and Clark Air Base. In 1959 the Bohlen-Serrano Agreement revised the terms to twenty-five 
years, terminating on September 16, 1991. Joseph M. Ahern, “Out of Sight, Out of Mind: United States Immigration Law and Policy 
as Applied to Filipino-Amerasians,” Pacific Rim Law & Policy Association 1, no. 1, (1992): 106; Maria Teresa M. Lim, “Removal 
Provisions of the Philippine-United States Military Bases Agreement: Can the United States Take it All,” Loyola of Los Angeles Law 
Review, 20 (1987): 421. 
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from Clark Air Force Base.
909
 The bases were critical to the Philippine economy. By 
1988, they accounted for four-percent of the Gross Domestic Product and employed over 
46,000 Filipinos, the majority in base-related jobs.
910
  
Many Filipina women labored on the bases as cooks, maids, laundresses and in 
the base towns, in the bars, clubs and massage parlors of the massive entertainment 
industry.
911
 As in Vietnam, relationships and sexual encounters both willing and 
unwilling often occurred in these militarized spaces.
912
 Frequently accompanying the 
economic opportunity for women in the base towns were hopes of love and marriage with 
an American serviceman. Many of the women who came to the towns from small rural 
villages with limited skills, education or money found their dreams of love and marriage 
tainted by the only job available to them, prostitution.
913
 By 1990, there were an 
estimated 6,000 licensed “entertainment women” or “bar girls,” and 14,000 unlicensed 
streetwalkers working in and around the 500 go-go bars, massage parlors and short-term 
hotels in Olongapo, ten-percent reportedly owned by retired US servicemen.
914
 Some 
Filipino locals viewed prostitution as a necessary evil that protected decent and 
                                                 
909 Ahern, “Out of Sight, Out of Mind,” 106. 
910 Ibid; Desmond Ball, ed., US Bases in the Philippines: Issues and Implications (Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Research 
School of Pacific Studies, The Australian National University, 1988). Ahern reports that by 1988 the US government expended 
approximately $350 million per year on direct military support in the Philippines, and US service personnel approximately $100 
million annually in the Philippine economy. Additionally, according to Desmond Bell, base-related jobs composed 80%  in Angeles 
city, and produced 98% of Olongapo’s gross revenues.  
911 For further study of the relationship between the US military, prostitution and sexual violence in the Philippines see Sandra 
Sturdevant and Brenda Stoltzfus, Let the Good Times Roll: Prostitution and the U.S. Military in Asia (New York: The New Press, 
1993) and David Pivar, “The Military, Prostitution, and Colonial Peoples: India and the Philippines, 1885-1917,” The Journal of Sex 
Research, Vol 17, No. 3, (Aug., 1981): 256-269. 
912 Rape was a constant issue in the entertainment areas. Between 1981 and 1990, US servicemen faced 105 charges of rape, 
lasciviousness and seduction, 15 of those cases involved children under the age of sixteen. All of the cases but one were dismissed. 
Chief Petty Officer Daniel F. Dougherty was convicted in 1982 on multiple sex offenses against Filipina girls ages 12 and 14, and 
sentenced to 20 years hard labor in a military prison. Susan Marquez Owen, “Men and Women of ‘Sin City,’” San Francisco 
Chronicle, August 5, 1990.  For further information on militarism, sex and rape and military endorsed prostitution as a component of 
national security see: Enloe, Maneuvers; Shegematsu and Camacho, Militarized Currents; Moon, Sex Among Allies; Brownmiller, 
Against our Will; Hohn and Moon, Over There; and Jin-Kyung Lee, Service Economies. 
913 Susan Marquez Owen, “Men and Women of ‘Sin City,’” San Francisco Chronicle, August 5, 1990. 
914 According to Enloe, because “prostitution” was illegal in the Philippines, women in the entertainment industry received licenses 
under “other” named occupations like “hostesses.” In 1976 for example, Olongapo had 6,019 registered as “hostesses.” Enloe, 
Maneuvers, 74; Susan Marquez Owen, “Men and Women of ‘Sin City,’” San Francisco Chronicle, August 5, 1990. 
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respectable Filipina women from sexual violence and rape by providing “an outlet for the 
soldier’s sexual urge and at the same time make money out of it.”915 
However, prostitution often resulted in pregnancy. As in Vietnam, by the time US 
military forces left the Philippines in 1991, shutting down both Subic Bay and Clark, an 
estimated 50,000 illegitimate Amerasians remained.
916
 Unlike the Amerasians from 
Vietnam, Korea, Thailand, Laos and Cambodia, those born in the Philippines had no 
recourse through the AIA or the AHA. Both pieces of legislation excluded the 
Philippines. One argument for the exclusion was that Amerasians faced less 
discrimination in the Philippines as compared to other countries.
917
 Another, and more 
politically viable, was that policymakers feared the massive influx of Amerasians that 
would occur had the legislation included the Philippines.
918
  
In either case, the large Amerasian presence in the Philippines even ten-years 
after the implementation of the AIA reflected the consequences of legislation that failed 
to address the root cause of the Amerasian “problem.” Clearly, the legislation never 
intended to deter American men from abandoning illegitimate children in Asia but rather 
to fulfill a humanitarian need and perhaps to appease the residual of guilt left over from 
the Vietnam War.  Neither of these factors existed in the Philippines and policymakers 
                                                 
915 Because prostitution was illegal, local government officials, businessmen and the US Navy collaborated to hide the industry. In 
Olangapo, prostitutes were officially registered as “hostesses.” By 1976 Olongapo registered 6,019 women in this category. Enloe, 
Manuevers, 73. 
916 As in Vietnam, accurate accounting of Amerasians in the Philippine is difficult. Ahern bases his estimation on numbers reported by 
the Pearl S. Buck Foundation accounting per the Philippine census and those reported by Sheila Tefft, “America’s Troubled Legacy in 
the Philippines,” Christian Science Monitor, December 31, 1991. Ahern, “Out of Sight, Out of Mind,” 107. 
917 This argument is indefensible considering the Amerasians in the Philippines faced discrimination for similar reason as those in 
Vietnam—militarized conception, racism, interracial mixtures, and illegitimacy. In addition, the large Catholic influence in the 
Philippines was critical of illegitimacy. P.C Kutschera and Mary Grace Talamera-Sandico, “Somatic Illness and Psychosocial Risk 
Among Military Amerasian Adolecents and Young Adults in Luzon, the Philippines,” Asia Pacific Journal of Social Work and 
Development 23, No. 3 (October 2013): 183-197; S.L Bachman, “U.S. Sailors’ Forgotten Children,” Chicago Tribune, March 27, 
1993. 
918 An earlier draft of the AIA did include both the Philippines and Japan however the final version omitted them. There is no clear 
justification in the Congressional Record for the exclusion. SB 1698, Hearing; Ahern, “Out of Sight, Out of Mind,” 116. 
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ignored the same sense of responsibility expressed in the inclusionary discourse that 
surrounded the Amerasians of Vietnam to the Philippines.  
Thus, the recent signing in 2014 by US President Barack Obama and Philippine 
President Benigno Aquino of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), 
which will return American troops to the Philippines, becomes problematic.
919
 While 
Americans view the EDCA as helping contain Chinese influence across Asia, and the 
Filipinos welcome it as an opportunity to modernize its own military defense and to profit 
once again from the presence of US troops and US dollars, those who oppose the return 
of US forces remember the human consequences—the rape, violence, and the illegitimate 
children that accompany large numbers of American servicemen.
920
  
Some of the most vocal critics are the estimated 52,000 Amerasians still living in 
the Philippines; the majority now adults with families of their own. In 2012, a study by 
the Philippine Amerasian Research Institute in Angeles City reported that, even in 
adulthood, the Amerasians were “a severely socioeconomically impaired population,” 
who contend with “serious physical and mental stress issues, including homelessness, 
alcohol and drug abuse.”921 Many worry that without legislation by either country, the 
return of American troops will again result in the creation of more Amerasians, 
                                                 
919 The signing of the EDCA occurred in April 2014. The agreement is a modern version of the 1947 Mutual Defense Treaty and 
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both the United States and the Philippines, “share an understanding for the United States not to establish a permanent military 
presence or base in the territory of the Philippines,” and any US presence must occur by “invitation of the Philippines and with full 
respect for the Philippines Constitution and Philippine laws.” Carl Thayer, “Analyzing the US-Philippines Enhanced Defense 
Cooperation Agreement,” The Diplomat, May 2, 2014. The country grants American troops, ships, and planes access on a rotational 
basis as the Philippine Constitution prohibits the establishment of permanent bases. Aileen S.P. Baviera, “Implications of the US-
Philippine Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement,” Asia Pacific Bulletin, no. 262  (May 9, 2014), accessed, February 15, 2015, 
EastWestCenter.org/APB, http://www.eastwestcenter.org/sites/default/files/private/apb262.pdf. 
920 Although the opposition to the EDCA is small among Filipinos, concerns about the bad behavior of US servicemen specifically 
against women are evident. Seth Robson, “US Military’s Return to the Philippines Sparks Economic Hopes,” Stars and Stripes, 
August 21, 2014. 
921 The study also found that the black Amerasians, as in Vietnam, had a higher incidence of physical and mental issues. P.C 
Kutschera and Talamera-Sandico, “Somatic Illness and Psychosocial Risk,” 183-197. 
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compounding already existing problems of fatherlessness, poverty, and unemployment.
922
 
Twenty-seven year old black Amerasian Jennifer Stephens summarizes the concern of 
many, “‘I am not against US troops – I just think the Philippine government should come 
up with an agreement that they have to be responsible for what they are doing.’”923  
Stephen’s request seems reasonable specifically considering that in 1993 the 
Filipina mothers of 8,600 Amerasian children in Olongapo filed a class-action lawsuit 
against the US government for child support.
924
 The plaintiffs in Acebedo v. United States 
claimed a “breach of contract” for medical services and educational benefits between the 
US Navy and the plaintiffs and their children.
925
 The Navy, they argued, had created the 
contract by fostering and promoting prostitution in Olongapo, an area the Navy officially 
designated as a center of rest and recreation for US servicemen. The Navy also supplied, 
funded and operated a medical and education clinic, the Social Hygiene Center, to ensure 
that female “entertainers” were “registered and regulated.”926 Since the Navy had created 
the environment and the conditions for conception, the plaintiffs claimed, it was therefore 
responsible for caring for them. 
The attorney for the plaintiffs, Joe Cochett, a former Special Forces paratrooper 
and retired colonel for the US Army Reserves, likened national responsibility of the 
United States to take care of the Amerasians to other aspects of US military presence 
abroad, “’If one of our tanks runs over a crop in Germany, we pay for that crop. If one of 
our military vehicles in Italy or wherever we may have a camp, injures a civilian, we pay 
                                                 
922 “The Philippines’ Forgotten Generation,’” BBC News Asia, May 20, 2014, accessed January 23, 2015, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-27379710. 
923 Sunshine Lichauco de Leon, “Filipino Fathered by US Soldiers Fight for Justice,” The Guardian, December 31, 2012. 
924 S.L Bachman, “U.S. Sailors’ Forgotten Children,” Chicago Tribune, March 27, 1993. 
925 Maria B. Montes, “US Recognition of its Obligation to Filipino Amerasian Children Under International Law,” The Hastings Law 
Journal, (July 1, 1995): 1621-1967. 
926 Ibid.; S.L Bachman, “U.S. Sailors’ Forgotten Children,” Chicago Tribune, March 27, 1993. 
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damages to that country’s citizenry.”927 In this case, the United States has created 
children, Cochett implied, and so it too must pay for them. 
However, the Federal Court of Claims disagreed, ruling that the suit did not meet 
the requisite elements of a legal contract and that a resolution to the Amerasian issue lay 
with Congress, not the courts.
928
 Congress pointed back to US immigration and 
citizenship law and the sex-based distinction upheld by Fiallo v. Bell.  No legal 
assumption of biological or legal filiation existed between the Amerasians and their 
alleged fathers, thus no legal responsibility lay with the US Navy. In their vocal 
opposition to the claims of the Filipina mothers, some US military officials and 
servicemen reverted to arguments used a decade earlier to oppose assertions of national 
paternal responsibility for the Amerasians of Vietnam: “American taxpayers are not 
responsible for foreigners conceived by consenting adults,” and “the children may have 
been fathered by foreigners who were not Americans,” and of course, accusations that the 
women “tried to get pregnant in the hope of marrying or moving to the United States.”929  
Such statements and the ruling of the Court reflected a legacy of irresponsibility 
regarding the actions of American servicemen abroad and a determination to legally 
absolve assertions of natural paternal filiation between children and fathers. The 
exclusion of the Philippines from the AIA and the AHA, although troubling in its own 
right, occurred because of the sex-based distinction in US law that protects American 
servicemen from the paternal responsibilities. Thus, as American forces prepare to 
reenter the Philippines under the EDCA, absent is any discussion of how to prevent the 
                                                 
927 S.L Bachman, “U.S. Sailors’ Forgotten Children,” Chicago Tribune, March 27, 1993. 
928 Montes, “US Recognition of its Obligation to Filipino Amerasian Children Under International Law,” 1621-1967. 
929 Bruce Lambert, “Abandoned Filipinos Sue US Over Child Support,” New York Times, June 21, 1993. 
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future creation of a large and illegitimate population of Amerasian children. The silence 
on the issue speaks volumes and the rulings in Acebedo v. United States, Miller v. 
Albright, the numerous legislative proposals for citizenship for the Amerasians since the 
AHA, and most currently, the failure of American leaders to address the issue as the 
American forces return to the Philippines reflects the absence of real change. 
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